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ABSTRACT 
 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa are often held responsible when their institutions 
fail to deliver good quality care and are associated with poor health outcomes. Negative 
perceptions prevail and particularly in the National Department of Health it is held that the 
CEOs are generally not adequately qualified, inexperienced, incompetent and often 
inappropriately appointed. This study attempts to articulate the CEOs views (their side of 
the story) and in particular how they perceive the challenges that they face and what 
solutions they proffer in improving the running of their institutions.  This research is viewed 
through the lens of the New Public Management paradigm (NPM), in terms of Public Sector 
Reform and in particular Health Sector Reform in South Africa. 
 
Thirty CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa responded to a survey of their opinions. The 
majority (86%) of them felt they were unable to manage their institutions effectively. A 
subsequent qualitative study of CEOs and experts in public management using in depth 
interviews and further focus group discussions with CEOs and senior hospital managers 
revealed that the major challenges that the CEOs faced were financial, human resources and 
operational management issues. Procurement and information challenges were linked to 
financial and human resources deficiencies, lack of accountability mechanisms and the 
presence of corruption. The Performance Management System currently in place did not 
work appropriately and was driven by perverse incentives. Political interference was also a 
pervasive problem. 
 
Their recommendations were that they needed clear and unambiguous delegations and the 
appropriate resources so that they can take full responsibility of their institutions. Clear 
accountability structures were paramount in achieving better health service management 
and care according to the advice of experts in public management as well as that of senior 
hospital managers. This requires the creation of enabling legislation and an appropriate 
accountability framework. The blanket application of NPM principles is also questioned. 
Selective application of the tools of NPM should be tested and consideration be given to the 
dimension of added public value in the South African public hospital context. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
A brief background is given to understand the context of the study in terms of health sector 
and public sector transformation in South Africa. The Research Problem is presented which 
largely revolves around the challenges that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) face in public 
hospitals in South Africa and a method to understand these from the CEOs perspective. The 
knowledge gap, context of the study, the purpose statement, the research question and 
justification of the study is expanded upon in this introductory chapter. 
 
Health Sector Reform (HSR) was a particularly challenging one for the new government of 
the Republic of South Africa. Its effective transformation into one new non-segregated 
health system after the first democratic elections in 1994, was largely a political triumph for 
the post-apartheid ANC led government. However, the government’s inability to manage 
the various challenges posed by the introduction of its health plan such as a district based 
Primary Health Care system as the basis of its health care system, its attempts at 
modernisation of hospital management by the introduction of  a new cadre of managers, 
including hospital CEOs, and its weak commitment to decentralisation is largely blamed for 
its inability to deal with the high mortality it faces, the quadruple burden of disease(the 
term describing the top four causes of DALY’s in South Africa), poor health outcomes 
measured, and a perpetuation of a hospicentric model of health care, often with substantial 
political meddling (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, Sanders & McIntyre, 2009). This inability 
manifested itself in particular at all levels of health care management but is substantially 
more prevalent at senior levels of health care management and especially amongst CEOs of 
Public Hospitals in their inability to manage effectively (Harrison, 2009).  
 
The unequal application of the New Public Management principles across the public sector 
post 1994 also makes for incoherent policies and poor implementation particularly in the 
public health sector (Cameron, 2009). Reversals on earlier policies of decentralisation of 
public hospital management have also contributed further to this (DBSA, 2010). 
Furthermore, there has been little regard to the international recommendations by the 
WHO as articulated in its “Making Health Systems Work” policy papers or that of its World 
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Health Review recommendations so that by the end of 2009 the South African Health 
System was in a worse state than it was in 1994 just based on its health outcome indicators 
(Harrison, 2009 and WHO, 2008). However in acknowledging the deficits within the current 
health system the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi in 2011 announced a new 
strategic policy and plan for the next few years to rebuild the national health system based 
on a specified service delivery contract with clear health outcomes as deliverables (South 
Africa, 2010a and South Africa, 2010b). Within this plan he identifies the capacity building 
and empowerment of CEOs of public hospitals as important to his plan’s success. The 
strategic policy has culminated in the publication of three pieces of draft legislation, two   as 
regards a National Health Insurance (South Africa, 2011a and South Africa,2015) and a 
second on hospitals called a Policy on the Management of Hospitals (South Africa, 2012).  
 
Also, a new Human Resources for Health Plan was adopted in 2011 dealing quite 
comprehensively with the HR capacity development issues (South Africa, 2011c). 
Furthermore the Green Paper on the Policy on the Management of Hospitals was published 
in March, 2012, and creates a defining legal framework to address the recruitment and 
expectations of CEOs of public hospital and hospital board members as well as the 
categorisation of hospitals (South Africa, 2012). The policy is in line with the Minister’s 10 
point plan which aims to reorganise the health system and improve the management of 
hospitals and in particular addresses the challenges that hamper the effective and efficient 
delivery of services. Some of these problems relate to the lack of enabling policies and 
legislation, as well as capacity constraints related to the CEOs of hospitals themselves. This 
is a landmark policy on the management of hospitals which further supports the rationale of 
the research in that it also looks at the efficient functioning of CEOs of public hospitals and is 
an important document informing the legal context of this study. Thus this research which 
proposes to assess CEOs views on their ability to perform adequately and deliver quality 
health care in the context of current reform policies is more than appropriate and extremely 
timely.  
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1.1. Introduction to the Research Problem  
 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa face huge challenges in managing their hospitals 
(Bateman, 2011 and Harrison, 2010). The main challenges they face according to Bateman 
and Harrison are linked to their inability to make management decisions as regards strategic 
planning, financial management and to a lesser degree on operational management issues 
such as supply chain management and equipment maintenance. These failures according to 
the authors are largely attributed to a lack of appropriate managerial delegation, poor 
performance management systems, and unclear lines of responsibility and accountability.  
 
With the introduction of CEOs to replace the previous hospital superintendents and to 
manage hospitals in the public sector (South Africa, 1996) there has been a move away from 
the old, traditional public administration approach to a more business-like approach that 
has been adopted by government. This new management paradigm is described as the New 
Public Management (NPM) and it has emerged in the public administration of most 
developed western countries beginning in the late 1970s and in some developing countries 
later in the 1990s (Lynn, 2006). However it was partially adopted by the new regime in 
South Africa following its democratic transition (Cameron, 2009).  
 
An opportunity has now arisen since 2012 going forward to revisit this issue of the roles and 
responsibilities of CEOs of public hospitals with the articulation of a new strategic direction 
taken by the National Department of Health under the Minister Dr Aaron Motsoaledi. This 
opportunity is also addressed in the Minister’s Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement 
(NSDA) and the National Department of Health’s Strategic Plan for 2010/2011- 2012/2013 
(South Africa, 2010a; South Africa 2010b) in terms of improving the quality of health 
services as a national priority. More recently a legislative framework has been created that 
also addresses this issue regarding the management of hospitals, viz. The Policy on National 
Health Insurance (South Africa, 2011a and South Africa, 2015) and the Policy on the 
Management of Hospitals (South Africa, 2012). The problem statement that has been 
identified is that CEOs in public hospitals in South Africa find it challenging to manage their 
hospitals effectively and this is elaborated upon further below. 
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1.1.1. The problem statement  
 
In the South African Medical Journal (Bateman, 2011, p. 152) Chris Bateman makes 
reference to the inability of CEOs of the largest tertiary hospitals in Johannesburg to make 
timely purchasing and maintenance decisions to ensure appropriate health care delivery:  
 
Austerity measures at ‘head office’ put a R25 000 ceiling on autonomous tertiary 
hospital equipment procurement. Fulfilling the hospital’s core mission and 
containing costs this way (resulting in longer patient stays) seems absurd, even given 
the endemic corruption and mismanagement in Gauteng’s Health Department  
(currently unable to account for R19 billion). (Bateman, 2011, p. 152-156). 
 
 This has been highlighted again in 2012 where in the national press a special two page lead 
called “INSIDE A SICK SYSTEM” which had headlines such as: “State healthcare in crisis”, and 
“Public hospitals in Gauteng sick and tired” (Sunday Times, 2012). This is a national problem 
according to the press and again highlighted the need to explore this important topic of 
CEOs in public hospitals and their alleged inability to manage properly.  This research 
problem has been informed by the New Public Management paradigm which argues the 
case for using private sector managerial principles which focuses on effective management 
and realisable outcomes as its key performance measures and using a range of tools such as 
performance based contracting (Besosa, 2007). Management effectiveness is further 
defined by Mitch McCrimmon (2007) as that which entails efficiency, getting things done 
with least cost, and achieving set targets whilst making use of all relevant resources. 
However, there has been a dearth of research done on the management effectiveness of 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa and in particular on their views on their ability to 
manage effectively (DBSA, 2010). 
 
1.1.2. The knowledge gap 
 
Although research has been published on the poor health outcomes in South Africa 
(Coovadia, et.al, 2009 and Huddle, 2011) very little is known about the managerial 
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constraints faced by the health service managers and in particular that of the CEOs of public 
hospitals in South Africa and their impact on their ability to manage effectively. This also has 
not been elaborated upon in the context of NPM reforms adopted by South Africa post 
1994.The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) has also tried to describe the 
requirements for an ideal type of hospital CEO but their reports give no in-depth insights 
into the challenges that CEOs of public hospitals face in managing effectively or how they 
can perform optimally (DBSA, 2010). This is attributed largely to a lack of competencies, 
qualifications and experience according to DBSA whilst other authors such as Bateman 
(2011) and Harrison (2010) attribute this to a lack of delegation and unclear lines of 
responsibility and accountability. The recent legislation on the management of hospitals 
(South Africa, 2012) identifies the lack of enabling legislation as well as capacity constraints 
which includes questions about  the competencies of hospital CEOs, their lack of training, 
lack of strategic support and inadequate capacity to deal with operational issues as key to 
improving the management of hospitals (South Africa, 2012).  However, this legislation fails 
to address the question as to how CEOs of public hospitals view the challenges they face in 
managing their hospitals effectively and what can be done to improve this. The views of 
other important players in this regard have also not been articulated before. This problem is 
viewed critically within the context of Health Sector Reform (HSR) in South Africa over the 
last two decades. 
 
1.1.3. The context of the study 
 
There is a pressing need to address the competencies, efficiencies and effectiveness of CEOs 
of public hospitals according to the Minister of Health and he raises this issue in his 10 point 
plan and Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement (South Africa, 2010a). He argues that the 
CEOs have been inappropriately employed and haven’t the requisite competencies. The 
Minister then proffered the following solution when unveiling his 10 point plan specifically 
as it affects the CEOs of public hospitals. In particular, the finalisation of delegations for all 
health service managers at all levels of the public health system and in particular for hospital 
managers so as to ensure decentralisation of management. The plan also makes reference 
to an evaluation of all CEOs of hospitals so as to determine whether they meet the 
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minimum requirements for effective management of their hospitals and institute corrective 
measures if they do not. He argues that the new National Policy on the Management of 
Hospitals creates the enabling legal framework to implement these plans (South Africa, 
2012). This policy’s objective is to ensure that an enabling framework for the management 
of hospitals is to be supported by New Public Management Paradigm (NPM) principles of 
effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. The Minister wishes to hold the CEOs 
accountable through the Hospital Improvement Plan and the establishment of the Office of 
Health Standards and Compliance as articulated in the National Strategic Plan (South Africa, 
2010b) as well as the Green Paper on the National Health Insurance (South Africa, 2011a). 
This research explores the challenges facing CEOs in managing public hospitals in the 
context of this current Health Sector Reforms. 
 
1.1.4. The Purpose Statement 
 
The main purpose of the research was to explore the managerial challenges facing CEOs in 
public hospitals in South Africa in the context of current health sector reform in South 
Africa. The views of CEOs of public hospitals of the challenges they face in managing 
effectively was sought. This was complimented by the views of public management experts 
as well as that of senior hospital managers which was sought in this regard. The views of the 
public management experts was to give a top down view and the senior hospital managers 
were to give a bottom up view of these challenges. The purpose of the research was also to 
investigate the transformation of the public health system of South Africa since 1994, with a 
focus on the evolution of policies as it affects the CEOs of public hospitals ability to manage 
effectively. The dominant model in understanding this evolution was the New Public 
Management paradigm as it largely informed public sector reform in South Africa post 1994 
(South Africa, 1997) as well as the current international dialogue on health systems 
improvement that relate to effective management in the public health sector (WHO, 2008). 
The findings of the research are presented, analysed, interpreted and discussed in this 
research report. The research then recommends a set of proposals to improve the current 
situation as regards overcoming obstacles to effective public hospital management.  
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1.1.5. Hypothesis 
 
The adoption of the NPM managerialism in the public sector has not worked as anticipated 
and in particular as to the effective functioning of CEOs of public hospitals and this is largely 
due to a lack of delegations. 
 
1.1.6. The Research Questions 
 
1. The primary objective of the research was to understand the management challenges 
faced by CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa for the period 1994 to 2015. 
2. The secondary research question is how has Public Sector and Health Sector Reform 
policies in the light of NPM principles defined the managerial roles of CEOs in public 
hospitals in South Africa since 1994? 
3. Finally recommendations as to possible solutions were sought from all the participants in 
terms of how to improve the management of public hospitals in South Africa. 
 
1.1.7. Justification for the study 
 
Although South Africa has had a decade of transformation in the public sector as a whole 
and in particular in relation to health sector reform, the challenges facing the government 
have increased and its health outcome measures have in fact fallen since 1994 (Harrison, 
2009). The initial reforms proposed for public hospitals were largely ineffectual and CEOs in 
public hospitals were also often unable to manage effectively leading to a declining quality 
of care in public hospitals (Bateman, 2011, p 152-156 and Harrison, 2010,p 6-9). However, a 
new resolve by government to deal with managerial inefficiencies and poor performance  in 
the health sector over the last decade has resulted in a number of new policies that intends 
to reshape the public health landscape quite dramatically through the creation of a National 
Health Insurance (South Africa, 2011a) and in particular the new policies on hospital 
management (South Africa, 2012) which directly impacts on who is employed as CEOs of 
public hospitals and how they are the expected to perform.  But again there has been no 
attempt by government or research bodies to understand the situation from a CEOs 
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perspective and this is what this research is aiming to do. The research wants to understand 
the CEOs viewpoint of these challenges and have them articulate their story. A top down 
view from public management experts as well as a bottom up view of senior hospital 
mangers was also sought so as to validate or refute the claims of the CEOs. 
 
1.2. Summary of Chapters 
 
Chapter One: 
This introductory chapter describes the background and context for the study on the 
management challenges being faced by the health care system in South Africa since 
democracy. It highlights in particular the challenges faced by CEOs in public hospitals and 
argues the case for studying the problems CEOs face from their perspective. The knowledge 
gap clearly identifies this: the story from the CEOs perspective is missing from the discourse 
on public health services management in this country.  The research questions as well as the 
significance and justification for the study in the current context of dynamic policy change 
and restructuring of the public health system in South Africa is also presented. 
 
Chapter Two:  
The conceptual framework is placed within the New Public Management Paradigm and is 
the lens through which health sector reform in South Africa is viewed. This as part of a 
broader restructuring of the public sector generally and health sector reforms particularly 
since 1994. Its international dimensions as well its pertinence to local reform are also 
critically discussed. The review also includes an in-depth account of hospital management 
reform since then and which is still ongoing with draft legislation as recent as December 
2015 being circulated for public comment that may affect the future management of public 
hospitals in South Africa. It also expands on the NPM theoretical framework that informs 
the context of the study. 
 
Chapter Three: 
This chapter presents the methodology section and presents the research paradigm and 
research design that underlie the study. It also details the research methodology and its 
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specific use of some quantitative and mainly qualitative methods in attempting to explore 
CEOs views of the challenges they face in managing hospitals and what they recommend in 
improving their ability to do so. Furthermore, in depth interviews of experts in public 
management was done to understand the problems that CEOs raise in the broader context 
of public sector and health sector reforms. Also a focus group of discussion with senior 
hospital managers was also carried out to validate the CEOs views and explore possible 
solutions.  The data analysis and research strategy plan are also presented with a brief 
description of their limitations and ethical challenges.  
 
Chapter Four: 
In this chapter the research results obtained through quantitative and qualitative research 
methods are analysed thematically and discussed. The first section deals with the 
quantitative information obtained from the self-administered questionnaires. This is 
presented in descriptive form. Confidence limits are presented and where appropriate Chi-
square tests. Because of the small sample size in depth analytical statistical analysis could 
not be done with any certainty. The second section deals with qualitative information and 
seeks to elicit information on the views of the challenges faced by CEOs in public hospitals 
and how to resolve them. The in-depth interviews of public management experts as well as 
a focus group discussion with senior hospital managers were also analysed. The 
triangulation of these surveys, interviews and focus group discussions is further analysed. 
This discussion is done in the context of contemporary challenges and opportunities as 
viewed by the collective and in informing what they view as possible solutions. 
 
Chapter Five: 
The discussions in the preceding chapter leads to a reflection on current health sector 
reform, public sector reform, and the unfolding roles of CEOs in public hospitals through the 
lens of NPM in chapter five. It looks at the rise of NPM in South Africa, the challenges of 
decentralisation, financial public service reforms and performance management in the light 
of recent health sector reform. It locates the views of the CEOs within the current context 
and critiques their challenges as well as their recommendations in improving their situation 
in overcoming some of the impediments to better manage their hospitals. The discussion is 
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also informed by the views of the public management experts as well as that of the senior 
hospital managers. 
 
Chapter Six: 
Chapter six presents the conclusions and recommendations. The study confirms the findings 
of other authors of their assessment of the challenges facing CEOs of public hospitals in 
South Africa. These were in relation to a lack of delegations, poor performance 
management systems and unclear lines of responsibilities. The recommendation to 
government is that to make the policies on the management of public hospitals work 
requires the implementation of existing policies so that services to the public are provided 
in ways that are economical, efficient, effective, accountable, responsive and adaptable. 
This can only be done if there is enabling legislation for sufficient decentralisation and 
effective delegations as well as for appropriate performance measurement and 
accountability systems to be put in place. The uses of NPM tools are questioned and this 
research indicates that it should be used selectively appropriate to the South African 
context. Consideration should be given to international trends around viewing public service 
through a public value perspective. Further research in this regard is also recommended. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the literature review and document analysis. It is introduced by 
looking at the conceptual framework within the context of South African public sector 
reform (PSR) and health sector reform (HSR) in particular. This framework contextualises 
itself within the New Public Management paradigm and later discusses the evolution of 
NPM from an international perspective. It critiques performance management and 
accountability as important components of NPM as it is implemented in the South African 
public sector and in the health sector in particular. It also discusses the challenges faced in 
using performance management tools and the performance paradox that often creeps into 
its measurement. It then reviews the documents and literature in relation to health reforms 
in South Africa through the lens of NPM. This chapter reflects on NPM and its use in recent 
public sector reform and on other international trends as well as developing countries 
experiences. Africa in particular will be scrutinized with its experience of NPM and public 
sector reform. 
 
2.1. The Conceptual Framework 
 
The research will be viewing the local context that CEO’s of public hospitals managerial 
function as it relates to an NPM paradigm which informed public sector reform and health 
sector reform post 1994. This will be compared to the experiences of NPM in other parts of 
the world and in particular in developing countries. This is done with a view to assessing its 
effectiveness and current implementation in various settings with a view to proffer solutions 
going forward. The conceptual framework as described below is to approach the research in 
a systematic way. This done firstly by understanding the South African (local context) of 
public sector and health sector reforms since from 1994.Secondly by international trends in 
public sector reforms (PSR) including experiences in Africa. The NPM paradigm is the lens 
through which this is reviewed. 
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Figure 1. The Conceptual Framework 
 
2.2. Contextualising public hospital management in South Africa: Literature Review and 
Document Analysis 
 
A literature review and document analysis of the impact of public sector reform and of 
health sector transformation in South Africa is presented below. The functioning of CEOs in 
public hospital in the context of these reforms is done in depth next. This covers the South 
African health sector transformation from 1994 to date and looks at the challenges faced by 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa during this transformation. The inclusion criteria for 
the review was all literature and documents published, including grey literature, since 1994 
on public sector transformation and in particular on health sector reform and its use of the 
NPM paradigm in informing these reform efforts. 
 
The approach to the literature review and document analysis as regards CEOs in public 
hospitals in South Africa is specifically informed by the following areas: The South African 
Health System and its Transformation (in the context of the public sector reform locally); 
The New Public Management paradigm and its discourse internationally and nationally (as it 
informs the debates around decentralisaton, delegation, performance management and 
accountability); and the international recommendations by the WHO in informing the 
strengthening of health systems. These areas are addressed in turn in relation to whether 
CEOs of public hospitals are  to function optimally in South Africa within its current reform 
agenda.  
Local Context post 1994: 
Public Sector Reform 
Health Sector Reform 
CEO’s in public hospitals 
managerial challenges 
Local Solutions 
International context: 
Theoretical context 
Developed Countries and 
NPM 
Developing Countries and 
NPM 
NPM 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1. The South African Health System and its transformation 
 
The history of the South African health system is one of segregation, discrimination and 
fragmentation (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, Sanders & McIntyre, 2009). From the onset of 
Dutch colonisation in the 16th century and the subsequent British rule and then National 
Party rule and the consequent apartheid system there is ample evidence of inequitable 
health care provision by the state. Health services were racially segregated as far back as 
1897 according to Coovadia, et.al. (2009). The 1919 Health Act (South Africa, 1919) devolved 
hospital curative care to the four provinces (Transvaal, Natal, Cape Province and the Orange 
Free State), and preventive care to the local governments or municipalities and this act also 
further entrenched the segregation of services by race and its historic inequities. Areas not 
covered by local governments were offered state services often through mobile clinics. The 
apartheid system worsened the fragmentation of health care when it created the 
Bantustans (the Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana) each with their own health 
systems. In 1983 (South Africa, 1983) this separation was further extended with the creation 
of own affairs health services to Indians, Coloureds, Blacks (Africans) and Whites in the rest 
of the country and in what was called self-governing authorities for certain designated 
Bantu ethnic groups (Coovadia, et al., 2009). The control and funding of these various 
authorities was carefully manipulated by Pretoria (Schaay, Sanders and Kruger, 2011). There 
were huge discrepancies in the funding of these health care departments and Whites had 
access to state of the art health care services in the public sector while blacks in the 
Bantustans had poor care on the whole. The private sector also started booming in the 
1980s and they tended not to discriminate by race but on ability to pay or on access to 
health insurance. Under the apartheid government there were 14 separate health 
departments (the provincial governments, own affairs and the Bantustans having their own 
health departments). Health services under apartheid were hospicentric focusing mainly on 
curative care, with a large and growing unregulated private sector.  
 
Therefore, the health system inherited by the newly elected democratic government in 
1994 had numerous challenges and in particular the large inequalities in health care 
provision to the various race groups, between rural and urban areas and more strikingly 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
between private and public sectors. There were also inequities in the allocation of resources 
between levels of care (primary care getting the least) with over 80% of resources allocated 
to hospitals. Academic and other tertiary level hospitals accounted for 44% of total public 
sector health-care spending. Only 11% of spending was allocated to non-hospital spending. 
The latter points are extremely pertinent to this research exercise as it indicates the huge 
financial responsibilities placed on CEOs of hospitals by virtue of the resources that are 
allocated to them to manage (Coovadia, et al, 2009).  
 
The ANCs Health Plan (developed with the WHO and UNICEF), published in 1994, (ANC, 
1994) was the post-apartheid model envisaged for health system reform. It was based on a 
primary health care approach using the district health system as its implementation model. 
The new government had some notable successes and this included the consolidation of the 
14 health departments under apartheid into one national and nine provincial 
administrations. Health services were open to all (desegregated), and primary health care 
became accessible without cost to users. In terms of the new National Health Act (South 
Africa, 2004) the primary health care services (as part of the district health system) and 
hospital services were defined as provincial responsibilities. This allowed for the control of 
these health care functions to be held at the provincial head office level. The national 
department was responsible overall for health policy. 
 
Despite these achievements the ability to further implement this new vision was 
constrained by poor human resource capacity, inadequate planning and stewardship, lack of 
appropriate leadership and management, the increased demands on the public health 
system by the quadruple burden of diseases (the four main causes of morbidity and 
mortality in South Africa), and curtailed spending in the public health sector (Bongani, 
Fisher, Lalloo, Sitas, Tollman & Bradshaw, 2009).  However, David Harrison (2009, p. 1-33) in 
his discussion document: “An overview of Health and Health Care in South Africa 1994 – 
2010: Priorities, Progress and Prospects for New Gains”, describes the post-1994 public 
health sector restructuring as having accomplished significant improvements in terms of 
access, rationalisation of health services and its bureaucracy and more equitable health 
expenditure.  
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He does concede that these early gains were eroded by a sudden increased burden of 
disease mainly related to HIV/AIDS, TB, Injury and Non-Communicable Disease epidemics 
that were running concurrently. Harrison also opined that there were poor health systems 
management in place and low staff morale in some areas leading to poor quality health care 
relative to total expenditure.  
 
The Hospital Revitalisation Programme (a flagship infrastructure development programme 
of the ANC led government after 1994) was largely a capital expenditure driven project to 
improve hospital infrastructure and partially successful according to Harrison (2009). In 
relation to operational efficiency Harrison commented on the inefficiencies in the 
management of the South African public health system, reflected by the over expenditure of 
its health budget in the past financial years. He also referred to the poor differentials in the 
management of district hospitals as a case in point: the average length of stay across 
districts varied from 2.2 to 8 days, and the usable bed utilisation rate varied from 50% to 
90%. 
 
Harrison (2009, p. 32-33) makes the following recommendations in improving operational 
efficiencies by clear separation of political and management roles and responsibilities to 
enable senior health managers to focus on service management, by devolution of defined 
management responsibilities, accountability for performance, appropriate use of knowledge 
management for decision making, improved financial management, effective use of time 
and instituting efficient processes for improving the quality of care amongst others. Harrison 
contests that because of political interference there has been a  lack of devolution of clear 
management responsibilities, a lack of financial management ability, an inability to make 
informed decisions and a lack of accountability at nearly all levels of management in the 
health services. These arguments as posed by Harrison (2009) are extremely important in 
the context of this research. They emphasise that the problems related to lack of devolution 
of management responsibilities as a major impediment facing health service managers in 
the delivery of quality health care. Specifically as regards the devolution of management 
authority Harrison (2009) and Schaay, Sanders and Kruger (2011) highlights this issue as an 
urgent priority in relation to the slow institutionalisation of the district health system and 
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the lack thereof in relation to the decentralisation of staffing, budgeting and expenditure 
control to hospitals.  
The argument thus far is that despite the fragmented services inherited from the apartheid 
system great strides have been made in addressing access and the development of a new 
national health system based on the primary health care approach and one emphasising 
equity. However due to the increased burden of diseases, lack of management capacity and 
resources, as well as a lack of devolution of clear management responsibilities and lack of 
concomitant accountability, the resilience of the health system to deal with the current 
challenges was  severely compromised.  More disturbing also is that there is a decline in life 
expectancy and an increase in all causes of mortality across both males and females and 
across all races as described in the recent South African Health Review (2010). So, beginning  
since 2009 we have witnessed  the start of a regression in the overall health of South 
African’s as measured by life expectancy, mortality and morbidity patterns and this is a 
reflection of the inability of the health services to deal with these problems for well over a 
decade now (South African Health Review, 2010). It is therefore, in the light of the above 
discussion that a review of the evolution of policies which influenced the way CEOs were 
deployed during the Health Sector Reform since 1994 as well as their future roles and 
responsibilities will now be critically discussed.  
 
2.2.2. CEOs in public hospitals in post-apartheid South Africa 
 
The post-1994 era in South Africa has been characterised by a high number of new 
legislative and policy reforms. The new democratic order and the change of the apartheid 
regime also provided an opportunity for the introduction of significant Public Sector 
Reforms (PSR) in the Public Service and Health Sector Reforms (HSR) in the National Health 
System (NHS). However, HSR in South Africa has  been a protracted process that was already 
set in motion before the change of government, gained momentum since 1994 and is still 
unfolding (Van Rensburg, 2004). As part of this wider reform the National Department of 
Health (NDoH) adopted decentralisation of hospital management as a key policy in pursuit 
of a more efficient, effective, responsive and accountable public sector hospital system 
(South Africa, 1997). This was a key policy aimed at defining the functions, roles and 
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responsibilities of the new cadre of hospital managers (now called CEOs) that were taking 
over from the old hospital superintendents and hospital secretaries. The overall aim of this 
strategy was to delegate authority and decision making powers from provincial departments 
to the new cadre of hospital managers (South Africa, 1996). But this did not happen as 
anticipated and the results are described in the sequence of events that unfolded below. 
 
In 1997, the NDoH produced a White Paper on Transformation of Health Service Delivery 
(WPTHSD) (South Africa, 1997) which raised specific concerns relating to the management 
of public hospitals. These concerns related to the inefficient management of resources, 
inequitable and inaccessible services and poor management structures and systems. In 
addressing these concerns the WPTHSD proposed amongst other things the following 
principles:  the roles and functions of hospitals to be redefined so as to be coherent with the 
primary health care approach, rationalisation of hospital services, facilities, staffing and 
infrastructure investment, decentralised hospital management to ensure efficiency and cost 
effectiveness and that hospital boards be established to improve local accountability. The 
proposed decentralisation of hospital management represented a fundamental policy shift 
at that time in the decision making processes among National, Provincial health 
departments and Hospitals. Provincial health departments were to “delegate significant 
decision making powers to hospital managers, including the authority to make decisions 
relating to personnel, procurement, and financial management” (South Africa, 1997, p. 28). 
With regard to personnel administration, the WPTHSD proposed a fundamental shift from 
personnel administration to Human Resource Management, and in it indicated that, 
“authority for almost all line personnel management functions will be delegated to 
institutional level, hospital managers will decide on most appointments, performance 
appraisals, and promotions and will be responsible for disciplinary and grievance 
procedures” (South Africa, 1997, p. 18). However, this policy as regards hospital managers 
was not implemented for nearly a decade after its adoption. So although the appropriate 
recruitment of hospital managers with the necessary delegated power and authority was 
seen as a key policy imperative of the national government it never really materialised for 
nearly a decade after the white paper was published. The reluctance in its implementation 
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was always political according to most authors on the subject (Harrison, Cameron, Coovadia, 
et. al). 
 
Nearly ten years later, the President of South Africa Mr Thabo Mbeki in his State of the 
Nation Address in 2006 highlighted this lack of delegations and accountability of hospital 
managers as follows that: “To improve service delivery in our hospitals, by September this 
year we will ensure that hospital managers are delegated authority and held accountable 
for the functioning of hospitals” (South African, 2006, p. 14). It is therefore critical to reflect 
on the challenges that the process of decentralisation faced and why the authority that was 
intended to be delegated to hospital managers in managing their hospitals effectively over 
the years from the WPTHSD until now did not take place. International literature indicates 
that HSR are politically problematic and the most powerful health sector actors are often 
satisfied with the status quo and this applied to the South African experience as well 
(Glassman, Reich, Laserson and Rojas, 1999 & Collins, Omar, and Tarin, 2002). The problems 
of implementation of hospital decentralisation ranged from a lack of a determined system 
of policy formulation and implementation, political and bureaucratic opposition, to the lack 
of managerial ability and skills at the health service level (Collins et al., 2002). It is therefore 
important, firstly, to understand the decentralisation of hospital management policy process 
and, secondly, the level of authority and decision making powers that were intended to be 
delegated to hospital managers as a result of the decentralisation.  This all harkens back to 
what was named the Hospital Strategy Project (South Africa, 1996). 
 
2.2.3. The Hospital Strategy Project 
 
In 1995, The National Department of Health awarded the Hospital Strategy Project to a 
consortium made up of consultants from the Monitor Company, Health Partners 
International, and the Centre for Health Policy and representatives from the National 
Labour and Economic Development Institute (South Africa, 1996). This was a contract to 
analyse major issues and problems confronting the public hospital system at the time, as 
well as providing possible strategies to address them. On the problems facing public 
hospitals the final report noted that there was an over-centralisation of power which has led 
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to a systematic underdevelopment of management skills, particularly in areas such as 
human resources, financial and labour relations management and to an attitude of action 
after permission. The proposed policy recommendations were to implement a National 
Policy on Decentralised Hospital Management. This was in line with the prevailing 
understanding of the New Public Management principles albeit not fully adopted in the HSR 
processes (Cameron, 2009). The following were important elements of this policy: 
delegation of considerable powers over human resources, finances, procurement, and other 
important management functions to hospital management;  a change in the role of 
Provincial Health Administration from its executive and administrative line management 
role, to one in which its principal functions were to set guidelines and policy, as well as to 
provide essential support for hospital management; the establishment of democratic, 
accountable Hospital Boards as statutory bodies, with defined governance powers; 
development of effective management structures and systems and the recruitment, 
development and retention of skilled hospital managers (South Africa, 1996).  
 
The HSP further proposed the following implementation strategies (HSP, 1996): a core 
package of essential measures to be put in place by the Department of Health and Provincial 
Health Administrations, constituting the minimum necessary requirements for 
decentralisation to be effective; criteria for granting decentralised status that sets out the 
plans, systems, and capacities necessary before delegations of authority can be delegated; a 
staged timetable for implementation, with flexibility for provincial and hospital variation; 
the National Department of Health to negotiate the legislative context in which the 
decentralised policy will be implemented, and provide the necessary support to Provincial 
Departments; Provincial Departments to be ultimately responsible for implementation of 
the decentralised hospital management; and Provinces to produce detailed implementation 
plans covering, governance and accountability, general management, staffing and personnel 
management, labour relations, management capacity, systems development, management 
of clinical processes and communication strategies for its implementation. The HSP 
submitted their final report to the National Department of Health. Some members of the 
HSP served in the initial Departmental Committees such as the Hospital Coordinating and 
National Hospital Policy Committees. Nine drafts of the document, “Decentralisation of 
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Hospital Management Policy”, were produced and presented to different committees and 
stakeholders during this period. The ninth and final draft was presented to the Hospital 
Coordinating Committee (a Ministerial Steering committee overseeing the HSP) in May 
1996. There were differing views on the position of the Department with regard to this 
report, but what is clear from the local research is that any work or discussion that has since 
followed on decentralisation of hospital management is based on the HSP report. The HSP 
report was comprehensive on analysing the prevailing situation and presented practical 
strategies and solutions going forward.  Decentralisation of hospital management was to be 
implemented concurrently with the establishments of the District Health System (DHS). 
However the policy priority of the Department at that time was Primary Health Care (PHC) 
and the DHS was seen as a critical step in achieving universal health care coverage. At this 
time many proponents of DHS argued for a move away from the hospicentric health system 
to a comprehensive PHC system based on the DHS. Hence, during this period resources and 
policy focus were shifted away from hospitals to PHC. This might have seriously undermined 
the momentum on the implementation of the decentralisation of hospital management 
policy. However, several strategies were clearly defined by the HSP and the WPTHSD, and 
what was required was detailed implementation plans to forge ahead with implementation. 
Specific structures and systems were put in place to coordinate and fast track the 
implementation process. However, this did not occur and various ministerial advisory teams 
were subsequently put in place to take this process forward. 
 
2.2.4. The Inter-Departmental Task Team for Decentralisation of Hospital Management  
 
In 1997, a number of local and International Technical Assistants were appointed by the 
National Department of Health (NDoH) to assist in driving the decentralisation of hospital 
management policy process forward. An inter-departmental task team for decentralisation 
was set up to coordinate the implementation of the decentralisation of hospital 
management policy. The task team was comprised of representatives from the following 
stakeholders: The National Department of Health which held the Chair and Convenorship; 
The European Union (EU) provided Technical Assistance to the National Department of 
Health; representatives from the Department of Public Service and Administration, 
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Department of State Expenditure, Department of Finance; Universitas Hospital; 
Potchefstroom Hospital; Western Cape Health; Johannesburg Hospital and the Advisor to 
the Minister. A four stage process of decentralisation was proposed (South Africa, 2000) as 
follows: National, Provincial and Hospital preparation; Hospital application for decentralised 
status; Provincial Assessments of hospitals preparedness for decentralised status; If 
successfully assessed and the hospital met the criteria for decentralisation a charter of 
interdepartmental delegation is conferred upon the hospital and key management posts. 
The main focus areas were Corporate Performance Management Agreements; Business 
Planning; Cost Centre development; Management with audit tools; Personnel and Team 
Competency Assessments; Development Plans; and the Twinning of South African Provincial 
Hospitals with European Counterparts and in particular with French hospitals. 
 
The Inter–Departmental Task team agreed on very extensive criteria for considering 
approval for decentralisation. An audit tool was developed and piloted at the then 
Johannesburg Hospital. Some areas of the criteria included the following to be in place 
(South Africa, 2000): a defined period of in-budget service delivery; evidence of a strategic 
plan and the capacity  to implement; a business plan to include projected activity levels by 
cost centre and quality standards; monitoring and evaluation tools for the implementation 
of the business plan; the capacity to improve Human Resources Management(HRM), and a 
Human Resources Development(HRD) plan; an appropriate operational structure; 
recruitment, performance management and disciplinary procedures with the capacity to 
effect; all staff to have job descriptions; a service delivery improvement plan with indicators 
and service standards; budget and expenditure control mechanisms; Union support and the 
establishment of hospital boards amongst others. Provincial Departments were expected to 
constitute evaluation teams and use the above criteria to evaluate different hospitals for 
decentralisation. However, functions that were the responsibility of other Departments 
outside the Department of Health such as the Departments of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA), Finance and Public Works were posing serious challenges with 
delegations. For example, the DPSA is the principal Ministry for HRM functions in the Public 
Sector. A Ministerial Task Team was then set up to deal with these obstacles. 
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2.2.5 The Ministerial Task Team on Decentralisation of Hospital Management.  
 
In 1999, due to the slow progress on the implementation of the policy on decentralisation of 
hospital management a Ministerial Task Team comprising of representatives of the NDoH, 
Public and Private Hospitals representatives, Unions, and International Health experts  was 
appointed to review progress and make further recommendations. In August 1999, the 
Ministerial Task Team produced an interim report, which was presented to the newly 
formed MinMEC (a Ministerial Committee chaired by the Minister of Health and having all 
the Members of the Executive Committees of Health of all the provinces sitting as 
committee members) where it was adopted. The report made the following 
recommendations: An immediate review of the roles of National, Provincial and District 
Health Departments within a decentralised management framework, the launch of a 
communication strategy on the issue; adoption of  cost centre management in public 
hospitals; placing performance management agreements in all public hospitals; 
appointment of CEOs or General Managers in all hospitals; and these appointments to be 
based on competencies and open to competition and not confined to doctors only. In order 
to achieve this form of decentralisation, the use of corporate Performance Management 
Agreements (PMAs) was proposed. The key areas of the PMAs were business planning, 
objective setting and delegations. However, in 1999, legal advice sought by the DPSA raised 
concerns about the use of PMAs specifically in that they are legally unenforceable within the 
current Human Resources Management Framework (HRM) and the PFMA requirements 
(South Africa, 2006) and cannot be used as prescribed. In order for PMAs to be adopted 
complex legislative changes would be required (South Africa, 2000). Based on this legal 
advice and the complexity of adopting new legislation allowing for the use of PMAs the 
Department silently abandoned the idea of PMAs. However, implementation of these 
recommendations continued in a patchy way across some provinces up until 2007. The 
following Table (Table 1) presents the summary of the key process followed during the 
decentralisation of hospital management as it relates to HRM between 1994 and 2007. 
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Table 1: Summary of Process during the decentralisation of HRM function 
Period Key Legislation/ Policy decision 
1994 National health Plan for South Africa 
Reconstruction and Development 
Programme 
Public Service Act, 1994 
1995-1996 Hospital Strategic Project 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1997 White Paper for the Transformation of 
Health System in South Africa 
1999 9th and Final draft of Decentralisation of 
Hospital Management. 
Policy presentation to Hospital 
Coordinating Committee 
Ministerial task team on decentralisation of 
Hospital Management 
MINMEC and PHRC interim report on 
decentralisation of hospital management 
First Performance Management Agreement 
between hospital CEOs and Provincial 
HODs. 
2001  Public Service Regulations 
 
2002 – 2006  Formal HRM delegations NW Province – 
effective 2002 and Gauteng Province 2006 
 
2.2.6. Institutional Arrangements for the Human Resources Management Function  
 
The institutional arrangements at a human resources management level were also complex 
and difficult to follow making implementation of hospital management decentralisation a 
near impossibility. The following Figure (Figure 1) represents the institutional arrangements 
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for Human Resource Management during the decentralisation process. The DPSA had the 
overall responsibility for the Public Service Act (and its regulations) which is the key 
legislation upon which the HRM function in the public service is based. It places enormous 
responsibilities and powers with the MECs and the Head of Departments in the various 
provinces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Institutional Arrangements for Human Resource Management Function 
 
The MEC and or HOD may voluntarily delegate functions to officials in the provincial head 
office, district offices and hospitals according to this model. However, the approaches across 
provinces were not uniform. Gauteng developed specific criteria (See Table 2 below) as 
competencies expected of CEOs in 2009 but never implemented it (South Africa, 2009). The 
main reason for the lack of implementation was the unclear directives from the DPSA as 
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well as a lack of enabling legislation and regulations and in my opinion a lack of political will. 
However the guidelines do indicate the intention of the province to give more delegations 
to the CEOs and therefore holds the CEOs more accountable on core managerial aspects, 
and client, stakeholder and shareholders satisfaction (Table 2). Its application did not 
materialise in any substantive way. The provincial governments also introduced the 
mandatory setting up of functional hospital boards but these were largely toothless political 
appointments that were more ceremonial in nature than acting as proper governance 
structures. Despite these efforts the power of budget determination, procurement, large 
expenditure determination (above R25000) and senior appointments as well as 
advertisement of posts were all centrally determined (Bateman, 2011). 
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Table 2: Competencies expected of CEOs 
Core Management criteria: 
1. Implementation of the Turnaround Strategy.  
2. Alignment of the hospital’s performance with the Annual Performance Plan. 
3. Implementation of the Governance Framework, Quality Assurance and the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks.  
4. Sound Financial Management and Accountability.  
5. Effective and efficient management and administration of the Hospital.  
6. Client orientation and customer focus.  
7. Change Management, Knowledge Management, Service delivery innovation, 
 
Problem solving and analysis, Communication, People Management and Empowerment 
Client Satisfaction: 
1 Implement the Service Transformation Plan, Service Packages and “Health Status 
Indicators/index” (HSI) to: 
a. Improve the health seeking behaviour of clients.  
b. Increase the appropriate utilisation of health services by relevant clients.  
c. Improved service delivery efficiency. Improved client care.  
d. Improve client positive experience at all related health service points.  
e. Improve quality of care.  
f. Ensure effective and efficient medical and nursing care.  
g. Ensure implementation of National Health Programmes. 
Employee Satisfaction:  
1. Increase employee participation in improvement of health service delivery.  
2. Increase employee utilisation of work environment to improve productivity.  
3. Improve employee achievement of performance expectations.  
4. Increase number of employees meeting quality standards through training.  
5. Increase employee motivation to achieve service delivery targets through 
recognition and rewards 
Stakeholder Satisfaction: 
1. Increase stakeholder participation in support of GDoH service delivery.  
27 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Increase stakeholder awareness of GDoH service delivery.  
3. Increase stakeholder satisfaction through compliance to legislative mandate.  
4. Increase stakeholder satisfaction through sound governance practices 
Shareholder Satisfaction: 
1. Increase shareholder funding in support of conformance to health service package 
specification at all service levels. 
2. Increase shareholder satisfaction through conformance to prescribed support 
services management practices.  
3. Improve institutional performance against “Health Status Indicators/index” (HSI).  
4. Improve shareholder contribution to Gauteng Department of Health strategy.  
5. Increase shareholder awareness of DoH services participation. 
Adapted from the Gauteng Criteria (South Africa, 2009) 
 
2.2.7. The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper). 
 
An important policy that provides the framework for institutionalising all of the New Public 
Management principles into the public service was adopted as early as 1997 and was called 
The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (WPTPSD), (South Africa, 1997, p. 
1). It sets out eight transformation principles amongst which it states that “transforming 
service delivery is the key”.  It elaborates upon this by stating that “a transformed South 
African public service will be judged by one criterion above all: its effectiveness in delivering 
services which meet the basic needs of all South African citizens”. “Improving service 
delivery” was the White Paper’s ultimate aim. It further emphasises that public service 
managers require new management tools to implement service delivery successfully. The  
tools are  those of the new public service management (NPM tools) and are described as 
follows: “assignment to individual managers of responsibility for delivering specific results 
for a specified level of resources and for obtaining value for money in the use of these 
resources; individual responsibility for results matched with managerial authority for 
decisions about how resources should be used; delegations of managerial responsibility and 
authority to the lowest possible level; and transparency about the results achieved and 
resources consumed”(ibid). The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery 
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(WPTPSD) established a policy design for the delivery of public services which views the 
citizens as customers and aims to hold public officials to account for the services they 
deliver. This approach was encapsulated in the name that was used for this iniative, viz. 
Batho Pele (a Sesotho adage meaning “People First”).  
 
The Batho Pele policy is made up of eight service delivery principles as set out below. It uses 
the concept of the citizen as customer and describes this as useful in that certain 
assumptions which are as basic and fundamental to public service as  they are for 
commercial gain (South Africa, 1997) and these are to treat citizens as customers and 
implies: listening and taking into account their views when deciding what services should be 
provided; treating customers with consideration and respect; ensuring that the agreed level 
and quality of service is always of the highest standard; and responding promptly when 
standards of service fall. This White Paper clearly indicates that government planned to 
adopt the New Pubic Management approach within the public services sector and to 
embrace as its core principles that of effective service delivery and customer centeredness 
using private sector management tools. But as described earlier by Harrison (2010) and 
Cameron (2009) this did not occur as planned and less so in the health sector. These 
opinions were further explored in this research. 
 
2.2.8. The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
 
Another important piece of legislation that impacted directly on the ability of senior 
managers in the public services to perform was the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
promulgated in 1999. The PFMA (South Africa, 1999) was part of the government’s financial 
reforms that were put in place soon after the 1994 elections. The first phase of reforms 
began with the establishment of a new intergovernmental system, which necessitated that 
all three spheres of government (national, provincial and local) developed their own 
budgets (called decentralised budgeting). This was facilitated by substantial financial 
transfers to provinces and municipalities from the national treasury. Also, multi-year 
budgeting was introduced through the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) which 
replaced the one-year incremental system. The final part of this first phase of reforms was 
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to ensure that the budgeting process was better aligned to policy, planning and budgeting. 
The second phase of reforms was through the adoption of the PFMA i.e. the guiding 
legislation. The PFMA’s objective was to modernise the financial management system and 
demand accountability. This was also to be further ensured by reforms to the procurement 
system (South Africa, 1999). The third phase of reforms was the use of service delivery 
indicators, performance budgets and the adoption of generally recognised accounting 
practices (GRAP).  
 
Other principles of the transformation agenda on public sector management can be seen in 
the Batho Pele White Paper, the White Paper for the Transformation of the Public Service 
(WPTPS) (South Africa, 1997) and more recently in the Public Service Regulations (South 
Africa, 2001), which provides the context for the reforms to property ownership and 
procurement systems, and the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of public 
services, again a reflection of NPM like reforms.  An important principle was that managers 
must be given the flexibility to manage within an appropriate policy framework that met the 
constitutional requirements of transparency and accountability. This was to be done in 
terms of the conditions required by the PFMA which aimed to provide a legislative basis of 
best practices in requiring public service bureaucrats in ensuring that their public service 
departments deliver services to consumers as efficiently and effectively as possible. The 
PFMA clarifies the separation of responsibilities between the head of department (the 
accounting officer) and the political head (called the ‘executive authority’ which could either 
be a national Minister or a provincial Member of the Executive Committee). The politician 
(executive authority) is responsible for policy choices and outcomes, while the head of 
department (accounting officer) implements the policy and is accountable for the outcomes 
by taking responsibility for delivery of outputs defined in the departmental policy and 
budget. In this way, the Act empowers accounting officers by conferring on them the 
authority they need to carry out their responsibilities. This however meant that financial and 
delivery accountability rested with heads of departments and could not be devolved further 
according to the PFMA and many heads of department’s particularly in health kept this 
control. However, the subsequent Public Service Regulation (South Africa, 2001) allowed for 
the delegation and authorisation of appropriate functions. This allowed for some delegation 
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of functions to employees at the discretion of the head of department but not 
accountability. Consequently some Heads of Departments of Health delegated a number of 
functions and responsibilities to CEOs of public hospitals. However this varied across 
provinces and these delegations often had limited financial discretions for CEOs (Bateman, 
2011). 
 
2.2.9. The DBSA and its Reports on Strengthening Management and CEOs in the public 
health sector 
 
Of substantial pertinence and importance to this study is the recent work of the 
Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) in relation to Health Sector Reform in South 
Africa. In particular and of relevance is a project carried out by the DBSA for the NDoH which 
looked specifically at the functioning of CEOs of public hospitals. Two reports emanated 
from the project: the first report entitled: “DBSA/NDoH Benchmarking Hospital 
Management and Developing an ‘Ideal Type’ for Hospital Management” (DBSA, 2010, 
confidential – copyright DBSA and NDoH) and the second entitled: “Strengthening 
Management in the Health Sector: An Assessment of Hospital CEOs and District Managers” 
(DBSA, 2010, confidential – copyright DBSA). These reports are discussed in detail below.  
 
The aim of these DBSA projects, on behalf the NDoH, was to develop an understanding of:   
(i) The role requirements and responsibilities that hospital and district managers (health 
care managers at Levels 13 and 14 - these levels are a DPSA determined ranking of senior 
management officials in the public sector) should fulfil in order to facilitate the delivery of 
quality care. (ii) The ideal qualifications , experience and competencies required by health 
care managers at Levels 13 and 14, and how these might differ across the grades and in 
different types of institutions. (iii) The minimum qualifications, experience and 
competencies required by health care managers if they are to fulfil the role requirements, 
and how those might differ across the grades and in different types of institutions. This 
review was done in order to develop a framework or scorecard for assessing and ranking 
hospital managers and develop the ideal requirements for this job. Although the initial brief 
was to look at only Level 13 and 14 hospital managers the brief was subsequently 
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broadened to include District Managers which are at Levels 11 or 12 generally. The Research 
Methodology included a literature review (international and local), a high level review of 
hospital manager job profiles (both international and local), and key informant interviews 
from government, academia and the private sector. The report focussed on Appropriate 
Competencies as defined by experience, qualifications, competencies and On-The-Job 
support (using the WHO Health Management model). The report acknowledges its 
limitations however in that contextual factors such as adequate staffing, functioning support 
systems and an enabling environment can also influence a hospital manager’s ability to 
manage effectively and these have not been addressed substantively.  
 
The report on “DBSA/NDOH Benchmarking Hospital Management and Developing an ‘Ideal 
Type’ for Hospital Management” findings are summarised below:  
 
(i) The key characteristics of hospital managers 
 
As far as role descriptors are concerned the findings from the DBSA literature review 
indicated similarities but also notable differences, in the job profiles of hospital managers 
across different contexts. The job profiles of hospital managers in various settings are 
described in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Job Profiles of Hospital Managers  
Developing Country Developed Country 
Public Sector Operational efficiency in an environment of 
limited resources. 
Access to services. 
Provision of outpatient services. 
Public Health programmes. 
Stakeholder management. Operational 
efficiency in an environment of limited 
resources. 
Provision of patient services. 
Financial Management. 
HR Management 
Private Sector Private Sector Operational efficiency in an 
environment of more abundant resources. 
Supply chain management. 
Facilities management. 
Marketing. 
Hotel Management. Operational efficiency 
in an environment of more abundant 
resources. 
Research and innovation. 
Financial management. 
Profit maximisation. 
Marketing. 
Source: DBSA (2010) 
 
The Public Sector requirements don’t differ much between developing and developed 
countries except for involvement of public health programmes and more stakeholder 
involvement required for the public sector. Private sector profiles tended to focus on 
managerial efficiencies in both developed and developing countries. 
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(ii) The key characteristics of Hospital Managers: Qualifications and Experience 
 
The report found that most hospital managers have both clinical and business qualifications 
and experience. The perceived value, according to the report, differed according to context, 
and these are described in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Qualifications and Experiences required of hospital managers 
 Developing Country  Developed Country 
Public Sector Preference is for clinicians 
with qualifications in public 
health or health 
administration. 
Public sector experience is 
an advantage. 
No clear preference has 
emerged, but emphasis 
seems to tend towards 
management experience. 
The value of clinical 
insight/experience is also 
acknowledged. 
Private Sector Preference is for managers 
(who may have a business 
qualification, but must have 
solid management and 
business experience) with 
experience of/insight into 
clinical and health issues.
  
 
Preference is for managers 
who have a master’s degree 
in Health Administration or 
an MBA. 
Clinical qualifications not 
seen to be necessary (or 
even necessarily desirable). 
Source: DBSA (2010) 
 
The report makes reference to a Hospital CEO survey in the US, by Cejka Search and 
Solucient ( 2005), the study which compared the characteristics of what are called Best of 
Breed (BoB) CEOs of hospitals to those of median hospital CEOs which had the following 
findings: 
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a. BoB CEOs are more likely to have a master’s degree, and more likely to have more 
than one advanced degree. 
b. Less than 10% of BoB CEOs had a degree in law or medicine. 
c. BoB leadership team members were more likely to have a master’s degree or PhD 
(77%) than those in median hospitals (56%). 
d. In the private sector management experience is favoured. 
 
The report also made reference to a four country study of private and public hospitals in 
Latin America (Bogue, Hall and La Forgia, 2007) which revealed that developing country 
private sector hospitals were more likely to have hospital managers with non-medical 
graduate degrees than were public hospitals. These hospitals also emphasised non-medical 
managers with business experience. Business experience was the most valued criterion for 
private hospital managers and the least valued for public hospital managers. However, 
public hospitals in Latin America emphasised physicians with government managerial 
experience as their preference. The report also made reference to a McKinsey Quarterly 
Report (2008) which showed that research on developed country public sector hospitals (for 
example the National Health System of the United Kingdom) indicated  that clinical 
experience may be critical in ensuring operational efficiency and performance management. 
A study on NHS hospitals showed that hospitals whose general managers have a clinical 
background positively impact on performance, and that clinical skills help managers better 
understand hospital operations and to manage doctors more successfully. However the 
report also makes reference to an earlier study by Filerman (2003) to counter the UK 
experience with the following conclusion and that is that research on public health systems 
in developing countries indicates that both general management and public health 
competencies are desirable, but that if a choice was made, the decision would err on the 
side of general management competence.  
 
A WHO study (Dal Poz et al. 2009) of a number of African countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Ghana, Togo, South Africa and Uganda) indicate that health managers tend to be clinicians 
(which includes doctors, nurses, pharmacists, health officers and clinical officers) who 
undertake management duties as an additional role and that very few managers are not 
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health professionals.  Also that recruitment is often based on qualifications rather than 
ability to perform and that the Masters of Public Health (MPH) is a common technical 
requirement, but the WHO emphasises that it must be accompanied by appropriate 
management experience. 
 
(iii). Key Characteristics of Hospital Managers: Competencies 
 
In addition to generic management competencies, the following key characteristics of 
hospital manager’s competencies are emphasised according to the DBSA in different 
contexts and is summarised in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Key Characteristics of Hospital Managers: Competencies 
 Developing Country Developed Country 
Public Sector Stakeholder relationship 
management. 
Strong people management. 
Communication skills. 
Ability to manage “upward”. 
Self Belief. 
Self Awareness. 
Self Management. 
Drive for improvement. 
Personal Integrity. 
Setting direction. 
Delivering the service. 
Private Sector Information management. 
Public relations. 
Strategic thinking. 
Customer orientation. 
Ability to manage health 
professionals 
Integrity and credibility. 
Visionary. 
Results-orientated. 
Collaborative. 
Values driven. 
Team building. 
Strategic thinking. 
Source: DBSA (2010). 
 
The report further reviewed a survey of Chairs of Hospital Boards by Halstead (1989) in 
determining what characteristics they would covet in hospital managers. The following was 
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revealed: a commitment to the highest quality of health care, an unquestionable reputation 
and a track record of high integrity and morals, leadership skills, and being able to recruit 
and retain the best possible management team, decisiveness and an ability to build and 
promote a very good working partnerships with medical and other health professional staff. 
The survey concludes that individual characteristics and skills will determine the difference 
between a hospital manager’s success and failure. 
 
Furthermore, the report also reviewed the study on public and private hospitals in Latin 
America (Bogue, Hall, and La Fogia, 2007) which outlined six leadership characteristics that 
hospital managers ranked as critical: education, values consistent with the hospital, time 
availability, experience in planning, conflict management skills, and health leadership 
experience. The report indicated that public hospital managers placed a higher value on the 
following characteristics: clinical experience, ability to represent patients, education, 
knowledge of information systems, and political influence as important. These reports 
played a pivotal role in informing the South African government in developing legislation 
governing the appointment and functioning of public hospital CEOs and this culminated in 
the gazetting of a Green Paper on a Policy on the Management of Public Hospitals on the 
2nd March 2012 which is discussed in some detail later.  
 
 The DBSA Report on “Strengthening Management in the Health Sector; An Assessment of 
hospital CEOs and District Managers.” is described below: 
 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was also requested by the National 
Department of Health (NDoH) to assess the competency of CEOs and heads of public 
hospitals (hospital CEOs) and district managers with a view to strengthening health service 
management capacity at public hospitals and health districts. The assessment of hospital 
CEOs and district managers links to point four of the National Health Strategic Plan: 
Overhauling the health care system and improving its management. 
 
The process commenced with research to inform the development of assessment tools and 
a scorecard for hospital CEOs and district managers, which was informed by the preceding 
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DBSA’s international literature review. Following this a nation-wide assessment was 
conducted. High participation in the process and the cooperation of provinces indicated a 
strong shared interest among health managers in improving health management outcomes.  
This DBSA report outlines the background and objectives, methodology, process, findings 
and conclusions, and recommendations emerging from the study. The recommendations of 
this report were intended to align with other priority initiatives, including: Improving the 
Quality of Health Services, and Improving Human Resources Planning, Development and 
Management, as outlined in the NDoH report: Key initiatives to strengthen health facility 
and district health management. According to the report the ideal way of determining the 
competence of hospital CEOs and district managers would have been to review individual 
and institutional performance data, and compare these. However, the DBSA admitted that 
reliable individual performance data was not available, and given the number of factors 
contributing to overall institutional performance, it was impossible to come to firm 
conclusions about individual performance based on this data (DBSA, 2010). 
 
Thus, based on the empirical research, the DBSA study developed a health management 
competency framework, scorecard, and assessment battery with which hospital CEOs and 
district managers were assessed. Each of these assessments were reviewed and validated by 
relevant internal and external subject experts and stakeholders. The key components of the 
hospital and district manager scorecard included: qualifications, experience, and assessed 
competencies.                      
 
The research hypothesised that the ideal profile of a hospital/ district manager would 
comprise: health and business qualifications, and extensive experience within public health.  
The competency framework outlined a set of 19 competencies customised to the South 
African public health environment. These competencies were clustered into five groups: 
Strategic/ Transformational, Stakeholder/ Environment, Operational and People, Core 
Functional, and Personal Competency clusters.  
 
Overall, 338 hospital CEOs and 46 district managers were assessed during this process, 
comprising 95.52% of the study population. The analysis of employment reveals that 12% of 
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managers were acting in their current position. Also, 75% of managers were below the 
salary level 13 (i.e. are not senior management as per the public service nomenclature). An 
association between remuneration level and total scores for hospital CEOs was observed, 
with the managers of higher remuneration levels typically scoring higher than managers of 
lower levels (with a few notable exceptions). Amongst hospital types, National Centre, 
Tertiary and Regional hospital CEOs scored in the main higher than managers of other 
hospital types (again, with a few notable exceptions). Psychiatric, TB and other Specialist 
hospital CEOs scored on average lower than managers of main hospital types . Across all 
hospital types, hospital CEOs scored least on Core Functional, Strategic/Transformational, 
and the Operational and People Competency clusters, the implications of which are 
elaborated further in the report.  
 
Analysis of hospital CEO qualifications of all participants highlighted the positive impact of 
health qualifications on assessed competency, with added qualifications in business as well 
as public administration effecting positively on the result as well. The ideal experience 
profile appeared to be between six and twenty years’ experience, preferably in a public 
sector health environment, according to the study. 
 
Hospital CEOs and district managers were subsequently requested to assess themselves on 
each competency, and on average, scored themselves much higher than their actual 
assessed competency scores. As far as preferred delegations were concerned, hospital CEOs 
indicated a strong preference for HR delegations out of a choice of HR, Finance, and Supply 
Chain Management delegations; whereas district managers expressed a preference for 
Finance delegations. Of significance in these evaluations, health service managers and in 
particular CEOs of hospitals were asked to outline their top constraints to performance. Lack 
of budget dominated as the highest ranked constraint, followed by limited delegations and 
lack of competence of direct reporting lines and supporting teams (see Figure 2 below).  
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Figure 3: Constraints to performance as determined by health service managers (DBSA, 
2010) 
 
Second to lack of budget, however, there are several reasons cited as performance 
constraints, with provincial differences. For example Limpopo, North West, Eastern Cape, 
Free State, and Western Cape managers cited limited delegations as a crucial constraint 
following lack of budget, compared to Gauteng and Mpumalanga (who identified poor 
facilities as a constraint), KZN (vacant posts), and Northern Cape (lack of equipment). 
 
An analysis of stress concluded that there was significant stress within both the hospital and 
district system. Furthermore, there exists limited capacity to adequately manage the 
existing stress. Of significance was that participants that scored higher on this dimension 
also displayed a greater capacity to manage stress according to the study. 
The recommendations emphasised a comprehensive but flexible approach for hospital and 
district manager interventions based on individual need. These interventions were to 
include but were not limited to: training and development, mentorship and coaching, 
recruitment, and succession planning. The report further emphasised the importance of 
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having a comprehensive approach in terms of implementing any interventions to reform the 
system, and that manager competence is only one amongst many systemic and institutional 
factors to consider. These reports informed the development of the survey instrument used 
in this research. These two reports also led to the promulgation of the policy on the 
management of hospitals with a particular reference to the CEOs of public hospitals and this 
is discussed below.  
 
2.2.10. The National Health Act: Policy on the Management of Hospitals  
 
Because of a lack of enabling legislation as well as the objectives of the Ministers – 10 point 
plan whose aim is to improve the quality of health care and in particular the functionality of 
hospitals the Minister of Health gazetted  a Green Paper on a  Policy on the Management of 
Public Hospitals on the 2nd March 2012 (South Africa, 2012). This was a landmark policy in 
creating an enabling legislative framework that is intended to achieve amongst other things 
a clear set of requirements for the appointment of CEOs of public hospitals, as informed by 
the DBSA reports, as well as what is required of these CEOs in future. In its introduction it 
makes the following points (South Africa, 2012, p. 32): 
 
In line with the 10 Point plan’s strategic point number 4 on “Overhauling the health 
care system and improving its management”, the Department identified key 
deliverables to improve the management of hospitals. Whilst significant inroads 
have been made in addressing some of the key deliverables aligned to strategic point 
4, a number of challenges continue to hamper effective and efficient delivery of 
quality health care. Some of the challenges identified were systemic in nature, for 
example, the lack of appropriate legislation and policies, while in other cases the 
challenges related to capacity constraints,, such as the competency levels of hospital 
CEOs, lack of proper training, lack of strategic support, and the lack of capacity to 
deal with small operational issues. 
 
This national policy on the management of hospitals overall objective was to ensure that the 
management of hospitals is guided by principles of effectiveness, efficiency and 
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transparency. Its specific objectives are extremely pertinent to this research and are as 
follows: to ensure implementation of relevant legislation and policies to improve the 
functioning of public sector hospitals; to facilitate the appointment of competent and skilled 
hospital managers; to provide for the development of accountability frameworks and 
systems; and to ensure the training of managers to be competent in leadership, 
management and governance. It further goes on to classify hospitals into district, regional, 
tertiary and central hospitals as well as what  are regarded as specialised hospitals (South 
Africa, 2012, p. 33).  
 
Furthermore in s2.2 it details the appointment of competent and skilled managers and 
describes the job description for a hospital CEO as follows: 
 
The Job purpose will be to: 
Plan, direct, co-ordinate and manage health care and support services effectively 
and efficiently as an integral part of the health service delivery in the area served by 
the hospital; 
Represent the hospital authoritatively at provincial and public forums. 
 
This section also makes reference to the most critical competencies as prescribed in senior 
management and middle management requirements of the Public Service Administration 
(South Africa, 2011). The national policy elaborates on the minimum requirements for 
appointment as a hospital CEO and then describes the development of accountability 
frameworks in terms of governance and public participation. It describes the minimum 
requirements for appointment to hospital boards, the functions of hospital boards and 
hospital board subcommittees. However there is not enough detail in my opinion. This 
specifically as it relates to the performance measurement of the CEOs and consequential 
incentives and disincentives. The roles and responsibilities of hospital boards are also not 
sufficiently elaborated upon. However, the new policy locates itself firmly within the 
Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement signed by the Minister of Health.  
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2.2.11. The Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement  
 
Of importance to NPM practitioners are the use of performance contracts (Perry, 2009). 
South Africa under the Zuma presidency introduced performance contracts for ministers 
and these were called Negotiated Service Delivery Agreements (NSDAs). These are a five 
year performance agreement contract signed by all the cabinet Ministers with the 
President. It is also a contract that commits key government stakeholders and partners to 
the delivery of particular outputs as they relate to identified sectors of the South African 
government. The Government decided on 12 key outcomes as the priority indicators for its 
planned programme of action for the period 2010 – 2014. The priority for the health sector 
is improving the health status of the entire population and is described as Outcome 2: A 
Long and Healthy Life for All South Africans. The Minister of Health has signed this 
agreement and it is his personal performance management contract with the President 
(South Africa, 2010a). To be able to contribute to the realisation of this outcome the 
National Department of Health’s (NDOHs) Strategic Plan for the period 2009 - 2014 lists 10 
priorities as part of its 10 Point Plan for the overall improvement of the national health 
system (South Africa, 2009).  
 
The 10 Point plan focuses on an essential set of strategic areas namely:  
the enhanced overall stewardship and governance of the health system; the 
implementation of a National Health Insurance as a mechanism to finance the health service 
provision and delivery platforms; significantly improving the quality of health services that 
are provided to its citizens through a National Quality Accreditation Body; overhauling key 
components of the management systems and structures in the public health sector; better 
planning and management of human resources for health; the strategic implementation of 
infrastructure development and maintenance initiatives, including the use of public private 
partnerships; the comprehensive and aggressive combating of HIV, AIDS, TB and other 
communicable diseases; mass mobilisation of communities and key stakeholders to 
promote better health outcomes for all; the review and strengthening of the drug policy and 
procurement systems; and re-engineering the health system to one that is based on a 
primary healthcare (PHC) approach, with more emphasis on promotive and preventive 
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healthcare that will underlie all interventions needed to achieve the outputs (South Africa, 
2009).  
 
To understand the current context of Health Sector Reforms in South Africa it is important 
to have an overview of the current strategies and plans that relate to governments overall 
ambition to transform the health system. The appropriate starting point is to describe the 
NSDAs intentions as indicated in its four output areas: 
Output 1: Increasing Life Expectancy 
Output 2: Decreasing Maternal and Child Mortality 
Output 3: Combating HIV and AIDS and decreasing the burden of disease from Tuberculosis 
Output 4: Strengthening Health System Effectiveness. 
 
Outputs 1 to 3 were informed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) as developed 
by the United Nations (2000) and are the main priorities of the Minister. However to 
achieve this government has to deal with Output 4 (strengthening health system 
effectiveness) first. Output 4 is of particular relevance to this research and is briefly 
discussed next. To strengthen the public health system, a number of initiatives were 
planned to be undertaken by the National Department of Health (NDoH) complementary to 
those proposed for Output one to three above. These initiatives included 
the need to overhaul and improve the health services delivery platform, from a high cost 
curative and hospicentric care model to one that promotes cost-effective re-engineered 
Primary Health Care delivered as close to the community and household as is possible, 
supported by robust and sustainable improvements in management and supervision. This 
strategic imperative resulted in the promulgation of the Green Paper on the National Health 
Insurance (South Africa, 2011) and this is briefly reviewed below.  
 
2.2.12. The National Health Insurance: 
 
South Africa has taken on a new policy direction with its National Health System mapped 
out in its green paper on National Health Insurance (NHI) (South Africa, 2011a).  The NHI 
plans to ensure that the public has access to appropriate, efficient and quality health 
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services. The policy describes four key interventions: “i) a complete transformation of health 
service provision and delivery; ii) the total overhaul of the health-care system; iii) the radical 
change of administration and management; iv) the provision of a comprehensive package of 
care underpinned by a reengineered Primary Health care” (South Africa, 2011a, p. 5). This is 
a significant step forward for South Africa and is reminiscent of the 1948 policies for a 
National Health System (NHS) in the United Kingdom post World War II (Naidoo, 2012). 
 
South Africa, as mentioned before, has many challenges including a huge burden of disease, 
worsening health profiles of the population, poor health service management systems and a 
shortage of key health personnel in the public health sector (Harrison, 2010). To address 
these challenges the NHI policy is framed within the following social justice principles: a) the 
right to access health care services; b) social solidarity which makes reference to financial 
risk protection for the entire population; c) effectiveness through the use of evidence-based 
interventions; d) appropriateness which talks to the adoption of new and innovative health 
service delivery models; e) equity that aims to ensure universal coverage with care 
according to need; f) affordability that means that services will be procured at reasonable 
cost but recognizing that health is a public good and g) efficiency that will be ensured by 
creating appropriate management systems that avoid duplication across all spheres of 
governance (South Africa, 2011a).  
 
The main aim of the NHI is to improve access to quality health services for all South Africans. 
It bases its approach on a Re-engineered Primary Health Care (PHC) system that focuses 
mainly on community outreach services through the use of community health workers 
based at primary health care clinics using a defined primary care package of services 
(Naidoo, 2012). There will also be opportunities for the delivery of PHC through private 
providers that are accredited and contracted within districts. Hospital based care packages 
are categorised according to the type of the hospital which range from district, to regional, 
to tertiary as well as central and specialised hospitals. 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
The first five years of NHI was aimed at testing the implementation of the policy through 
pilot studies and will also include strengthening the health system in the following particular 
areas: 
• Management of health services 
• Quality improvement audits 
• Infrastructure upgrade 
• Medical devices and equipment upgrade 
• Human Resources planning, development and support 
• Information management modernisation 
• Setting up of an NHI Fund. 
 
The NHI also mentions the creation of an Office for Health Standards and Compliance 
(OHSC) to inspect and accredit facilities and services, set norms and standards and provide 
for an independent ombudsman. The NHI policy provides for the payment of providers and 
encourages a risk-adjusted capitation system as its preferred method of payment. Some 
public hospitals have already outsourced the management of their hospitals through the 
private sector using Public Private Partnership (PPP) agreements. One such notable PPP is at 
the Albert Luthuli Hospital in KwaZulu Natal. These NHI proposals could have major 
implications for the future funding structure of hospitals and how they are managed both in 
the public and private sectors but details of these is absent. (South Africa, 2011a).  
 
A specific focus of the 10 point plan, the NHI policy and the Policy on the Management of 
Hospitals is to improve management of health services and is again relevant to this 
research. This turnaround strategy for improving management proposes to introduce a 
common competency framework for health managers, together with predetermined 
standards, delegation of responsibilities and functions to the facility level. It makes 
reference to the DBSA work as that will be used to finalise the framework for the 
employment of health managers as well as inform the design of the training, support and 
performance management measures. Performance Management Systems (PMSs) will be 
introduced for rewarding outstanding performance and sanctioning poor performance. The 
aim is to develop a PMS that promotes accountability in a developmental and not a punitive 
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way. A similar focus is to be directed at the service delivery and supervisory levels 
respectively through skills development programmes, mentoring, monitoring and evaluation 
processes. This output is of special significance to this research and the unfolding of this 
policy implementation will inform in particular the document analysis as well as possibly the 
future functioning of CEOs in public hospitals. What largely informed HSR in South Africa 
and articulated on its policy on the NHI is informed by the theory behind the NPM paradigm. 
This theoretical context of NPM and its effect on Public Sector Reform (PSR) as well as that 
of the current Health Sector Reform (HSR) in South Africa are now discussed. 
 
 2.3. The Theoretical Context of NPM reforms 
 
The Theoretical Framework is informed by the changes affecting the role of government 
from the late 1970’s according to Larbi (1999). The New Right or neoliberals was 
increasingly criticising the size, burgeoning cost and role of government bureaucracies and 
was questioning its efficiency and effectiveness. The Keynesian welfare state was regarded 
as a monopoIy deliverer of public services and fundamentally inefficient. Little consideration 
was afforded to the public as its customers and its results or outputs were questionable 
(Bereton, 1994). It was argued that it was only through the free market and its forces 
through competition   that economic efficiency could be achieved and the public should be 
offered free choice of who should deliver services (Bereton, 1994: 14). There was broad 
agreement among commentators on public sector reforms, such as Flynn, (1993), Ferlie et 
al.( 1996), Walsh (1995) and Pollitt (1993), that this New Right or neoliberal criticism of the 
Keynesian welfare state, and of its public administration centred on it, was largely dictated 
to by the opinions of liberals economists such as Hayek (1973), and by public choice 
theorists such as Niskanen (1971), Buchanan (1975) and Meuller (1979). According to other 
authors such as Jordan (1995), public choice theory was one of the New Right’s most 
effective weapons. The main criticism of public choice theorists of the traditional public 
administration system was that the reward system it used did not advance effective service 
delivery and that the politicians and bureaucrats had no motivation to control costs 
(Chapman, 1979). This often led to an inherent wastage of financial resources and an in-
built tendency for expenditure to grow. Routine public service delivery continuously 
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expanded and took precedence over real productivity. Market forces were viewed by the 
neoliberals as the only disciplining mechanism that could prevent government becoming 
bloated, inefficient and underperforming. According to Hayek (1960), bureaucrats promote 
this expansion of governmental functions because of self-interest and these become 
eventually over supplied or over-extended. This then results in the creation of an ever-
growing bureaucracy with a hierarchical authority structure fixed on rigid rules. These 
authors further argue that over time the capacity for top-down control diminishes as 
bureaucratic expansion gets to a critical point where it becomes impossible to control 
effectively. This leads inevitably to bureaucratic failure according to Downs (1967) and 
Breton and Wintrobe (1975). In the search for improving efficiency and effectiveness in 
government, not only were reforms an economic imperative but the use of private sector 
management techniques and practices were preferred under the New Public Management 
paradigm.  According to Flynn (1993, p 12) by the 1980s these ideas moved to the 
mainstream of government policy, particularly in the West, and collectively provided “a 
framework within which privatisation, expenditure controls and the introduction of markets 
all hang together”. 
 
The rise of New Public Management (NPM) over the past few decades was described as 
“one of the most striking international trends in public administration” according to Hood 
(1991, p 2-3). Hood attributes NPM’s rise to four administrative megatrends, namely: 
 
(i) attempts to slow down or reverse government growth in terms of overt public 
spending and staffing; 
(ii) the shift towards privatisation and quasi-privatisation and away from core 
government institutions…; 
(iii) the development of automation, particularly in information technology and the 
production and distribution of public services; and 
(iv) the development of a more international agenda, increasingly focused on 
general issues of public management… 
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So in terms of the theoretical context that informed the conceptual framework for this 
research the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm was used (Holliday, 2001). The 
rationale behind this is that the public sector reform agenda in South Africa post 1994 was 
largely informed by the international trends of government reform which was driven by the 
NPM paradigm, and was clearly articulated in the White Paper on Transforming the Public 
Services (South Africa, 1997). This NPM paradigm also informed Health Sector Reforms 
(HSR) that took place in South Africa during the 1990s and 2000s as well as some aspects of 
current reform including that of public hospital management (Cameron, 2009). Theoretically 
therefore the research needs to explore the reform era in terms of NPM (where it began 
and where it is now) and its relationship to the meanings of public management (new or 
old) and the function of government as well as views from its detractors, starting with an 
international perspective as described below. 
 
2.3.1. An International Overview of New Public Management 
 
The New Public Management (NPM) paradigm has come to dictate the rationale behind 
public sector reform by bureaucrats and academics alike (Polidano, 1999). Some 
commentators have acclaimed it as the new paradigm of public administration (Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992; Borins, 1994; Hughes, 1998). NPM reforms according to these authors 
are a general response to prevailing pressures on government – specifically public hostility, 
less budgets and the pressures of globalisation. There is general consensus about the key 
components of NPM which include the freeing up of line management from too much 
regulation, decentralisation, changing of public service departments into free standing units 
or commercial companies; performance based management through contracts, and the use 
of competition such as contracting-out and/or the creation of internal markets (Aucoin, 
1990; Hood, 1991). Various other authors subsequently included privatisation and 
rightsizing (often downsizing) as part of the package (Ingraham, 1996; Minogue, 1998).  
 
Hood (1991, p. 4) in his seminal publication: “A Public Management for All Seasons” 
elaborates on the seven doctrinal components of new public management as follows: 
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(i). Hands-on professional management in the public sector; 
(ii). Explicit standards and measures of performance; 
(iii). Greater emphasis on output controls; 
(iv). Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector; 
(v). Shift to greater competition in the public sector; 
(vi). Stress on private sector styles of management practice; 
(vii). Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. 
 
According to Hood, a means of interpreting NPM’s origins is as a marriage of two different 
sets of ideas. One marriage partner was the new institutional economics. This was built on 
the post-World War II development of public choice, transaction cost and principal–agent 
theories from the original work of Arrow (1963) to Niskanenen’s (1971) main theory of 
bureaucracy.  This helped to produce a set of public sector reform principles built on 
competition, user choice, transparency and the use of incentive structures. The other 
partner in matrimony was a set of consecutive waves of business type managerialism ideas 
being adopted in the public sector, most in the way of the Taylor’s scientific management 
movement (Pollitt, 1990). This assisted in producing a set of restructuring improvements 
and reforms underscored by professional business management expertise. This was seen as 
more important than technical expertise, and requiring substantive discretionary powers to 
achieve results (free to manage), and critical to better institutional performance, through 
the progressive embracing of high performance cultures (Peter and Waterman, 1982) and 
the move to appropriate measurement and management of organisational outputs. 
 
According to another reputable author in this field, Kettl (2000), in his work: “The Global 
Public Management Revolution - A Report on the Transformation of Governance”; the point 
is made that since the 1980s the international reform movement in public management has 
been much more determined and enthusiastically underway than in any period before. Kettl 
(2000, p. 7-18) describes the reform as “striking” as a result of the numerous and varied 
countries that have implemented the reform agenda in a relatively short period of time 
(including Mongolia, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States). He also asserts that 
these reform strategies have been very similar in characteristics. Kettl succinctly describes 
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six core characteristics of this reform as follows:  Firstly improved productivity: How can 
governments deliver better public services for less tax money? Secondly, marketisation: 
How can government adopt market-style tools to deal with the problems of government 
bureaucracy? Thirdly, a service orientation: How can government better serve citizens? 
Fourthly, decentralisation: How can governments be more responsive and effective? Fifthly, 
better policy: How can government improve its policy making abilities? and Sixthly, 
accountability for results: How can governments be held accountable for what they promise 
to deliver?  
 
Public sector structures and practices that informed the old or traditional public 
administration was seen as obstacles to economic efficiency and acted against the 
development of a customer service culture according to Osborne and Gaebler (1992). They 
believed that the traditional bureaucratic model was too mechanistic and inflexible. This 
challenge of traditional public administration they believed had led to the development of 
an alternative paradigm (NPM) which stressed management rather than administration and 
was much more flexible in dealing with dynamic environments than its predecessor 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). They proceeded to identify ten threads (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992 p. 19-20) which entrepreneurial public organisations have in common, i.e. they: 
 
- Promote competition between service providers, 
- Empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy, 
- Focus on outcomes not inputs, 
- Are driven by goals and not by rules and regulations, 
- Redefine clients as customers and offer them choices, 
- Prevent problems before they emerge, 
- Earn money not spend it, 
- Decentralize authority, embrace participatory management, 
- Prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic mechanisms, 
- Catalyse public, private and voluntary agencies to solve community problems.” 
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These core characteristics of NPM reform as described by Kettl (2000) and Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992) informed the conceptual framework of this study as it is the lens through 
which the research questions was viewed. It assisted the research in assessing health sector 
reform in South Africa since 1994 as well as its implications for CEOs in the management of 
public hospitals.  Furthermore, Kettl (2000, p. 8-15) also describes two models of reform. 
The Westminster reforms, shaped by the experiences of New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom governments (as well as Australia and Canada) and the American style re-invention 
which although being implemented later and much more incremental was more sweeping in 
its reforms in Kettl’s opinion. These two strategies defined the basic models that have 
powerfully shaped the global reform debate around the world according to Kettl. Africa and 
South Africa in particular have adopted these reforms albeit piecemeal according to Oluwu 
& Wunsch (2004) and Cameron (2009). However this is explored in depth after the 
international overview. 
 
There also has been many arguments (ideologically charged often) about the advantages 
and disadvantages of the NPM according to Polidano (1999) which focuses on the need to 
adopt or otherwise of NPM reforms in principle. However, Polidano concedes that 
supporters and critics alike often accept the general assumption that the new public 
management principles are applicable universally. The universality assumption of NPM is 
supported by the fact that NPM catch-phrases features conspicuously in the language of 
civil service reformers all around the world (Thomas, 1996).  
 
According to Polidano the political proponents of public administrative reform move into 
action behind a vanguard of rhetoric. Polidano asserts that the pretentious language draws 
on prevailing ideas that are internationally fashionable. But the question Polidano poses is 
whether the “new paradigm” has gone beyond rhetoric? (1999, p. 3).  
 
Kettl (2000) concludes in his comprehensive historical overview of New Public Management 
reform in the West is that it meant to replace traditional, hierarchical, inflexible, authority-
driven public service bureaucracies with newer, market-based, competition driven 
institutions.  However he does conclude that the international reform process is not a 
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simple effort to replace government services with markets. Also implementation reforms 
differed across countries and from the literature the Westminster reforms aligned itself 
much more to the NPM paradigm than did the American re-inventing of government in 
terms of the operationalisation of its reforms and its use of NPM tools across all 
government sectors. There was much greater privatisation and corporatisation in the UK 
than in the USA where most of the reforms were at federal level rather than at state level 
and the USA made greater use of the non-governmental and non-profit sectors than the UK. 
 
Other analysts such as Halligan (2007) and Lynn (2006) have analysed NPM from a different 
perspective, whether its underlying market philosophy is valid and whether it has truly 
accomplished what it has claimed. Some analysts such as Drechsler (2005) have even argued 
the whole notion of a NPM and if so what is its real value? These contestations as well as 
their views on public sector reform of the last few decades are explored further below. 
 
Halligan (2007) commented on the public management reform era, and like Kettl, (2000) 
says that we have seen remarkable and sustained transformation of public administration in 
countries internationally over the last few decades. Halligan (2007) describes a different 
view of reform generations and models in his discussion on NPM. He uses the term first 
generation reformers to denote countries that are considered to be the pioneers in NPM 
such as New Zealand and Australia (i.e. the 1980s) in contrast to the other countries that 
subsequently followed. The first period of reform according to Halligan replaced traditional 
public administration with a set of reforms supported by business management principles. 
The sequence of these reforms according to Halligan is described somewhat differently to 
that of Kettl (2000). Halligan asserts that in the late 1970s and early 1980s a new 
management paradigm was developed and implemented in public administration 
internationally that superceded the importance placed on inputs and processes with one on 
outputs, outcomes and results. This was the first generation of NPM according to this 
author (ibid). The main initial reforms focused on improving the management of the core 
public service (including deregulation, decentralisation and downsizing the senior public 
service) as well as improving the performance of its financial management systems. This was 
followed by agentification, corporatisation and later privatisation.  The mid-1980s saw a 
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weakening of the reform momentum. A new way was required that was associated to an 
emerging global macro-and micro-economic reform agenda, the most substantial being a 
move to influence the organisation of the operations of government. The first phase of this 
second generation of reforms displayed an adoption of NPM principles in many respects. 
However, the main theme was management improvement. This commitment to neo-liberal 
reforms in the 1990s resulted in the public service becoming much more decentralised, 
contractualised and privatized (Halligan and Power, 1992). This reform agenda focussed on 
competition of service delivery, contracting out, a customer focus, sticking to core business, 
and the introduction of the purchaser/provider model. These same principles have also 
been adopted by the policy on the NHI (South Africa, 2011). The focus according to Halligan 
covered a flexible personnel system; a core public service that focused on policy, regulation 
and oversight of service delivery; and substantial use of the private sector. New financial 
management systems were introduced that was based on budgeting on an accrual basis, the 
use of outputs, outcomes and results reporting, and extending devolution to budgetting and 
financial management ( Boston et. al. ,1996; Kettl, 1997 and Scott, 2001).  
 
The devolution of responsibilities from central departments to line agencies was an 
important feature with a lesser role for previously dominant public agencies being a 
significant consequence. The third generation reforms, so obvious in the developing 
Australian experience, have four dimensions that are planned to bring together major 
aspects of governance according to Bogdanor (2005): stewardship through guiding delivery, 
coherence through a whole-of-government approach, and a greater responsiveness to 
government policy. These four dimensions are planned to achieve the following: recovery of 
the central agency as the main player with a more direct influence over other public service 
departments; whole-of-government as the new way of coordination; central monitoring of 
department or agency on implementation and delivery; and departmentalisation through 
absorption of statutory authorities. Together these new reforms provided the basis for 
integrated governance. This whole-of-government agenda had a concentration element in 
so far as central agencies were driving systemic policies across several departments. The 
outcome has been a tampering of decentralisation through strategic management control 
from the centre and a realigning of the relationships of centre and line agencies. Underlying 
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all of this was an important political control aspect according to Halligan (2007). So on 
reflection of three decades of NPM, Halligan identified that the core principle of the 1980s 
was to ensure that departments provided policy advice and had to manage effectively and 
efficiently and that the language of the mid-2000s was to ensure effective delivery as well as 
policy direction with the latter primarily defined in terms of outcomes. This again deals with 
overcoming managerial constraints as well the importance of outcomes as performance 
measures, two important issues that this research intended to understand more about in 
the public hospital setting, but from a CEOs perspective. 
 
The view of events as proposed by Lynn (2006) is that the new discourse on public 
management has had a more systematic evolution that has been initially centered on a 
business-like paradigm called the “New Public Management” or “managerialism” (Hood, 
1991, p. 3). This in his opinion replaced the traditional, Weber style, bureaucratic 
government on a nearly global scale. Lynn (2006) describes the evolution of the traditional 
public administration, informed by the scientific management theorists adequate for the 
industrial revolution and the two world wars, being replaced by public management and 
then the new public management paradigms. This is an economic relook at the efficiency 
and relevance of government and huge bureaucracy to its new incarnation of focusing on 
the predominance of the principle of governance that has emerged in its discourse. Lynn 
argues that effective management of public organisations is critical to the success of any 
government’s policies and perhaps even of democracy itself. This rapid growth in its 
development was due to the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and a more tight-fisted 
approach to the management of public finances.  He also includes factors such as 
heightened expectations of citizens on government’s ability to deliver on promises made 
after the end of the Cold War, increased interdependence between economies 
(globalisation), an growing pressure for regulation and the need for dependable and 
prudent administration of government functions as well as the increasingly popular appeal 
of neo-liberal ideologies and policies. Lynn concludes that because of these reforms national 
and international management consultancies began to proliferate and flourish and 
academic interest in these developments increased hugely. Also, according to this author a 
new vocabulary emerged in the 1980s and 1990s with words such as new public 
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management, reinventing government and state modernisation and reform entering the 
vocabulary of policy makers, public management practitioners and scholars worldwide.  
Lynn further elaborates that the discourse on public management experienced a major 
transformation in the 2000s that realigned the relationship between the state and society, 
between government and citizen, and between politics and management and an emphasis 
on governance presently as the overarching determinant of understanding NPM and its 
implementation.  
 
Other authors such as Christensen and Laegreid (2007), and like Halligan (2007) also posits 
that the New Public Management had generations of reform. The first generation of NPM 
reforms, which started about twenty years ago, was based on a pulling together of new 
institutional economic theory, public choice theory and new management theory and the 
central focus of this ideology was its prescription on a new public-sector focus on efficiency, 
decentralisation, disaggregation, increased competition, adoption of private sector 
management principles and increased use of performance based contracts. NPM was seen 
as advocating both decentralisation (let managers manage) and centralisation (make the 
managers manage) (Hood, 1991). Decentralisation is another important concept for this 
research in that it intends bringing decision making closer to the people that require 
services and allows managers to make discretionary managerial decisions so that the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery is improved. Decentralisation reforms often 
involve legal acts (i.e. the legislative frameworks), and as the experiences in Health Sector 
Reform (HSR) in South Africa have indicated thus far this was not in place in the last decade 
until now (South Africa, 2012). However, delegation is a specific form of decentralisation 
where responsibility, authority and resources are transferred, and is dependent on 
competencies of individuals at all levels of management, but accountability still resides in 
the centre and is also a focus of this research (Oluwu & Wunsch, 2004). These generations 
of reforms as described by experts in the field are important to this research as they inform 
reforms in developing countries and those countries particularly in Africa who are at various 
stages of reform. 
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In practice the NPM paradigm is constantly evolving, according to Christensen and Laegried 
(2007), and the main trends were initially towards more horizontal and vertical 
specialisation resulting in a more disaggregated and often incoherent public sector. In the 
second generation of public sector reforms –following two decades of initial NPM reforms 
according to Bogdanor (2005) – there has been a move away from decentralisation, 
disaggregation, and single purpose organisations towards a whole-of-government (WOG) 
approach. This according to the authors is a trend evidently seen in Australia and New 
Zealand, regarded as the pioneers of NPM, and was also happening in other goverments as 
well(Bakvis & Juillet, 2004 and Kamarck, 2004). WOG is an attempt to better coordinate all 
levels and sectors of government so as to improve public service delivery (ibid). The South 
African government has also attempted this approach by establishing a Planning Ministry 
and a Monitoring and Evaluation Ministry in the Office of the President. The Cabinet also 
operates within a framework of clusters. However the challenge of having appropriate 
oversight, adequate public accountability, a general lack of transparency and an increase in 
corruption in the awarding of tenders (often seen globally) within the NPM paradigm has 
seen the shift of focus of NPM from efficiency towards an emphasis on governance 
according to Lynn (2007).  
 
This later changes in public administration reform according to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) 
was to reform the structures and process of public sector organisations with the objective to 
make them run better.  These include structural and process changes. Structural changes 
include: retrenchment or downsizing the public sector organisation, aggregating or 
disaggregating the departments in order to improve coordination or encourage 
specialisation, privatisation, decentralisation and corporatisation or agentification. While 
process changes include: hands on professional management, private sector approaches to 
management practice such as performance management agreements, flexibility in 
operations and practice, and the adoption of market type mechanisms which includes 
modernisation of service delivery methods. 
 
Public sector reform in Africa has been varied with some countries taking up NPM reforms 
more than others (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003). The African State is believed to 
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be stretched to the point that urgent reform is needed. What is recommended are 
reduction in the size of its governments, refocusing on core services to the public and 
reengineering of its activities using business process reengineering principles. The 
Commission recommends better incentives for effective performance to be put in place so 
as to strengthen economic sustainability and improve the efficiency of the state. Many of 
these proposals are inspired by NPM principles, the main proposal was to put in place, 
within those sectors of the public service that are not privatised, the performance incentives 
and the competitiveness that exist in the business environment. The move towards meeting 
civil society needs more efficiently and effectively forms part of a package of reforms in the 
public sector making way for the introduction of market orientated public management 
methods. A significant number of African countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritius, 
Senegal and Uganda, have embraced substantial reforms planned at improving the quality 
of life of their populace, and establishing new government institutions to establish efficient 
and effective public service delivery systems. However, the Commission states that despite 
the amount of resources invested in reforms by these governments, little progress has been 
made. Accessible health services, education and housing still remain out of reach for many 
communities. With a few notable exception of successful cases of public sector reform (such 
as Botswana for example), public service delivery remains at a sluggish state according to 
the Commission. The following recommendations are made by the Commission: 
 
 for the successful implementation of public sector reform programmes in Africa: 
i) African public services should adopt NPM, which includes, Performance Oriented 
Civil Service, Total Quality Management, Decentralisation, Pay Reform, 
Commercialisation and Customer-Driven Government. 
ii) Performance contracting and commercialisation techniques should be 
recommended for the management of public enterprises that are not privatized; 
iii) Fundamental changes in the accounting system should be introduced, to 
accommodate cash accounting as well as accrual and capital charging; 
iv) Government should institutionalize a competent, efficient and accountable 
system of governance that offers an enabling environment for private investors. 
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The regulatory and law enforcement functions need to be performed strictly to 
protect consumers and citizenry from unscrupulous investors; and 
v) African governments should establish Work Improvement Teams (WITs) as a 
means of enhancing the quality of services, through increased productivity and 
teamwork. Governments need to emphasise reforms that enhance efficiency in 
the public services, value for money, financial and managerial activity. 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2003, p. 50) 
 
In both developed and developing countries, the damaged perceptions of the public service 
was exacerbated further as governments held the expensive public sector responsible for its 
budget deficits and fiscal crisis, and they therefore introduced market-driven policies and 
service reforms in line with the NPM paradigm to try and address these( Haque, 2004). The 
globalisation of NPM has also been influenced by various international actors such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the Asian 
Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and the United Nations Development Bank according to Haque. The push for neo-liberal 
policy preferences in developed nations, encouraged these international institutions to have 
an anti-state policy stance, and imposed private sector based public sector reforms (in line 
with the NPM model) on developing nations during the 1980s and 1990s. There are also 
mega-regional organisations - including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European 
Union (EU) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) – which all have advocated 
NPM style reforms in the public sector – often as a conditionality of the loans that they 
offered. In addition, many international management consultancy firms and public 
management experts have played a significant role in packaging and selling the principles of 
NPM to governments worldwide (Haque, 2004). 
 
In questioning if NPM is appropriate for Africa, Vyas-Doorgapersad (2011) in his review of its 
implementation in Africa has found this varied. The common elements of NPM as practised 
in African countries according to this author include: 
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(i). Decentralisation or decentralising management which involves disaggregating and 
downsizing of public services. Decentralisation includes deconcentration, delegation, 
devolution or privatisation. This has not happened in the present health sector reform in 
South Africa or anywhere else in Africa in any substantive way particularly as regards direct 
delivery of health services. 
ii). Contracting out is an alternative term for outsourcing which means contracting, sub-
contracting or  externalising non-core activities to free up cash, personnel, time and facilities 
for activities. This has potential within current health sector reforms particularly as regards 
laundry, cleaning services, security and food provision in the short term and the envisaged 
purchaser-provider split of health service delivery in the long term. But this will require 
massive investment in training and use of appropriate financial and health information 
systems to be put in place with the appropriate professional and technical support. 
(iii). Performance Contracting which is an instrument to reform state-owned enterprises. 
Performance based contracting in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda is an 
outcome-based approach to improving health services delivery (Johannes, et. al., 2011). So 
far this has been  inappropriately implemented in the South African public health sector and 
what is need is an overall review bringing elements of what is required by the OHSC, the NHI 
and linking individual performance to institutional performance appropriately. 
(iv). Corporatisation is an emerging trend that involves converting civil service departments 
into free standing agencies or enterprises, either as a part of the civil service or completely 
outside it. South Africa has embarked on this form of NPM in its creation of many of its State 
Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) such as the establishment of the Companies and Intellectual 
Property Registration Office (CIPRO) but with mixed results (Chipkin and Lipietz, 2012). 
 
Some of the other new techniques that have been adopted in some parts of Africa include 
performance management systems (Botswana, South Africa, Uganda); pay and grading 
reform ( Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea and Tanzania), operational and management control 
systems (South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius), total quality management and 
information and communication technologies in service delivery in many African countries. 
(Vyas Doorgapersad, 2011). These again have some successes but mostly have not been 
sustained. Larbi (1999) argues that the new public management approach may not be a 
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panacea for the problems of public sector management particularly in crisis states, but a 
careful and selective adaptation of some elements to certain sectors may be beneficial. 
 
A review of the NPM literature also indicates an emerging opposing view focusing on the 
weaknesses of NPM and whether it’s still relevant or not (Boston, 2009). Drechsler, (2005, p. 
10) articulates this quite well in his paper on “The Rise and Demise of the New Public 
Management” where he concludes that: “The price paid for NPM reforms has been 
high…The optimal solution for this is a genuine post-post NPM system, Weberian-based but 
with the lessons from NPM learned, …..which puts the human person into the center of 
administrative decision making.”  
 
Some of these changes point to failings of the NPM. Privatisation, corporatisation, 
decentralisation and agentification without independent and autonomous monitoring and 
evaluation (appropriate accountability frameworks) of these institutions may produce 
corruption and lead to abuse. Incentivisation in the absence of disincentivisation does not 
work. Whole-of-Government, collaborative government, public-private partnerships or 
joined-up government is not sustainable in the absence of shared trust between the 
associated partners according to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004). Also, one cannot have a good 
quality of government without competent civil servants. The permanent adaptation of NPM 
is defined succinctly in the following sentence: “different circumstances demand different 
managerial tools”. This represents public value pragmatism according to Alford and Hughes 
(2008, p. 130). The aggregate of terminology according to these authors informs the key 
mechanisms of NPM, which are people: “People for People” as the new NPM mantra. The 
new PM needs capable and dedicated managers, who carry out the appropriate policies and 
provide public services to the citizens in a manner that are efficient, effective, ethical, 
accountable, responsive and able to adapt easily to different conditions. This can only be 
done if there is sufficient decentralisation and delegation as well as appropriate 
performance measurement and accountability.  
 
The focus of this research therefore was to unpack these principles as viewed from the CEOs 
perspectives as well as understand them in the context of NPM reforms and policies that 
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pushed for the decentralisation of management, the development of performance and 
accountability mechanisms, as well as the appointment of competent and skilled CEOs of 
public hospitals in South Africa. The research also explores how these changes in the current 
South African public health system impacted on CEOs of public hospitals (as senior health 
service managers) ability to deliver good quality of care. In terms of  the new Policy on the 
Management of Hospitals (South Africa, 2012) there is elaboration on the structure and 
functioning of hospital boards as well with the aim of improving governance and 
accountability at public hospital level. The requirements and roles and responsibilities of the 
CEOs of hospitals are also broadly defined. Administration is necessarily embedded in public 
law and political institutions and customs, and the consequences of state-building forces for 
governmental institutions and performance is of fundamental importance (Lynn, 2006). In 
the South African context the lack of enabling legislation was assumed to be a major 
impediment in implementing hospital management reform but it appears that now with the 
necessary political will and the enabling statutes that were proposed such as the Policy on 
National Health Insurance (South Africa, 2011a) and the Policy on the Management of 
Hospitals (South Africa, 2012) this has changed. There is now some policy direction and an 
enabling policy framework to ensure government delivers on promises it makes. 
 
As the NPM becomes more results orientated the significance of the results measuring 
process (i.e. performance management) has increased markedly. This however is 
inextricably linked to delegations and accountability within a legislative framework. It must 
be noted that there has been substantial literature expressing disapproval of  NPM 
protagonists views in that they ignore the history of reinventing government (Williams, 
2000) and that are often too naive in their criticism of traditional public administration 
(Riccucci, 2001). However for purposes of this research the NPM paradigm (as described 
above) is used as it is the prevailing public administration structure in advanced capitalist 
societies and is being increasingly used by developing nations. It is also still relevant locally 
as the South African government is using its principles and tools albeit not wholeheartedly 
because it does not want to create the impression that it is buying into its neo-liberal 
ideological roots as argued by Cameron (2009). 
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The theoretical framework based on the NPM paradigm and its key dimensions of improved 
productivity, marketisation, service orientation, decentralisation, appropriate policy and 
capacity in the public sector also informed the evolution of public management in South 
Africa. Its manifestation in particular as regards CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa is 
examined. What we can conclude is that the NPM paradigm has been influencing public 
sector reform in South Africa since 1994 and to a lesser extent health sector reform. The 
recently adopted legislation and policy announcement clarifies the future of the health 
system generally and that of CEOs in public hospitals in particular and places the research 
questions within a much more certain context than what prevailed in the past. What will be 
researched is whether these reforms as guided by NPM principles have worked or not as 
viewed by the CEOs themselves as well as by other key informants as outlined in this 
research. One such principle is that of performance management. 
 
2.3.2. Performance Management  
 
Importantly linked to the issue of New Public Management and its relationship to the 
effective management of public hospitals is the discourse on performance management and 
management accountability, and its measurement and research in the public sector in 
particular ( Perry, 2009). These are also some of the NPM tools referred to by Kettl (1997, 
2000) earlier on in this review. As can be seen from the discussion above NPM has become 
more results orientated and the importance of performance management has increased 
dramatically. However research on performance management is challenging and Perry 
(2009) elaborates on the development of criteria that informed this research agenda.  
 
In New Zealand, personalised performance contracts have supplanted the rigid rule- and 
process-based civil service system. Public service managers are recruited on fixed term 
contracts and negotiate their performance outputs with their seniors or even with ministers 
depending on the level of appointment. There are performance rewards for excellent work 
and they can be dismissed if they are not meeting their negotiated outputs or targets. The 
agency managers (who are on performance contract to democratic governance structures 
independent of government), in turn, often hire their own senior managers and hold them 
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accountable through performance contracts. This performance managed, output based, 
contract-governed system has nearly entirely superceded the nation’s traditional civil 
service system in New Zealand. (Kettl, 1997, p. 446-462). 
 
With regard to developing criteria for this research reference is made to the work by Perry 
(2009). Perry argues that the criteria he developed in 1991 are still pertinent today and can 
be used for research on understanding human resource management generally. These 
criteria are useful for developing the research questions and determining what types of 
questions should be used to assess a strategic human resources research agenda. This is 
also useful in assessing performance as viewed by the practitioner (or as in this research 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa) and enquiring about their views of their ability to 
perform, what performance management systems are in place, have they sufficient 
delegation, are they held accountable and what do they recommend in improving their 
ability to perform better. The latter issue of delegations and concomitant accountability is 
according to the literature review and document analysis key to understanding some of the 
limitations faced by CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa. 
 
The performance management implementation and its effect on hospitals particularly in 
developed countries have had a variety of impacts according to Christensen, Laegried and 
Stigen (2014, p. 120). They reviewed a new performance management system implemented 
in Norway using a Management By Objectives and Results (MBOR) performance 
management tool. They found that it undermined the informal trust based approach that 
traditional public administration relied upon and replaced it with a performance 
management system based on distrust and technical instrumental features. However 
performance management is seen as an essential part of the armamentarium of NPM and 
has been adopted within the South African public sector (South Africa, 1997) and this 
research also intended to assess its usefulness as perceived by the CEOs of public hospitals. 
 
Dzimbiri also argues the case for performance management systems implementation in the 
public sector in Botswana (2008). Dzimbiri defines performance management as: “a 
strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success to organizations by 
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improving the performance of people who work in them and by developing their capabilities 
of teams and individual contributions” (Dzimbiri, 2008, p. 43-57). To improve the quality of 
public services delivered and to satisfy the consumer (the citizen), the Directorate of Public 
Service Management (DPSM) of the Botswana government set out to develop initiatives 
that was planned to improve public service delivery. From 1994 to 1997 the DPSM 
introduced a variety of reforms such as the introduction of Work Improvement Teams 
(WIT), a Performance Based Reward System (PBRS), Decentralisation and an Organisation 
and Methods (O&M) Review. However poor public service delivery continued. Government 
came up with another initiative of improving public service delivery processes by 
introducing Business Process Reengineering. This mainly through the use of performance 
management systems (PMSs) to secure efficient and effective public service delivery and to 
ensure the improvement and sustainability of higher productivity levels. The PMSs were 
piloted in a few ministries and eventually adopted by government. The outcomes of 
implementation and in particular as regards service delivery were positive ever since the 
introduction of PMSs. The main challenges were that it was not equally enforced in all 
ministries, there were not sufficient champions (performance coordinators) to drive these 
changes in a sustainable way and there were often insufficient funds to ensure performance 
payments that were adequate or appropriate. Other challenges relate to 
knowledge/information gaps, institutional roles and responsibilities, authority positioning 
and reform fatigue. Dzimbiri believes that PMSs have the possibility to improve the 
performance of the public system and augment its ability to provide efficient service 
delivery to the nation. Performance Management Systems are still an important NPM tool 
that needs to be customised to the institution or public service that uses it. Another 
question for this research is whether our public service PMSs are appropriate to our setting? 
 
The view by Perry (2009) who has developed a strategic agenda for future performance 
management systems research informed the proposed research as well. Perry introduced 
several criteria for assessing important research for building our understanding of the 
human resources management field. These were informed by an analysis of the contents of 
leading human resource management journals. The journals collectively provided extensive 
evidence of human resource management research across many sectors and between 
65 
 
 
 
 
 
domestic and foreign contexts. The process informed the development of five strategic 
research agendas covering compensation, motivation, culture and political context, efficacy 
and effectiveness, and training and development. The selection criteria proposed was used 
in the development of the research questions and informing the agenda of this research, 
which focused on CEOs perceptions on issues of efficacy and effectiveness of the 
management of public hospitals mainly, and to a lesser degree to the other issues of 
motivation, culture and political context. These strategic research agenda items also 
assisted in developing the appropriate research questions for the in-depth interviews in 
particular. An area closely linked to issues of performance measurement is that of 
performance accountability and this is discussed next. 
 
2.3.3. Performance Accountability 
 
Another aspect of this research is to look at performance accountability from the viewpoint 
of the CEOs and other key informants of public policy and of public hospitals in South Africa. 
A worldwide expert in the area on accountability is De Lancer Julnes (2006, p. 1)  and in her 
seminal article on the issue of accountability makes the following arguments that in the 
United States, commentators have settled on “oversight and compliance” as the most 
reliable description of the accountability concept. Related to this the operationalisation of 
performance accountability and for the purpose of this research the accountability will be 
understood as holding someone responsible for something or some action. Thus, De Lancer 
Julnes describes being accountable as being responsible for one’s actions and subsequent 
consequences. This implies a direct causal relationship between actions and results, a point 
of contention for some commentators. The mechanism for holding a person or employee 
accountable is the domain of what Roberts (2002, p. 660) calls performance-based 
accountability, which “requires the specification of outputs and outcomes in order to 
measure results and link them to goals that have been set, in accordance with the norms of 
management practice”. 
 
Performance-based accountability according to De Lancer Julnes (2006) demands the need 
for performance measurement. This also requires the continuous collection of information 
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about an institution’s service outputs and results as measured against its planned goals and 
objectives. This main importance of focussing on results for both accountability and 
performance measurement has been linked with the increasingly negative perception of 
how the public view how their taxes are being spent (Schein, 1996). The perceived poor 
delivery of services by government has created pressure from civil society demanding much 
more accountability in terms of outputs and results. Performance measurement with an 
emphasis on results or outcomes has been hailed as a way to deal with these pressures for 
results-based accountability (Hatry, 1997). Ferlie (2000) also looks at the question of 
accountability much more comprehensively. He suggests that one should first distinguish 
between political and managerial models of accountability.  Political accountability ensures 
that those with democratic authority (such as politicians) are answerable for their promises 
and actions to the people. In contrast managerial accountability is ensuring that those with 
delegated authority deliver the agreed outcomes of performance (such as management by 
objectives or outcomes). It is more confined, circumscribed and less contestable than 
political forms of accountability (Ferlie, 2000, p.  121-138).  
 
This development of the accountability concept from the assessment of inputs and outputs 
towards that of outcomes was also driven by the United States of America’s federal 
government under the then US Vice-President Al Gore’s National Performance Review 
initiative and which culminated in 1993 with the passing of the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA) (Kettl,2000). Under the GPRA, federal agencies were to report on 
quantitative performance measures and targets.  Hatry (1997) argues that this evolution of 
accountability was not limited to the United States and that similar practices unfolded in 
New Zealand and Australia. However De Lancer Julnes cautions in drawing lessons from 
elsewhere since her target audience is American but she does concede that the larger point 
as regards the internationalisation of performance measurement, with various countries 
providing lessons for each other are useful and noteworthy.  
 
To summarise, De Lancer Julnes (2006) points out that the need for accountability in the 
government of the United States is determined in terms of the performance or results of 
actions of the public services. In this regard good performance has come to mean whether 
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the community or the constituents are satisfied with the way public services have been 
rendered. Current performance monitoring measures are called Managing for Results 
according to the author (ibid). These management improvement strategies were aimed at 
connecting the measures of performance to project or programme outcomes, and had to 
report continuously on the achievement of levels of performance. Governments can now 
show to their constituents what value for money they are getting for their taxes, how 
effectively their tax dollars are spent, and how expenditures benefit constituents’ lives. The 
NSDA signed by the Minister of Health and The Strategic Plan of the National Department of 
Health details the deliverables promised to its citizens in a similar manner (South Africa, 
2011a and South Africa, 2011b). The new Policy on Hospital Management creates the 
framework for accountability of the CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa through its job 
requirements and the establishment of hospital boards as its preferred governance 
structure  in a very prescriptive manner (South Africa, 2012).  
 
Performance measurement has been at the centre of current management reforms to 
improve accountability. As defined by De Lancer Julnes (2006, p. 161): “performance 
measurement is the regular and careful monitoring of planned implementation and 
outcomes”. De Lancer Julnes concludes that given the increasing demands of calls for more 
accountability of government institutions by citizens the world over it is rational to put 
forward the argument that performance measurement will continue to be a major 
consideration in addressing such demands. This research assesses performance 
management systems and its applicability and usefulness from the perspective of CEOs of 
public hospitals. A top down view of experts in policy and management and a bottom up 
view by senior hospital mangers is also sought in this regard. However performance 
measurement by itself has its own challenges and what one has to guard against is the issue 
of performance paradox. 
 
2.3.4. The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector 
 
Authors van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) posit that there has to be awareness and caution about 
the possible negative consequences of performance measurement in the public sector, aptly 
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termed the performance paradox.  They argue that whilst countries worldwide  devote 
more attention and spend more money and time on performance measurement and 
evaluation of the public sector efficiency and effectiveness than ever before, there are 
unintentional consequences that may not only challenge conclusions about public sector 
performance but can also adversely influence that performance.  They comment that the 
New Public Management (NPM) approach used by many governments ascribe a high priority 
to measuring outputs and outcomes. These governments aimed to develop and implement 
new policies and management activities from the information they got from the 
measurement of performance and this was intended to make policy implementation much 
more efficient and effective. However there have also been many unsuccessful attempts at 
introducing results-based management. 
 
Results based management has also been adopted by the South African government, in 
particular its cabinet, to measure the performance of Ministers and their departments. The 
authors do acknowledge the need for measuring outputs and outcomes if we want to 
improve government’s performance. However, they also describe that a number of unique 
characteristics of the public sector can be counterproductive to developing and using 
performance indicators, illustrated by different examples and these are described below. 
 
NPM practitioners convinced politicians to focus on their main business, which is making 
policies to achieve political goals but that implementation should be left to the market or 
quasi-market environment. This separation of policy and administration is to be managed 
through performance contracts which details what tasks are to be carried out  and by whom 
and what incentives were to be received and under what conditions. The executive agents’ 
performance is defined in terms of performance indicators, such as the number of goods or 
services rendered. Input management has thus been replaced by a results-based orientation 
according to de Bruijn (2002). This appears to have also influenced current thinking around 
the implementation of the NHI (South Africa, 2011). 
 
The performance paradox explains that there is a weak association between performance 
indicators and performance itself and the performance shortfall is caused by the general 
69 
 
 
 
 
 
inclination of performance indicators to lose measurable validity over time. According to 
van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) the deterioration of some performance indicators is due to four 
actions. The first is positive learning: that is, as performance improves, indicators lose their 
ability in detecting poor performance. The second is perverse learning, that is, when 
organisations or individuals have learned which aspects of performance are measured (and 
which are not), they use that information to game (falsify) their assessments. The third, 
selection, refers to the substitution of poor performers with better performers (akin to the 
healthy worker effect), which results in only good performers remaining, and the indicator 
loses its discriminating value. And fourth, suppression occurs when changes in performance 
are ignored. 
 
A comment by van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) is illustrative. These authors report on the 
percentage of crimes solved by the Dutch. The percentage of crimes solved was decreasing 
in the period under study and indicated therefore that the police’s performance was 
deteriorating. However, there were more perpetrators arrested, prosecuted, and punished 
than ever before, which should have indicated an improvement in performance. The 
authors show that crime patterns have changed in a way that invalidates this (well 
recognised) indicator. 
 
Another example of the performance paradox is a case of overrepresentation which looked 
at the UK National Health Service (NHS). It was negotiated as part of a performance 
indicator that patients should not be on a waiting list for an operation for longer than 2 
years. This measure seemed to work, as the average waiting time for an operation 
decreased. However, on further investigation it was found that because the waiting time 
was only counted after the first hospital consultation, consultations were postponed to 
decrease the waiting time (perverse learning). The indicator therefore did not accurately 
reflect performance, as the average waiting time did not improve at all but was merely 
pushed forward in time. The indicator reported an improvement where there was none. The 
two examples according to van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) indicated that a performance 
paradox can be invoked unintentionally (the police example) or deliberately (the health care 
example). 
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Accordingly, van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) and de Bruijn (2002) recommend that to 
counteract these unintended consequences of performance measurement in the public 
sector, performance assessment systems must take into account the unique features of the 
public sector.  The challenging nature of the use of performance indicators often requires 
the use of not one but many indicators, referring to distinct aspects of policy 
implementation (both tangible and intangible) and taking into account the interests of the 
various stakeholders (politicians, managers, funders, providers, purchasers, and consumers). 
They recommend that equilibrium has to be balanced between too much and not enough 
measure pressure. The authors make mention of an example of a performance monitoring 
framework that appears to take into account these issues and was developed for the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) by the Productivity Commission to benchmark 
the performance in the education, health, housing and community service sectors. South 
Africa has still to develop such detailed performance monitoring frameworks in my opinion. 
 
2.3.5. The New Public Management paradigm and its effect on public sector management 
in Africa and South Africa 
 
The African experience of NPM was somewhat different to that of the western world 
according to Nicholas Awortwi (2006). Awortwi states that a number of African States have 
used market and private sector management techniques as prescribed by the New Public 
Management (NPM) paradigm to reform the government sector with varying degrees of 
success. The main reason for this according to Awortwi is that most African countries lack a 
professional bureaucracy upon which NPM critically relies upon. He suggests that the 
training and capacitation of government officials is important for the NPM changes to occur 
and makes a plea to training institutions to take up this challenge. But despite this Awortwi 
is emphatic that Africa is beginning to transform and he says this is because of globalisation 
imperatives, rolling back of state functions, public sector efficiency requirements and 
internationalisation of NPM, amongst other changes that have altered the way government 
is doing its work. However, Vyas-Doorgapersad (2011) concludes in his review that there has 
been  varied results and few successes in the African experiences of NPM implementation. 
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The impact of the New Public Management paradigm on the public sector also had an 
impact in South Africa. Professor Robert Cameron (Cameron, 2009) answers two research 
questions. Firstly, to what degree has the South African public service been transformed by 
NPM reforms as compared to other reforms? And secondly, what has been the impact of 
these reforms? He suggests that although one of the main components of NPM was the 
move to the decentralisation of authority and responsibility to managers, in practice this has 
not occurred. There has been restricted delegation to Managers or Director-Generals by 
Ministers at National level as well as from Members of Executive Committees to Heads of 
Departments at Provincial level. He also contends in his paper that there has been a push 
towards a stronger central state in recent years with the idea of the developmental state 
and a joined-up government approach taking precedence over the initial NPM attempts to 
decentralise in the early year’s post 1994. South Africa did attempt following some 
international NPM trends by for example reducing public service staff in the 1990s but this 
had negative repercussions as it led to an exodus of skilled staff. 
 
 After 2000 there has been recognition of the shortage of skills in the public sector and a 
move to targeted growth in order to create an appropriate and sustainable cadre of skilled 
and professional staff. Another NPM reform that was widely adopted was corporatisation in 
the form of public entities (over 800 State Owned Enterprises have been created in South 
Africa since 1994). However the majority of these public entities was created in the 
Ministries of Transport and Trade and Industry and was more to deal with functional 
efficiencies than following the NPM ideology. Contract appointments, and the creation of a 
generic performance appraisal system were also NPM reforms adopted in an attempt to 
create a more flexible human resources system but this has been patchy at best according 
to Cameron (2009) and inconsistently applied as were the rest of the NPM reforms. 
Cameron concludes that at the end of the day the ANC government (with strong pressure 
from its alliance members) was not fully committed to right wing Public Sector Reforms. In 
fact the then Minister of Public Services, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (2006), admitted that 
the government wanted to use NPM skills, tools and techniques without buying into its 
neoliberal ideological framework. This suggested a less than enthusiastic commitment to 
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NPM reforms and therefore relatively little attempts at decentralisation and an avoidance of 
delegation of authority to senior managers which confirms the central theme of this 
research. Polidano (1999) also concludes that in developing countries NPM ideas are quite 
prevalent but more so at the level of political rhetoric rather than practice. He also 
examines the argument as to whether the NPM is appropriate for developing countries 
generally or not and in particular because of the prevailing problems such as corruption and 
poor administrative capacity. 
 
Further evidence of this reluctance to decentralise and delegate responsibilities to 
managers was confirmed by an earlier study by McIntyre and Klugman (2003) that showed 
that managers at the regional, district and facility level have a perception that they are 
excluded from the decision making processes and thus felt undervalued and disempowered. 
Although the study focused mainly on interviews with national, provincial and local health 
managers the findings also confirm the premise of the study that there is insufficient 
delegation of authority and that managers are annoyed that they are merely expected to 
implement decisions made by those above them without the appropriate support.  
 
2.4. The World Health Organization’s and other international proposals on improving 
health systems  
 
The World Health Report 2000 called “Health Systems: Improving performance” (WHO, 
2000), was the first World Health Report (WHR) that addressed the importance of having a 
good and fair health system as well as assessing its performance as critical in determining its 
impact on the health outcomes of any populations groupings. This report also informed HSR 
in South Africa. The report assists in understanding the real goals of health systems with its 
defining purpose being the improvement and protection of health. It also suggests that if 
policy-makers are to act on performance measures they need to have a clear understanding 
of the key functions of a health system which are viz. providing adequate health care  
services, producing the appropriate human and physical resources that make service 
delivery possible, raising and pooling the resources used to finance health care, and most 
73 
 
 
 
 
 
importantly addressing the issue of stewardship i.e. providing strategic direction for all of 
the different stakeholders involved. 
 
In further developing its health systems strengthening framework the WHO defined six 
building blocks critical for an effective health system (WHO, 2007, p. 3) as follows: 
1. Quality Health Services which deliver effective, safe, equitable, personal and non-
personal health services to those that need them, when and where needed. It also 
emphasises the paramount importance of good management to maximise health 
service coverage, quality, and safety and efficiency and that autonomy which 
encourages innovation should be balanced by policy, programme consistency and 
accountability. 
2. A productive health workforce that works in ways that are responsive, fair and 
efficient to achieve the best health outcomes possible, given the available resources 
and circumstances are fairly distributed and staff that are competent, responsive 
and caring. 
3. An appropriate health information system that ensures production, analysis, 
dissemination and use of reliable and timely information on health determinants, 
health system performance and health status. 
4. A well- functioning health system that ensures equitable access to essential medical 
products, vaccines and technologies of assured quality and cost effectiveness and 
which are scientifically sound. 
5. A good health financing system that raises adequate funds for health, in ways that 
ensure people can use needed services, and are protected from financial catastrophe 
or impoverishment associated with having to pay for them.  
6. Leadership and governance (although mentioned as the last building block this is the 
most significant, as all of the abovementioned will not succeed if this building block 
is absent or weak).  
 
The WHO also elaborated further upon this in its series on Making Health Systems Work in 
its Working Paper No. 10 (2007) called “Towards Better Leadership and Management in 
Health:  Report on an International Consultation on Strengthening Leadership and 
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Management in Low-Income Countries 29 January – 1 February 2007, Accra, Ghana (WHO, 
2007, p. 2-3) where it makes special mention in its proposed framework on the following as 
regards managers in the health services: 
 
1. Ensuring adequate numbers and deployment of managers throughout the health  
system, 
2. Ensuring managers have appropriate competencies (knowledge, skills, attitudes and 
behaviours), 
3. The existence of a functional critical support system (to manage money, staff, 
information, supplies, etc.) and, 
4. Creating an enabling working environment (w.r.t. roles and responsibilities, 
organisational context and rules, supervision and incentives, relationship with other 
actors). 
 
In terms of creating an enabling environment the WHO framework requires clarification of 
the extent of autonomy, and clearly defined roles and responsibilities, a good match 
between roles and structures, the presence of national standards, rules and procedures and 
so on. The report highlights the importance of delegation of authority (over staff, budgets, 
etc.) as a particular challenge in the working environment in the health sector which relates 
to this research’s main focus and recognises this as an international problem (WHO, 2007). 
The WHO does not make use of any NPM tools but argues the case for a move to 
strengthening health systems using their generic tools. 
 
The literature review covered the theoretical framework of the study. In this it looked at an 
international overview of NPM, why it occurred and how it played itself out in different 
parts of the Western World either developing in the Westminster Model such as the UK or 
the Re-inventing Government Model in the USA. It also looked at the views of detractors of 
NPM and questioned its validity in today’s world. Performance Management and 
accountability is also reviewed as a concept and its difficulty in research and application. 
The performance paradox is also discussed as a consequence of too much performance 
management. The literature review and the document analysis of the South African 
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experience with NPM and health sector reform and the role of CEOs are discussed as well. 
What is evident is that there has been tremendous transformation in the public sector and 
in particular the health sector in South Africa. The challenge of using the tools of NPM and 
not buying into its neo-liberal ideology has and will still be a key concern to the ANC led 
government. The South African government did adopt policies and legislation to implement 
the NPM paradigm and its most notable successes were in the Transport and Trade and 
Industry Ministries. The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service as well as 
the Public Finance Management Act was the most important pieces of policy and legislation 
enabling NPM reforms. However this has been patchy in particular in the Health Sector 
where reforms intended to decentralise health management and hospital management in 
particular has not sufficiently materialised.  
 
The recent promulgation of the Policy on the Management of Hospitals and the current 
reforms undertaken by the Minister of Health (with the signing of his Negotiated Service 
Delivery Agreement) has set the health system on a more structured and determined effort 
to improve health services in general and hospital management in particular. With this 
comes more accountability at all levels of the services. The DBSA determination on what is 
an ideal CEO and the recent assessments of CEOs are also discussed. The literature review 
and document analysis highlights the challenges that CEOs have faced in defining their roles 
and responsibilities since 1994 to date and it contextualises this research within the public 
sector and health sector reforms that have taken place since 1994. The WHOs views on 
what is required for effective health systems are also presented. In terms of the literature 
review and document analysis there has been insufficient decentralisation of health 
management and that the politicians still exert a huge amount of influence on the ability of 
health service managers to perform. There has been insufficient enabling policies and 
legislation for CEOs of public hospitals to manage effectively until now. In terms of this 
research the argument is made that NPM is an appropriate lens to view health sector 
reform and the challenges CEOs face in the management of public hospitals in South Africa. 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
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The major policy debates of the 1980s and 90s informed broad structural changes in 
government management practices in the UK and US and eventually other countries as well.  
Governments across the globe allowed new ideas such as NPM to lead a move away from 
the archaic centralised administrative practices of outdated governance to emerge from 
these trends in thought around management practices related to transaction cost 
economics, new institutional economics, public choice theory and new management 
theories. This is reflected on work by Kettl (1997, 2000, p. 67) and is articulated by Kettl as:  
“Management reform is not fundamentally about management. Elected officials do not 
pursue management reform for its own sake but because they believe it helps them achieve 
a broader political purpose”. 
 
This tension is and always has been between politics and management. The battle between 
what elected officials want, and delivering on what they promised  to their constituents on 
the one hand and what management does and is allowed to do on the other hand. A sober 
evaluation of the evidence from the various studies, projects, findings, and 
recommendations of the various consultants, Ministerial committees and task teams 
indicates that to improve overall hospital service delivery decentralisation is critical within 
the South African context. Adoption of NPM principles can occur within the current 
legislative reforms such as the WPTPSD and WPHSR. What is needed is a reform of financial 
management, human resources management and procurement efficiencies, and to 
minimise wastage and corruption. That decentralisation of authority regarding these 
matters has to be devolved onto hospital CEOs and senior management within an 
appropriate accountability framework. This view is supported by all of the evidence adduced 
to above and by the State President Thabo Mbeki himself in his State of the Nation Address 
in 2006. That it has not been put into effect can only be attributed to a comprehensive 
failure of Government to implement policy imperatives until now. However current reforms 
under the leadership of the new Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, indicates a 
determination to push reform, improve hospital management and restructure health care 
delivery fundamentally so as to improve the quality of health care to all South Africans. 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
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The methodology introduces the research paradigm and argues why the qualitative 
approach is the dominant form of the research. It is followed by the research design and the 
research methodology. This research is essentially a sequential mixed methods approach 
combining a quantitative element with two qualitative elements subsequently viz. in-depth 
interviews followed by focus group discussions. This section discusses the activities of the 
research regarding the collection, collating, consolidating, and analysing of data to form an 
argument for the thesis. Validity of the study through triangulation is discussed followed by 
the limitations and ethical issues.  
 
3.1. The Research Paradigm 
 
The research paradigm used for this study was largely qualitative with an element of 
quantitative research, so it can be referred to as a mixed methods approach. However a 
brief discussion drawing on the literature will clarify how I decided on this particular 
approach. Creswell (2003) suggests that for designing a research proposal a general 
framework or context should be used to provide unambiguous guidance on all aspects of 
the study, from determining the general philosophical assumptions behind the investigation 
to the detail of the data collection and analysis methods to be used. Creswell also 
elaborates on three frameworks that exist for designing a research proposal: quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed methods approaches. As this study has elements of both qualitative 
and quantitative research paradigms it can be regarded as mixed-methods. However the 
strength in this particular study is that following quantitative survey of CEOs opinions on 
management challenges they face a further set of in-depth interviews with these CEOs were 
carried out to explore these issues and proffer solutions from their perspective. To add to 
the understanding of the context of these challenges in-depth interviews were also carried 
out with experts in public management and a focus group with senior hospital managers. 
These participants were all purposefully selected and this approach adds much more validity 
to the findings and is truly a reflection of mixed methodologies intent in my opinion.  
According to Creswell (2003) mixed methods approaches have come of age and he argues 
that to include only quantitative or qualitative methods falls far short of the major research 
approaches being used currently in the social sciences. Furthermore, other developments in 
78 
 
 
 
 
 
social sciences research have been advanced by for example Newman & Benz (1998) argue 
that  the situation is less about qualitative versus quantitative research methodologies but 
how social sciences research practice lie on a continuum between the two. The most that 
can be said in modern day social sciences research is that studies tend to be either more 
quantitative or qualitative in nature. Bergman (2008) argues that these differences need to 
be re-examined and reconceptualised in order to benefit the mixed-methods approach. He 
argues that it contributes to a more robust approach to epistemology and lends itself easier 
to triangulation and therefore validation of findings. 
 
Creswell (2003) postulated that although the mixed methods approach is not as well 
developed than either the quantitative or qualitative strategies in social sciences research, it 
is much more pertinent today than ever before. Mixed methods research involves the 
collecting and analysing of both forms of information (qualitative and quantitative) in a 
single study. Creswell further elaborates that in acknowledging  that all methods have their 
limitations, researchers today, feel that any biases that emerge in any single method can be 
neutralised or cancelled if other methods are also used.  Green, Caracelli & Graham (1989) 
proposed that the usefulness of the mixed methods approach is that one may help enhance 
or inform the other. Also one method can be nested within another method so as to provide 
deeper insight into the different levels or units of analysis. The reasons for the mixed 
methods approach have led writers around the world according to Creswell (2003) to create 
new techniques for mixed methods of inquiry. This has developed into the numerous forms 
of mixed-methods research described in the literature such as multi-methods, convergence, 
integrated and combined, and furthermore shaped procedures for research. In particular 
three general procedures in which these strategies have been used are: 
1. Sequential procedures are where the researcher seeks to build upon or elaborate on the 
research results of one method with another method, 
2. Concurrent procedures are where the researcher converges quantitative and qualitative 
data simultaneously so as to provide a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 
research problem and, 
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3. Transformative procedures are where the researcher uses a hypothetical lens as an 
overarching point of view within a study design that uses both quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
 
In this research I used the sequential procedure i.e. quantitative research (self-administered 
questionnaires) followed by qualitative research (in-depth interviews followed by focus 
group discussions) so as to get a more reliable and valid insight into the challenges faced by 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa. This choice is elaborated upon further in the 
methods section below. 
 
3.2. The Research Design  
   
A research design according to Badenhorst (2007) is like a route planner. It is a set of clear 
guidelines and instructions on how to answer a particular research question. The research 
question is the ultimate destination of the route. Durrheim (1999) defines research design 
as the strategic framework for actions that serve as a bridge between research questions 
and execution of the research. More plainly, research design according to Durrheim (1999) 
is a planned systematic observation guided by research questions and a design that is 
specifically planned in order to ensure fulfillment of the specified purpose of the research.  
 
This section outlines the design of this study. The study design was carried out in phases, 
the first being an in-depth literature review and document analysis of public sector and 
health sector reform both internationally and specifically to South Africa. This was followed 
by a cross-sectional descriptive survey of a sample of 60 CEOs using a self- administered 
questionnaire. This was followed by in-depth interviews with 12 CEOs (from the sample of 
60) and in-depth interviews with three policy management experts that work at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. This was followed up with focus group discussions with a 
few of the CEOs (from the sample of twelve included in the in-depth interviews) and four 
senior hospital mangers. The experts provided a top down view of PSR and HSR in particular 
and the senior hospital mangers provided up a bottom up viewpoint of the challenges facing 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa. The design includes an elaboration of the 
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methodology applied in carrying out the research and a discussion of data analysis within an 
interpretive paradigm using thematic analysis. In this research the researcher adopted a 
sequential mixed method approach with the qualitative paradigm as the main methodology. 
The quantitative paradigm is used initially in the use of a questionnaire survey of 60 CEOs of 
public hospitals so as to provide empirical evidence for the assumption that they lack clear 
responsibilities and accountabilities and that these are the main factors that impedes their 
effective management of hospitals. This furthermore informed the design of the next stage 
of the study which was in-depth interviews with 12 CEOs of public hospitals drawn from the 
initial sample of 60. This was followed by a smaller focus group discussion with a few 
selected CEOs from the 12 interviewed before with a view to verifying the thematic analysis 
findings and offer recommendations to improve the current situation if required.   
 
The 12 in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with the CEOs were analysed and 
reflected upon. Subsequently, in-depth interviews were held with three experts in public 
management and with insightful knowledge of public sector and health sector reform in 
South Africa (Annexures 9 and 10). A focus group discussion was also held with a select 
group of senior hospital managers in order to validate the research findings as these were at 
a level just below the CEOs on the challenges faced by hospital in management of the 
institution and possible solutions. The latter two processes added more depth to the 
research in that it contextualised the CEOs perspectives (by having the experts view, a top 
down view) and further elaborated upon the lived experience of CEOs in running public 
hospitals (by having a focus group discussion with senior hospital managers, a bottom up 
view). 
 
3.3. The Research Methodology 
 
The third major element that goes into the research approach according to the Creswell 
model (2003) is the specific methods of data collection and analysis. In terms of the mixed 
methods research approach both predetermined and emerging methods were used in the 
form of document analysis, questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews and a focus group 
discussion. The one informed the other sequentially. 
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Creswell (2003) recommends that it is important to consider the full range of possibilities for 
data collection in any study, and to organise these research methods by their degree of 
importance in a predetermined way, their use of closed-ended versus open-ended 
questioning, and their focus for numeric versus non-numeric data analysis. In this study 
both open- and close-ended questions were used with multiple forms of data drawing on all 
possibilities with text and statistical analysis used where appropriate. 
 
This section discusses the activities of the research regarding, collating consolidating, and 
analysing data to form an argument for the thesis. According to Creswell (2003) these 
activities develop in response to a need to elucidate the purpose of mixing quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a single study. As described before this study followed a sequential 
mixed method but utilised the qualitative research method as the main methodology. The 
premise of the study is based on the aforesaid research questions.  
 
The study gathered data through a combination of a critical appraisal of the literature, 
document analysis, questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. 
With regard to the questionnaire survey the group’s response was sought in relation to their 
views on their ability to manage public hospitals effectively, their delegations or lack 
thereof, the importance of clear performance management structures with appropriate 
authority and their willingness to be further interviewed for the study. This served to inform 
the development of the subsequent in depth interviews. In depth interviews were 
conducted with a purposive sample of these CEOs to explore their responses further in 
relation to how they viewed their ability to manage effectively. The purposive sample was 
selected from the survey study as those CEOs that agreed to be interviewed were selected 
on the basis of experience and where they work. This was followed by a smaller selected 
group of CEOs taken from the in-depth interview group, where suggestions on how these 
challenges are viewed as a group and how can it be appropriately addressed. The CEOs were 
drawn from the database of the University of the Witwatersrand’s (Wits) School of Public 
Health where over 60 of the these CEOs details are kept – this from a National Department 
of Health’s initiative to train CEOs in hospital management  through an arrangement made 
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with the Universities  of the Witwatersrand (Wits) and KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) in 2005. Wits 
have largely focussed on Gauteng, Limpopo, the Free State, North-West, the Northern Cape 
and Mpumalanga Provinces, and hence the sample was drawn from these provinces (which 
approximates about 60 in total). Subsequent to this a further three in depth interviews were 
done with experts in public management that have particular insights in public sector and 
health sector reform in South Africa. Following on this a further focus group discussion was 
held with senior hospital managers from the public hospitals in Gauteng to gain an 
understanding of their perspectives of the challenges that CEOs face in running public 
hospitals and what are the possible solutions. This all was done to provide a very rich data 
set for the analysis. 
 
3.3.1. The Quantitative Methodology 
 
A quantitative approach according to Creswell (2003) is one in which the researcher 
primarily uses post-positivist approaches for developing knowledge, employs strategies of 
enquiry such as interventions or surveys, and collects data on predetermined instruments 
that yield appropriate statistical data. The quantitative methodology in this study was a 
survey of 60 purposefully selected CEOs using a self- administered questionnaire. The survey 
assessed in a quantitative manner whether managing effectively is a challenge, why it is a 
challenge and whether delegations or a lack thereof is a major determinant of management 
effectiveness for CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa. The research anticipated that 
although the total number of CEOs surveyed was about 60 a good response rate was 
anticipated and that truthful answers will be gleaned from the research because of the 
relationship established through the Hospital Management Programme. The purpose of 
conducting the survey was three fold; to acquire factual information on some aspects of the 
demography of the CEOs, the characteristics of the hospital (is it tertiary, regional, or 
district); to identify aspects in management effectiveness as defined by the CEOs (are they 
able to manage effectively) and is the latter closely associated with delegations of authority 
and performance measurement processes.  
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The other main reason for using a survey was to negotiate with CEOs for further access in 
order to engage in detailed data collection through an in-depth interview and subsequent 
focus group discussion (see Annexure 2 for the informed consent form). It was hoped that 
the CEOs would feel comfortable with further interviews once they had responded to the 
survey questions which indicated the reason for the research. Since the survey respondents 
were sought through a prior academic relationship (viz. the MPH Hospital Management 
programme) it was expected that this approach would put the CEOs at ease with the 
researcher.  
 
The survey instrument was designed such that it sought confidential responses but 
requested CEOs who were willing to be further interviewed in an in-depth interview and 
focus group discussion to disclose their willingness to participate. The questionnaire was 
emailed back to the researcher. 
 
The survey questionnaire was pre-tested on current MPH Hospital Management students. 
Pre-testing helped to identify problems that respondents may encounter in responding to 
the questions. The pre-testing also helped to check whether different respondents would 
interpret the questions the same way. Ultimately, the pre-testing of the survey instrument 
was expected to rule out biases or poor wording of the questions.  
 
3.3.2. The Qualitative Methodology 
 
A qualitative approach according to Creswell (2003) is one in which the researcher makes 
knowledge claims based mainly on constructivist perspectives or advocacy/participatory 
perspectives or both. The qualitative approach also uses methods of inquiry such as 
narratives, phenomenology’s, ethnographies, grounded theory studies, or case studies. The 
researcher therefore collects open-ended, emerging data with the main intent of developing 
themes. As indicated earlier, this study utilised the qualitative paradigm as its main research 
methodology. The justifications for a more elaborate use of qualitative interviews for this 
research are founded on the purpose of this study. This research intended to capture the 
lived experiences and practises of CEOs of public hospitals in relation to management 
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challenges and delegations of authority, accountability and performance management and 
how they personally view these. To add depth to these opinions and to assist in 
understanding them further the views were sought of experts in the areas of public 
management and of senior hospital managers reporting to CEOs.  
 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000) qualitative researchers believe that rich descriptions 
of the social world are critical in understanding complex social conditions such as found 
from first person accounts. Other reasons given on the importance for a qualitative study 
are drawn from Merriam‘s argument (1998). Merriam argues that qualitative research seeks 
to obtain an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon in order to discover what meaning 
people have constructed about that particular phenomenon. People attach new meanings 
and values to the issues that are confronting them in a rapidly changing public management 
environment. CEOs in particular have been given the attention  of the Minister of Health, 
the provincial head offices and the media and these have initiated changes as discussed 
earlier that may have been perceived differently by the public (South Africa, 2010). It was 
therefore important to understand these pressures from a CEOs perspective as well as from 
experts in public administration and senior managers reporting to CEOs of a public hospitals. 
(Bateman, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, according to Neuman (2011) qualitative researchers see almost all areas of 
social life as essentially qualitative. Qualitative data is not vague or deficient but highly 
meaningful. Qualitative research takes ideas from the people they study and places them 
within the context of a natural social setting. This was highly applicable to this study. 
 
3.3.3. The Mixed Methods Approach 
 
Creswell (2003) argues that the mixed methods approach is one in where the researcher 
bases knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds (e.g. consequence-oriented, problem-
centred, and pluralistic). It involves collecting data either concurrently or sequentially to 
better understand research problems. The data collection involves gathering both numeric 
information (e.g. on the survey instrument in this study) as well as text information (e.g. on 
85 
 
 
 
 
 
the interviews and focus group discussion as well as the document analysis) so that the final 
data set has both quantitative and qualitative information. This research used a mixed 
methods approach with quantitative and qualitative research methodologies sequentially 
employed. This research based its inquiry on the assumption that collecting diverse types of 
data best provides a deeper understanding of the research problem. The study began with a 
broad quantitative survey in order to generalise results to the study population and then 
focused, in the second phase, on detailed qualitative, open-ended interviews to collect in-
depth views from the participants. For example if the majority of CEOs in the survey 
acknowledge that a lack of delegations was a key obstacle to effective management then 
the subsequent in-depth interview took that into account. The survey also serves as gaining 
an entry point into this group of CEOs, making them aware of the study overall and inviting 
further participation. This was followed by a focus group discussion with a sub-group of the 
CEOs interviewed so as to validate the findings of the in-depth interviews and to proffer 
solutions going forward.  
 
This was further extended to include in depth interviews of experts in public management 
to understand the context of the functioning of CEOs in public sector hospitals and current 
public sector and health sector reform. A focus group discussion with senior hospital 
managers of public hospitals was also carried out to further understand and validate the 
CEOs views and to look at possible solutions going forward.   So in this situation the 
advantage of collecting both closed-ended quantitative data and open-ended qualitative 
data provided appropriate and in-depth information to best understand this research 
problem. This approach of mixed methods research captures the best of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. This research follows Creswell’s interpretation of the mixed 
methods approach to a degree but is much more dependent on the qualitative aspects in 
terms of its findings and analysis in that the first survey of CEOs using a self-administered 
questionnaire is used to generalise findings of the study population as well as to develop a 
detailed view of the meaning of a phenomenon or concept by these individuals through the 
in-depth interviews and to a lesser degree the focus group discussions. 
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3.4. The Data Collection  
 
Four methods were proposed to collect data; document analysis, survey questionnaires, in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions. Data was collected in four main phases as 
follows: 
 
3.4.1. Phase 1: Initial Document analysis 
 
Various documents containing data relevant to answering the research questions were 
analysed to inform the study. Thereafter, data relevant to this research was extracted from 
those documents and noted in the research notebooks. This initial phase of document 
analysis aimed to: 
1. Describe and critically evaluate New Public Management and Health Sector Reform 
policies applicable to CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa. 
2. Identify gaps in policies and plans in addressing the needs of CEOs to manage effectively. 
3. Demonstrate complexity of the implementation of policies identified in 1 above and 
what future plans there are to address these. 
 
Documents used were the relevant policy documentation from the National Departments of 
Health and Public Service, research done and published in the mainstream literature as well 
as research not published in peer reviewed journals but appropriate to the study. Any other 
sources of documentation such as newspaper articles as well as other media reports were 
used discretionally as cited before in the literature review and document analysis. This is 
presented in chapter 2 as background and in chapter 5 in the results and analysis. This was 
important in informing the development of the questionnaire and subsequently the in-
depth interviews. 
 
3.4.2. Phase 2:  The Questionnaire Survey 
 
A questionnaire survey of 60 CEOs was done initially (see Annexure 1 for the self-
administered questionnaire). This was intended to explore in a quantitative manner the 
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challenges CEOs face in managing their hospitals and what delegations meant to them. The 
sample was taken from a database of CEOs from the MPH Hospital Management 
programme run at the School of Public Health from 2006 to date. All 60 CEOs from the class 
were then purposively selected and sufficient responses from each province and different 
types of hospitals were anticipated. A very good response rate (50%) was achieved as 30 of 
the 60 CEOs contacted participated in the survey (Ehrlich, Joubert, 2014). The questions 
were all closed-ended so that the questionnaire lends itself to quantitative statistical 
analysis.  It was e-mailed to the participants, and confidentiality as well as anonymity was 
assured by coding the data and keeping the identifiers and codes under separate lock and 
key with the researcher. This was used when the sample was selected for the in-depth 
interviews. Informed consent was given by all the participants. The questionnaire was kept 
short so that it was easily filled in and returned. A high response rate was expected because 
of the existing relationship that the researcher had with these CEOs as MPH students. The 
CEOs were informed telephonically before the questionnaires were sent out and two 
reminder phone calls were followed through within the subsequent two weeks.  
 
3.4.3. Phase 3: In-depth Interviews 
 
From the 30 who responded to the self-administered questionnaires and who agreed to 
participate in the in-depth interviews a sample of 12 was selected for the in-depth 
interviews. Informed consent was first sought. The questions were open-ended and issues 
raised from the survey were further explored in depth. The main focus was to explore the 
CEOs lived experiences in terms of the challenges they face in managing hospitals, how they 
view their management effectiveness, the importance of performance management 
systems in their settings and particularly their delegations or lack thereof. Ultimately I 
wanted to explore their views on what they would possibly recommend to policy makers or 
senior managers in assisting them to manage their hospitals better (see Annexure 5 for the 
in-depth interview schedule). 
 
The sample for the in-depth interviews was drawn using a purposive sampling method. CEOs 
from all the provinces targeted by the survey were included. CEOs that have operated for a 
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minimum of three years were chosen since entry level CEOs would not have yielded useful 
management related information.  Also, the type of hospital being managed was considered 
in selecting the CEOs. Upon completion of the survey, those who had indicated an interest 
and willingness to be interviewed were followed up and assessed for their availability to be 
interviewed. It should be noted that in-depth interviews were conducted after a brief 
review of survey responses. A brief review of the survey responses aimed at obtaining an 
understanding of the perceptions, experiences and opinion of respondents from the survey 
and was used in formulating the interview schedule for the in-depth interviews. In-depth 
interviews with the willing CEOs sought to elicit a deeper understanding and interpretation 
of issues raised in the broader information produced in the preceding self-administered 
survey. Henning, Rensburg and Smit (2004) advised that the researcher needs to identify 
desirable participants who will travel with him on the journey to answer the research 
questions. The CEOs who responded positively to the in-depth interview had hospitals of 
varying sizes and responsibilities and this was important as it added nuances to the data 
from all hospital sizes. The respondents were contacted by phone to determine a date and 
venue for the in-depth interview. The in-depth interviews were intended to be 
conversations where the researcher is primarily a listener guiding the respondents into 
smooth transitions of topics albeit in a natural flow of information as provided by the 
respondent. At the end of each interview session, I affirmed in summary what the 
respondent meant. The affirmation was done by summarising the thoughts accrued and 
asking the respondents whether that was a correct interpretation of what the interviewer 
said.  Interviews were not scheduled back to back. Rather a minimum of a day was allowed 
between interviews to enable the  researcher to figure out the responses and write down 
process notes (things that happened but  were not obvious from records) as well as 
analytical notes (ideas that  arose upon meditating on the interview that risked getting 
forgotten) while the issues were still fresh in my mind. The responses were recorded with an 
audiotape and transcribed on the afternoon or evening of the interview session. Also, my 
reflections (views and feelings) were also recorded in the field notes immediately after the 
interviews before they were forgotten to aid in analysis of data.  
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The essence of interviewing the CEOs was to unpack the officials’ understanding of issues 
raised by the survey (which is informed by the research questions) with regard to 
management effectiveness and delegation. The researcher also sought the CEOs 
experiences while administering the in-depth interviews. The strategies of interviewing 
adopted for the CEOs were in order to elicit rich data.  The interviews were audio taped (see 
Annexure 6 for permission to audio tape).  
 
After the interviews and focus group discussions with the CEOs were conducted and 
analysed a further set of in depth interviews were carried out with three experts in public 
management (with particular knowledge of public sector and health sector reform in South 
Africa). This was done so as to add context and further depth to the research and in 
particular add an objective outside perspective of the local discourse on NPM, PSR and HSR. 
 
3.4.4. Phase 4: The Focus Group Discussion 
 
After the in-depth interviews were done and analysed a sample of six CEOs who participated 
in these in depth interviews were selected to participate in a focus group discussion. 
Informed consent was sought and it was anticipated that the six CEOs from various 
provinces would join in the focus group discussion. Only two CEOs of the six who agreed 
arrived. Another two sent their responses to my proposed questions by email. The focus 
group discussion was facilitated by myself and focussed on clarifying management 
challenges as informed by the in-depth interviews with the main aim in making 
recommendations to improve management effectiveness with a special focus on 
delegations (see Annexure 7). The focus group discussion did not add significantly in 
addressing the issue of management directly affected by a lack of delegations and poor 
performance management systems. However they added some insight into the lack of 
awareness and involvement in the current health sector reform initiatives. A further focus 
group discussion with senior hospital managers that report to CEOs of public hospitals was 
held so as to get their views on the challenges facing hospitals in managing effectively. This 
was intended to add depth to the research and to validate the findings of the CEOs 
interviews and focus group discussions as well as offer another perspective to finding 
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possible solutions to the challenges.  Focus groups are useful for concept exploration, 
generating new ideas and testing them, and determining distinguishing opinions between 
various groups (often stakeholders). Focus groups are often used as a means of 
triangulation with other data collection methods. Also, a guided discussion in focus groups 
more closely equates the unrestrained give and take of social discourse that goes into 
opinion formation which is often lost in the structured in-depth interview. Some believe 
that they are not intended to build consensus or make decisions but can inform the debates 
and discourse around research problems (Neuman, 2011).  
 
3.5. The Data Analysis 
 
Merriam (1998) defines data analysis as the process of making sense of the data that 
involves the consolidation and interpretation of what research participants have said.  
Regarding analysis, Merriam (1998) contends that data collection and analysis are best done 
simultaneously in qualitative studies.  Blanche and Kelly (1999) add to Merriam’s argument 
by stating that there is no clear point in time when data collection ends and data analysis 
begins in a qualitative research. Instead, data collection fades out gradually while data 
analysis fades in such a way that the researcher is mainly collecting data at the beginning 
and mainly analysing at the end.  
 
The literature review and document analysis informed the development of the self-
administered questionnaire. This was kept simple so that only key areas thought to be 
important could be covered in a simple yes, no, don’t know format. The survey responses 
were analysed using a standard statistical package, Epi info version 7, widely used to derive 
findings in health sciences. The analysis of the survey comprised mainly descriptive statistics 
in the form of frequency of responses chosen in the survey. The responses were further 
analysed with analytical statistics using t-tests and confidence intervals where appropriate. 
The sample size was too small to do in-depth any further analytical tests. Non parametric 
tests such as Chi-Square tests were carried out to assess if there were statistically significant 
differences between the various groupings whether it be by province, experience or 
demography. However because of the small sample sizes it did not provide any valuable 
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information. The data is presented with Confidence Intervals. The data also subsequently 
informed the development of the qualitative data collection tools viz. the in-depth and the 
focus group interview schedules. 
 
The qualitative data was analysed using a thematic analysis technique (Aronson, 1994). Atlas 
ti was used. In thematic analysis the task of the researchers is to identify a limited number 
of themes which adequately reflect the textual data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The in-depth 
interviews lend themselves to the following themes in terms of how CEOs view 
management challenges in the public sector in South Africa, how do they understand 
management effectiveness and how do current delegations or the lack thereof assist or 
mitigate against them managing effectively. Also, does the current performance 
management system assist or impede them in their ability to perform well. The focus group 
discussions main aim was to proffer solutions or recommendations in terms of the above 
thematic considerations. The focus group were also asked on their awareness and 
engagement with current health sector reform initiatives. These interviews (both in depth 
interviews and focus group discussions with the CEOs) were further tailored for in depth 
interviews with the public management experts. This was done in order to understand the 
challenges that the CEOs face in the current context of public and health sector reform in 
South Africa (top down). The further focus group discussion with the senior hospital 
managers was held to get a bottom up view of the challenges that CEOs face and what 
possible solutions there are. However the study was also open to any other themes that 
emerged. 
 
3.6. Validity  
 
The validity and reliability of data was promoted by the use of triangulation of the survey, 
the in-depth interviews and the focus group discussions. Blanche and Durrheim (1999) 
define triangulation as the use of many different methods in collecting data and reaching 
out for data from as many sources as possible.  Triangulation is an effective technique that 
enables the validation of data through cross verification from more than two sources, or in 
the social sciences research arena, it refers to the application and combination of several 
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research methodologies in the study of the same phenomena so as to get consistent 
answers. Blanche and Durrheim go on to explain that the researcher can triangulate both 
the methods by for instance analysing data both qualitatively and quantitatively. In this 
research, both method and data were triangulated. The multiple sources of data, which 
includes the survey and in-depth interviews followed by the focus group discussions, was a 
data triangulation strategy employed to enable the researcher to obtain different inputs 
from people. This multiple use of data collection methodologies employed in this research 
contributes to the depth and validity of the findings in a unique way in that two sets of in-
depth interviews were held (with CEOs and public management experts) and two sets of 
focus group discussions were held (with CEOs and senior hospital managers). This data was 
then checked for congruency in the messages that it could be sending as possible answers to 
the research questions. 
 
Method triangulation was also employed since the document analysis data was analysed to 
give a contextual picture of the challenges facing CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa 
and the concurrent unfolding of policies that impact on their roles and abilities to function 
adequately. In addition to the triangulation above, adequate time was spent in collecting 
data so that the data became saturated. Depth and richness of data was considered a 
strength in promoting the quality of research so that the results were as empirical as much 
as possible. The approach of utilising information derived from preceding interviews to draw 
information in subsequent interviews was aimed at digging deeply, richly and holistically in 
order to validate data. Consequently, the two sets of in-depth interviews were used to 
promote depth and richness of data.  The data generated was enriched and further 
validated by the two sets of focus group discussions through the triangulation process. 
 
3.7. Limitations of the Research 
 
The main limitation was that the majority of participants of this study were CEOs attending 
the MPH in Hospital Management at the University of the Witwatersrand. This limited the 
sample size considerably since there are many other CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa. 
The decision to sample from only five of the provinces in the country was due to limitations 
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in terms of both monetary and non-monetary resources such as time. This limitation, on the 
advice of the defence panellist, was subsequently addressed by interviewing three experts 
in public management and a further focus group discussion with senior health service 
managers within public hospitals. However, by collecting data from multiple sources in 
order to derive the varying nuances that were likely to yield adequate data for a thick, 
detailed and truthful description and understanding of the research question. 
 
3.8. Ethical Issues 
 
Ethical permission to conduct the study was given by the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Non-Medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand (No. H121001, Naidoo). All 
information collected from the CEOs were anonymised and kept confidential, except for the 
focus group discussions where confidentiality could not be guaranteed (see Annexures 2, 3 
and 4). No names were captured on the self-administered questionnaire or in the in-depth 
interviews. Codes were used to anonymise the survey and in-depth interviews and the 
names and codes of respondents were kept in a safe place. Personal autonomy was 
respected through an informed consent information sheet where the CEO as well as senior 
hospital managers who were invited to participate (in the survey, in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions), and the confidentiality as well as the right not to participate was 
assured. The potential benefit of the study was explained and no harm expected was also 
elucidated. However the in-depth interviews with the ascent from the experts was not kept 
confidential. A feedback process was explained as there is an ethical need and responsibility 
to report back on the findings.  
 
3.9. Conclusion 
 
The Research Methodology is described in this chapter. The Research Paradigm that was 
used in this study is largely qualitative and the rationale for this was to get an in-depth 
understanding of how CEOs of public hospitals view their managerial challenges.  A 
sequential procedure was adopted using document analysis followed by quantitative 
research (a self-administered questionnaire). This was followed by qualitative research (in-
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depth interviews and by focus group discussions). The document analysis was a critical 
appraisal of the literature, government documents as well as unpublished literature. The 
quantitative research was a cross sectional descriptive survey of thirty CEOs (sample size 
was 60). This was followed by the qualitative research which included in-depth interviews of 
12 CEOs as well in-depth interviews of experts in public management. The research was 
concluded with a focus group discussion of a few of the CEOs that were interviewed as well 
as a purposive sample of senior hospital managers. Quantitative data were analysed using a 
standard statistical package (Epi Info version7) and qualitative data were analysed 
thematically using Atlas ti. Validity and reliability was promoted by the use of triangulation. 
The main limitations of the study were that it confined itself to CEOs that attended 
postgraduate training at the University of the Witwatersrand and were known to the 
researcher. Furthermore the study was limited to 6 provinces in South Africa and CEOs were 
purposefully selected for the qualitative part of the research. All information collected from 
the CEOs was anonymised and kept confidential. 
 
 This study would not have been validated if the research only based its findings on the 
views of hospital CEOs only. To deal with this limitation (measurement bias and information 
bias) the research question had to be viewed through other perspectives. In depth 
interviews were therefore conducted with experts in public management to understand the 
context of the research problem in relation to current public sector and health sector 
reform context of South Africa. A further focus group discussion was also held with senior 
hospital managers of public hospitals. This to get another opinion (from health policy 
experts offering a birds eye view from the top down) as well senior hospital managers on 
how the CEOs of public hospitals view the challenges they face and to explore possible 
solutions from their perspective being closer to the coalface. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The results and their analysis are presented in this chapter. The initial phase of the research 
was the literature review and document analysis as described in chapter 2 and this informed 
the subsequent (sequential) methodology of the quantitative research ( the questionnaire 
survey) as well as the qualitative research (in-depth interviews and focus group discussions). 
These two aspects of the results as well as its analysis are presented in this chapter. The 
analysis, interpretation and triangulation of these findings are also presented. 
 
4.2. The Quantitative Analysis 
 
The MPH in Hospital Management training programme at the Wits School of Public Health 
had a total of 90 students for the intake period 2006 to 2008. Of these 90 students 30 had 
exited the programme before completing. The remaining 60 were all contacted by email and 
invited to participate in the study. They were all sent self-administered questionnaires and 
information sheets for written informed consent (see Annexures 1 and 2). The 
questionnaires were sent twice in December 2012 and again in January 2013. A total of 30 
responses were received (Response Rate of 50%) and the results are described below. This 
was as an good response rate as the usual expected response rate in a postal questionnaire 
is below 30% (Ehrlich and Joubert, 2014, 113-114) 
 
Age 
 
The mean age of the respondents was 52, 5 years and the range was 40 years to 62 years. 
(t-test 0.67, p value = 0.51). These were in line with the DBSA requirements as far as average 
ages of CEOs are concerned. They view as a marker, indirect as it may be, of experience. 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
Years worked as a CEO 
 
The mean years worked as a CEO was seven point seven years and the range was one year 
to 13 years. This demonstrated that in the main the CEOs had substantial hospital 
management experience. The mean required or suggested by the DBSA was about 6 years of 
experience in any form of health management before appointment to a CEO position 
 
Educational Qualifications 
 
All the respondents had some form of higher education ranging from Bachelors in Nursing 
(BACur), Medicine (MBBCh), Masters in Public Health (MPH) to Masters in Business 
Administration (MBA). These are presented in Table 6 below. There is a spread from health 
professional degrees to master’s degrees in health and administration. The most common 
qualification was the MPH (nine out of the 30 had an MPH as an additional qualification). 
This also meets the suggested requirements as espoused by the DBSA findings. 
 
Table 6:  Educational Profile of CEOs 
 Frequency Percent 
BACur 1 3.33% 
BACur, DPH 2 6.67% 
BACur, MPH 1 3.33% 
BACur,DPH 1 3.33% 
BACur,MPH 1 3.33% 
BComm 1 3.33% 
Bcur,DPH 1 3.33% 
Bcurh, MPH 1 3.33% 
BDentTx 1 3.33% 
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HonBach 1 3.33% 
Masters 2 6.67% 
MBBCH, MPH 1 3.33% 
MBBCH,MPH 1 3.33% 
MBBCh+ 1 3.33% 
MBBCH+ 2 6.67% 
MPH 9 30.00% 
MPH, MBA 1 3.33% 
MPH,MBA 1 3.33% 
ND, NHD, DPH, MPA 1 3.33% 
Total 30 100.00% 
 
In summary then the 30 CEOs who returned the self- administered questionnaires would 
have easily met the criteria of the Policy on Hospital Management (South Africa, 2012) and 
the criteria for appointment as recommended by the DBSA (2010). 
 
Gender and Race 
 
The majority of respondents were male (53%) and Black African (86%) and represents a fair 
reflection of racial transformation in public hospital management. In terms of the 
transformation agenda of the government this can be regarded as a success where females 
were nearly half of the CEOs surveyed and the majority were Black African. See tables 7 and 
8 below.  
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Table 7: Gender profile of CEOs 
 Frequency Percent 
Female 14 46.67% 
Male  16 53.33% 
Total 30 100.00% 
95% Conf Limits F 28.34% - 65,67% and M 34.3%-71.66%. 
 
Table 8: Race profile of CEOs 
 Frequency Percent 
Black 26 86.67% 
Coloured 1 3.33% 
Indian 1 3.33% 
White 2 6.67% 
Total 30 100.00% 
 
Hospitals and Provinces 
 
The majority of respondents worked in District Hospitals (60%) and were from the Gauteng 
Province (53%). See Table 9 and 10 below. 
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Table 9: Distribution of CEOs by type of hospital  
 Frequency Percent 
Central 3 10.00% 
District 18 60.00% 
Regional 8 26.67% 
Tertiary 1 3.33% 
Total 30 100.00% 
 
Table 10: Distribution of CEOs by province  
 Frequency Percent 
Free State 4 13.33% 
Gauteng 16 53.33% 
Limpopo 3 10.00% 
Mpumalanga 2 6.67% 
Northern Cape 1 3.33% 
North West 4 13.33% 
Total 30 100.00% 
 
The majority of respondents as indicated above were from District Hospitals, followed by 
Regional, Central and Tertiary hospitals. This reflected the proportions of these hospitals in 
the country. The District Hospitals operate at district level and have family physicians as 
their main medical work force. The Regional Hospitals have a few more specialist services 
with substantial specialist medical support. Tertiary hospitals provide for much more 
specialised and sub specialty services and are often the last resort in the referral pathway. 
The central hospitals (there are only ten in the country) offer sub-specialty services (such as 
transplant services) and are often linked to academic training institutions. Most of the 
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respondents were from Gauteng Province and the rest were from the Free State, Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and North West Provinces. 
 
Familiarity with Department Policies on Management 
 
The majority of participants (93,3%) responded ‘yes’ to the introductory question on 
whether the respondent was familiar with departmental policies that govern the way they 
managed and is presented in figure 3 below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Familiarity with Department Policies on Management  
95% Conf Limits No 0.82%- 22.07% and Yes 77.93%-99.18% 
 
It appears from these responses that there are some enabling policies for management at a 
decentralised hospital level throughout most provinces. 
 
Performance Management Systems 
 
Eighty seven percent responded ‘yes’ to the question on whether there are performance 
management systems for CEOs in place in their provinces as presented in figure 4 below. 
7% 
93% 
Percent 
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Yes
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Performance management and appropriate accountability frameworks are critical in the 
implementation of NPM managerialism approach. It appears that some of these NPM tools, 
i.e. performance management and accountability, are being used currently. 
 
 
Figure 5: Awareness of Performance Management Systems in place 
95% Conf Limits No 3.76%-30.72% and Yes 69.28%-96.24% 
 
Management Delegation Guidelines 
 
Seventy nine percent responded ‘yes’ to the questions of whether there is management 
delegating guidelines for CEOs in their provinces as presented in figure 5 below. So contrary 
to my hypothesis that the lack of delegations is the main reason that CEOs cannot manage 
effectively there does appear to be some delegations in place. This was to be investigated 
further in the in-depth interviews. 
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Figure 6: Awareness of Management Delegation Guidelines in place 
95% Conf Limits No 7.99%-39.72% and Yes 60.28%-92.01%.  
 
What are CEOs measured against? 
 
On the questions on what CEOs in the province are measured against 57 % said ‘no’ 
compared to 43% who said ‘yes’ as regards budget. An equal number (48,3%) responded 
positively as well as negatively as regards being measured against health  outcomes. When 
asked whether CEOs are being measured against staffing 73% of the respondents said ‘no’ 
and 27% said ‘yes’. And as regards being measured against quality of care 73% said ‘yes’ and 
27% said ‘no’. See table 11 below. This gives the impression that some other NPM tools as 
regards quality of care and health outcome measures are also being used. 
 
Table 11: What are CEOs measured against? 
 Yes No 
Budget 43.3% 56,7% 
Staffing 48,3% 48,3% 
Quality of Care 26,7% 73,3% 
Health Outcomes 73,3% 26,7% 
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Ability to manage  effectively 
 
The majority (86,2%) of respondents said ‘no’ to the question on being able to manage 
effectively in the current circumstances. This is probably the most important finding of the 
self-administered questionnaire survey. So despite their being departmental policies, some 
delegations and measures of performance the majority of CEOs believe that they unable to 
manage effectively. Effectively can be a broad term to describe both efficiency and 
effectiveness and was explored further in the qualitative interviews. It is described in figure 
6 below. 
 
 
Figure 7: Ability to manage effectively 
95% Conf Limits No 82.78%-99.92% and Yes 0.08%-17.22%. 
 
Are there sufficient delegations to manage effectively 
 
The majority (96,7%) of respondents said that they had insufficient delegations to manage 
their budget and most (73,3%) of the respondents said that they had insufficient delegations 
to manage health outcomes. All (100%) of the respondents said that they had insufficient 
delegations to manage staffing. Seventy percent said that they have insufficient delegations 
to manage quality of care. Figure 5 indicated that there was awareness and presence of 
some delegations but when asked specifically on budget, staffing, health outcomes and 
86% 
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104 
 
 
 
 
 
quality of care but when asked around the delegations of these management issues the 
majority felt that they had insufficient delegations except for health outcomes. This 
contradiction is explored in the qualitative part of the study. See Table 12 below. 
 
Table 12: CEOs opinions on having sufficient delegations to manage effectively. 
 Yes No 
Budget 3,33% 96,7% 
Staffing 0% 100% 
Quality of Care 26,7% 70% 
Health Outcomes 73,3% 23,3% 
 
Areas of performance that can be improved. 
 
The majority (90%) of respondents agreed that budget is an area of improvement that 
should be considered to improve performance. Most (96,7%) of the respondents felt the 
same about health outcomes and about quality of care and slightly fewer (93,3%) felt the 
same about staffing as demonstrated in Table 13 below. The question on the degree of 
delegations that needs to improve particularly around budget, health outcomes as well as 
quality of care is now a recurring theme that CEO’s feel that they are unable to address 
adequately. 
 
Table 13: CEOs opinions on which areas of delegation need to improve so that 
performance can be improved 
 Yes No 
Budget 90% 6,7% 
Staffing 93,3% 3.3% 
Quality of Care 96,7% 0% (3,3% DK) 
Health Outcomes 96,7% 0% (3,3% DK) 
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The main criteria for assessing performance 
 
Most of the respondents felt that budget control (73,3%)  and health outcomes(75%) should 
be some of the main criteria for assessing CEOs performance in the public sector. This is 
described in figure 8 and 9 below. This interesting finding indicates that although the CEOs 
agreed that they lack sufficient delegations as regards budget control and health outcomes 
in particular, they believed that these should be used in the measurement of their 
performance. 
 
 
Figure 8: CEOs opinion of Budget control as main criteria for assessing performance 
95% Conf Limits Don’t Know 2.11%-26.53%, No 5.64%-34.72% and Yes 54,11%-87.22%. 
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Figure 9: CEOs opinion of Health Outcomes as main criteria for assessing performance 
95% Conf Limits Don’t Know 0.09%-18.35%, No 8.30%-40.95% and Yes 51.33%-86.78%. 
 
4.2.1. Conclusions of the quantitative survey 
 
When asked about whether CEOs were measured against budget, staffing and quality of 
care less than half said that they were measured against these parameters (43% for 
budgets, 48% for staffing, and 27% for quality of care). Also 73% said ‘yes’ to being 
measured against health outcomes. However when asked about being able to manage 
effectively 86% said ‘no’. This was an important majority response. So despite having some 
enabling policies and delegations and wanting to be measured against health outcomes 
most CEOs believe that they cannot manage effectively in their current circumstances. 
When asked if there were sufficient delegations to manage effectively 97% said ‘no’ to 
budget, all (100%) said ‘no’ as regards staffing, 70% said ‘no’ as regards quality of care but 
73% said ‘yes’ as regards health outcomes. This strange contradiction can be explained by 
the fact that the health outcomes are largely a measure of the clinical care component of 
the hospital which is largely the responsibility of the health professionals and not that of the 
CEO.  When questioned about which areas of delegations needed to improve for their 
performance to be improved the majority said budget (90%), staffing (93%), quality of care 
(97%) and health outcomes (97%). This mirrors the deficits in the delegation question that 
the CEOs responded to earlier. So it appears that the CEOs were asking for substantially 
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more delegations in the areas of budget, staffing, quality of care and health outcomes. As 
regards the main criteria for assessing their performance 73% felt that budget control 
should be used and 75% felt that health outcomes should be used. This is a similar finding to 
the DBSA findings that CEOs identify lack of budget, followed by limited delegations as key 
constraints to them performing optimally (2010). Performance management should 
preferably be measured against budget control and health outcomes according to the CEOs. 
 
The self-administered questionnaire gave some insight into how CEOs viewed the challenges 
they face, what they think about their current delegations, what delegations they would like 
to have more of and what performance measurement criteria they should be measured 
against. However because this survey was largely exploratory and was used to inform the in-
depth questionnaire these findings must be assessed in this context. 
 
4.3. The Qualitative research 
 
 In-depth Interviews of hospital CEOs and experts in policy management as well as focus 
groups with a small group of CEOs and senior hospitals were carried out. The results are 
presented thematically, integrated and triangulated. 
 
Twelve CEOs of the 30 CEOs who returned the self- administered questionnaire and agreed 
to take part in the interviews were purposefully selected for the interviews. All 12 contacted 
agreed to participate and were subsequently interviewed. Two CEOs were interviewed face 
to face and the rest were telephonically interviewed. Further in-depth interviews were 
carried out with experts in policy management based on the inputs from the CEOs. 
Subsequently focus group discussions were carried out with a purposefully selected group 
of CEOs and another with a group of senior hospital managers. The experts in policy were 
selected based on their known expertise in the field. Two were from the Wits School of 
Governance (WSG, Professors Van Den Heever and Fitzgerald), and the other was from the 
Wits School of Public Health (WSoPH, the Health Policy SARCHI chair Professor John Eyles). 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. All the responses were collated and specific 
categories drawn into which the responses were allocated. They were subsequently 
108 
 
 
 
 
 
analysed using Atlas.ti, a Qualitative Data Analysis software. The analysis was thematic and 
four main themes (coded) were identified. These correlated well with the questions from 
the interview schedules. In this section, the responses to the in-depth interviews are 
detailed and presented in a way that enables the reader to grasp the salient points made by 
the respondents. The themes and sub-themes where appropriate were analysed 
systematically, integrated and triangulated, and are presented below. 
 
4.3.1. Major challenges faced as a CEO of a public hospital 
 
The major challenges the CEOs faced according to the in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions were Finance, Human Resources (HR), operational management issues, 
delegations, performance management, accountability, communication with the respective 
provincial head offices and health sector reform. These themes are discussed separately 
below. 
 
The first major theme that emerged was that of finances. This was probably the biggest 
challenge that the public hospitals face according to the CEOs. However as the triangulation 
shows these various challenges are inextricably linked and cannot be seen in isolation 
 
4.3.2. Finance 
 
From the interviews and focus group discussion financial issues were the overriding 
challenge faced by CEOs of public hospitals. Nearly all the CEOs complained of a lack of 
funds, inadequate budgets, and difficulty in accessing funds appropriately.  One CEO said 
that: “You will never have enough budget as a request and in terms of managing the 
finances,… the appropriate skills of people with financial management were also a difficult 
one to get”. (Interview 1) 
 
The lack of financial capacity in managing finances was also a major contributing factor for 
most CEOs. A CEO from the North West province elaborated on this concern as follows: 
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In terms of finance we were saying that we should have a fully functional section on 
finance and supply chain management that is headed by an assistant director, we 
don’t have that, our assistant director admin does everything, with HR, finance and 
maintenance.(Interview 1). 
 
Inadequate budgeting was a major concern of all CEOs. They are not involved in the budget 
process and it is not linked directly to their performance management system. One CEO 
opined that: “You work on a historical based budget and this is inadequate”. (Interview 2). 
 
Another CEO concurred with this opinion and further said that: “Staff costs rise in excess of 
budgeted increases which are often determined on a historical basis. Staff costs were 62% 
of total budget seven to eight years ago and are now close to 70% of total 
budget”.(Interview 5). 
 
According to most of the CEOs interviewed goods and services were always under budgeted 
and often led to overspending. Adjustment budgets were never sufficient and CEOs often 
had to take the blame for overspend. CEOs submitted regular requests for head office 
intervention or assistance but these requests were often ignored. This is also largely due to 
a lack of clear delegations according to them. 
 
The senior hospital managers complained that the budget increases often don’t keep up 
with inflation and are on average a 5% increase on the previous year’s budget. They also 
blame the lack of experience and insight at head office that informs the current poor 
budgeting processes. The budgeting system was an accrual based budgetary system and the 
focus group also raised it as an inappropriate budgetary process. Most of the CEOs 
recommended the use of zero based budgeting. “You work on a historical based budget and 
this is inadequate” said one CEO in the interviews.  Another one said that: “Goods and 
services are always underfunded and often led to overspend.” 
 
A bigger concern with finances was the issue of procurement. This is ultimately controlled 
by treasury at provincial head office according to the group. Any purchase above R500 000 
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must be advertised and anything below R500 000 can be handled by the hospital but this 
too has challenges. Hospitals can purchase about 80% of items on contract, 10% as 
emergency and 10% as urgent. According to the one hospital manager he believes that they 
have good delegations in Gauteng. The other managers disputed this by saying that there 
are inappropriate items on contract. Also the issue of sole suppliers was a vexing one and 
posed a challenge when these sole providers are unable to deliver the appropriate supplies. 
This is particularly problematic when it comes to critical items. Although the CEOs have 
discretion there are strict rules that regulate procurement and these change yearly 
according to some members of the group. It is often necessary to go through head office 
even if one is dealing with a sole provider. This confirms the views as expressed by 
Eyles(expert interview, 2015) as well who believed that the current tender system and the 
use of preferred providers allows for corruption creep particularly at provincial head office 
level. 
 
According to the senior hospital managers certain purchases needed to go through a Bid 
Adjudication Committee (BAC) and these become a tedious process when you want to 
purchase large items such as renal dialysis machines. With the current R500 000 limit you 
can only purchase two of these at a time even though you may need ten in a particular 
hospital. There is also a problem when you want to purchase two of these machines for 
adult patients and two for paediatric patients simultaneously. The Auditor General then 
sees this as a split order and raises it as an unauthorised expenditure query. There is also a 
problem with consumables because these are recurrent expenditures but the paper work 
required is very repetitive and onerous. Every new purchase of the same consumables 
requires BEE certification, SARs clearances and so on. The one manager who felt that R500 
000 is appropriate believed that CEOs are to blame for insufficient spending ability and he 
commented as follows: “CEOs interpret rules differently and there is no need to blame head 
office all the time”.  The other health managers agreed that procurement has improved. The 
main challenge and this is agreed upon by all the participants is the lack of technical capacity 
at the hospital itself and particularly in Finance and Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
departments and the lack of appropriate systems to support these. It seems that SCM is a 
new profession in public administration and there are insufficient qualified people to be 
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employed in these positions. Also once a person is employed in SCM they never move 
according to the participants. This is because once they learn the system and how they can 
work it to their advantage they then know how to benefit from it and are happy to stay in 
that position forever. This is where corruption creeps in according to the focus group 
members. So delegations although appearing to be somewhat sufficient is not 
implementable well particularly in HR, Finance and SCM because of this lack of human 
resource capacity as well as the possibility of corruption creep.   
 
The issue of financial accountability is of paramount importance but problematic according 
to all the senior hospital managers. “If the procurement officer does not procure he is not 
held accountable”, said one participant. He blames head office and does not take 
responsibility.  The hospital managers all agreed that so long as the HOD is the accounting 
officer and if he does not pass this accountability to CEOs the status quo remains. The only 
way to change this is to hold people accountable for outputs and outcomes according to the 
group. “At present no-one is held accountable for anything, even if there is a shortage of 
food and drugs” said one senior hospital manager. The senior hospital managers proposed 
that clinical executives (these are the senior hospital managers other title) need to have 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities. They believe that there are too many layers of 
bureaucracy at the larger hospitals and it becomes difficult to manage the different clinical 
units when the clinical heads (chief specialists in the various specialities) report directly to 
the CEOs. The one participant said in desperation; “Sometimes I feel that I am a paper 
pusher – a glorified clerk”. 
 
In relation to finances Prof Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015)commented on the PFMA (the 
Public Finance Management Act) which intended to bring financial accountability to the 
heads of institutions but he criticises it in that it does not allow for financial discretion “you 
cannot react to unforeseen challenges as you cannot shift moneys from line item to line 
item”.  According to him it has in fact taken a lot of financial discretion away from 
executives and pushed it to Treasury according to Fitzgerald. This leads to a lack of efficient 
expenditure overall. Financial Officers work in fear of the PFMA “and act paranoid” because 
one can be liable to criminal prosecution under the act. But this has rarely been the case. He 
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strongly affirmed that the PFMA took away strategic discretion. Financial procedures also 
often take weeks to administer. The PFMA did not do what it intended to do. It did not stop 
corruption and financial mismanagement. The PFMA moved us away from decentralisation. 
He also believed that because of this we have moved to a “pseudo centralised state”. There 
are trappings of centralisation but according to him five to six provinces are “out of hand”. 
They had all the corruption, financial mismanagement and patronage continuing unabated. 
He also felt the same about some municipalities.  At one stage a single Public Service Act 
was being drafted to make all public servants as part of one public sector. Resistance from 
local government (SALGA in particular) and the provinces put an end to that idea. Prof 
Fitzgerald felt that it was feasible to have one public service covering all three spheres of 
government but because of the lack of political support this idea died. 
 
Professor Fitzgerald (ibid) elaborated on the financial challenges that government 
institutions face. Currently the Public Service Commission has no oversight over local 
government according to Fitzgerald. Provinces have health and welfare budgets and these 
accounts for 80% of their total expenditure. The provinces can also move moneys around 
between different sectors and this is at their constitutional discretion. Because of this they 
will never give these functions up according to Fitzgerald. He also opined that during the 
Mandela and Mbeki periods lots of public officials came into the system and wanted to 
move government to a more efficient and productive state, a post-bureaucratic world. 
However they were often seen as “schizophrenic” where the left wing arm of the ANC was 
for a strongly centralised, controlled and developmental state. Yet there was a recognised 
need for improved efficiency and productivity.  He saw NPM as a way of clawing back power 
from the Reagonites and Thatcherites (or neo-liberals in opposition politics as he saw it). 
NPM was in effect, if implemented properly, giving back power to the state as a regulator 
and a social entrepreneur according to him. He saw NPM as a progressive response to the 
Reagonites and Thatcherites as well as public choice theorists. Tony Blair adopted NPM as a 
joined up state. In South Africa we too through clustering of related functions at cabinet 
level operate as a joined up state and this was NPM in action according to Fitzgerald and the 
other policy management experts (2015). 
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 The CEOs also complained that although they have no financial control over the budgets 
but are held responsible. Fitzgerald (expert, 2015) has also pointed out the restrictive nature 
of the current PFMA in governing expenditure. The CEOs also believe that there is no 
current enabling legislative framework to delegate financial responsibility and autonomy to 
CEOs. This function tends to sit with the Provincial Head of Department (HoDs) and 
Provincial Member of the Executive (MECs). This was also a finding in the literature review 
and document analysis as presented in chapter 2 of this research. This hierarchy of control 
points to the importance of context and established way of practice in the public services 
generally and health services in particular since 1994. It’s a reflection also of the apartheid 
era politically managed public service as well as the clientalist post-apartheid system.  
 
 Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015) also raised the issue of poor budgeting practices 
that currently occurs.  He believes that the current budgeting system is not strategic and 
does not link to any agreed performance indicators. The CEOs are the last to know in the 
entire process of budget determination according to him. The CEOs do get a budget letter at 
the beginning of the financial year but most CEOs do not sign it as they feel that they have 
no control over it and therefore do not want to be held responsible for it. There is also a lack 
of financial capacity in supporting the CEOs according to the experts. This was a recurring 
subtheme of this research. Most CEOs do not have the appropriate financial support in 
terms of level of appointments and capacity in their financial departments. These findings 
were also confirmed by the focus group discussion held with the senior hospital managers. 
 
What came through consistently through this research is that one of the major challenges 
faced by CEOs of public hospitals is that they have no real financial control over their 
budgets but are held responsible for spending. The CEOs believed that under the current 
political climate financial delegations were not possible. They do get a letter stating that 
they are accountable for the provisional budget but most CEOs know that they will 
overspend. A CEO responded:  “Because in the beginning you have insufficient budget”.  The 
budgets are always underfunded and because of the accrual based budgeting system that 
they use they are always carrying shortfalls into the following financial years. 
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Some solutions were proffered. Budgets should be zero based according to the one CEO. At 
present it is incremental in nature and does not take into account inflation nor salary 
increases. They do try and plan ahead and often have to defend their budgets and 
expenditure at regular meetings with head office.  They “have budget meetings monthly and 
do report on trends” and “every month you will say that you are overspent”.  
 
However they also feel that a big problem is that they present their budget requests to 
junior finance staff at head office who often have no insights into budgeting at hospital 
level. So they don’t understand the implications of the budgeting process and cannot act on 
the requests made by the CEOs. There is a general lack of support from finance staff at Head 
Office according to the CEOs.  They present budget line items with predicted expenditures 
and some have Activity Based Costing presented to argue the case for more budgets but 
invariably they get a budget based on the previous year’s expenditure. They do have 
“budget bilaterals” with head office during the financial year where they discuss budget 
issues but this often has no real impact on future budgeting. In fact this past year they were 
given “provisional budgets on quarterly predictions but to date have only received the first 
quarter”. “In October of every year you could present an adjustment budget but this did not 
happen this year.” The CEOs claimed that budgeting is now largely a “paper exercise” 
 
In summary then this study provides support to the findings of the DBSA (2010) and those of 
Cameron (2009) and Awortwi (2006) in that inadequate budgetting processes affect the 
running of public hospitals adversely and this is compounded by a lack of professional 
financial management capacity. Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015) also commented 
on inadequate budgeting systems and he sees the problem as much more systemic as just 
lack of involvement in budgeting exercise. Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015) believes that 
the PFMA which intended to bring better financial management and control to the public 
sector in fact did the opposite. It hamstrung financial decision making by restricting spend to 
budget line items, calling any deviations from this as inappropriate and this often led to 
qualified audits by the Auditor General. All participants agreed that there is insufficient 
budget and a general lack of financial delegations and discretions given to CEOs. The CEOs 
complain that because there is this lack it is hard to hold the CEOs accountable on the failing 
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of the institutions. The financial accountability issue is at the heart of the PFMA (1999) and 
so too were the proposed 2006 delegations. Having the CEOs being financial accountable is 
also a recurring theme in all of the Ministerial Task Teams findings and recommendations as 
well as the findings of the DBSA (2010). As it stands the real budget holder according to the 
PFMA is at the provincial head office viz. the HOD. 
 
4.3.3. Human Resources 
 
Another major challenge that was raised both in the in-depth interviews as well as the focus 
group discussion was that of Human Resource Management issues. As far as staffing is 
concerned CEOs in the majority of provinces can replace staff that leave during a financial 
year but any new staff appointments have to be motivated for at head office (this even 
applies to new cleaners too in some cases). All new posts and unfunded vacant posts need 
to be approved by head office before filling them.  There are no updated norms and 
standards as relates to human resources and they often use outdated organograms. This 
issue has been brought to the attention of head office numerous times. Another HR 
problem is a lack of middle management staff with appropriate expertise. Senior HR, 
Finance and Administrative support was a huge problem with the focus group discussants. 
However, lower level support staff was also in short supply and were often incorrectly 
graded, and were therefore difficult to retain. This affected operational management 
capacity and in particular in relation to supply chain management, clerical and 
administrative work, porters and cleaning staff somewhat adversely in the opinion of these 
CEOs.  
 
 One CEO who was concerned in particular about obstetrics and neonatology argued the 
need for advanced midwives. They often rely on agency staff, particularly on night duty, at 
huge expense to the hospital. This included the recruitment process which often had head 
office interference as this negated their ability to recruit appropriate staff. Permission was 
required from head office or the district office (in relation to district hospitals) to fill posts, 
professional posts, and in some provinces even to the level of cleaners. This often frustrates 
the CEOs as they are held accountable for the cleanliness of the hospital by the OHSC. 
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Another challenge that came up repeatedly was that staff structures were not updated and 
did not fit the current service package and this hamstrung CEOs in terms of getting 
appropriate staff. A CEO from a rural hospital said: “if I don’t have enough money to 
employ, then you cannot employ as you wish. The biggest challenge was scarcity of health 
professionals especially doctors and allied professionals”. (Interview 1). The lack of 
appropriate human resources, both in quality and quantity, was a major challenge faced by 
nearly all of the CEOs interviewed. Permission was often required from head office (or 
district head office) to fill posts, particularly professional posts. This was confirmed by the 
focus group discussion with senior hospital managers who complained of the tedious 
processes involved in filling posts especially specialist posts. This was borne out by the focus 
group discussions with the CEOs  where upon elaboration they described their inability to 
appoint staff that have left during the year problematic as even as replacements (i.e. filling 
vacant funded posts). This frustrates the CEOs as they are also measured against the 
cleanliness of the hospital. Often budget locks were imposed by provinces late in the 
financial year and all the filling of vacancies gets frozen. A CEO made the following point in 
this regard:  “I don’t have enough money to employ, then you cannot employ as you wish?” 
(Interview 6). 
 
Some appointments take a long time and are often held up at head office level according to 
the CEOs. Health professionals were particularly scarce, a point repeatedly made, and if 
CEOs have the opportunity to fill these posts the head office often takes over many months 
to vet the filling of the post which by then the health professional applicant has lost  interest 
in coming to the hospital. The CEOs repeatedly made the point that there are outdated 
organograms and no guidance as to what are the norms and standards of appropriate 
staffing levels for each type of hospital.  Another CEO also alluded to lack of capacity as a 
particular challenge: “In terms of management support there is a challenge where you as 
the CEO of a hospital... don’t have a fully-fledged management team (to support you).” The 
experts point to what they see as incompetent bureaucrats that have been appointed 
throughout government departments. The senior hospital managers also point this out as a 
problem and that the lack of decision making, the lack of accountability and prevailing 
incompetence is a malaise affecting head office mainly. They believe this is what causes the 
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“trench warfare” mentality as referred to earlier by the experts that were interviewed. This 
was clarified by the participants as don’t be seen or heard, keep your head within the 
trenches, don’t do anything and you will survive another pay cheque each month. 
 
One issue in HR was raised as a salient example by a manager that for him to fill a senior 
specialist post in surgery took well over a year because such a senior post has to be vetted 
by the provincial head office. This also contributes negatively on one’s risk management 
capacity according to this manager and head office seems unaware of these repercussions.  
There are some delegations to fill lower level posts such as that of medical officers, nurses 
and registrars.  
 
Also the clinicians who are often joint appointments with universities in the academic 
complexes (where hospitals are the training platforms for medical schools) feel more loyal 
to the university than to the services (the services pays their salaries). These clinicians who 
are heads of their respective clinical units have their PMDSs done by the CEOs and the group 
said that this is inappropriate and undermines them. The one senior hospital manager felt 
very strongly that the clinicians should report directly to the senior hospital managers.  
 
Another idiosyncratic management committee was the EXCO (Executive Committee) of the 
hospitals where the main component of this committee was the administrators who sit with 
the CEO and this is the highest decisions making body in the hospital. This committee 
determines allocation of resources, staffing levels, procurement processes and other core 
service related issues. The core business i.e. health care provision, is not addressed by this 
committee directly as there are very few representatives of the health care providers on this 
committee.  There also appears that personalities play a big part in determining how people 
are managed.  The focus group as a whole believe that the management structures need to 
be sorted out first before you hold people responsible and accountable. The key challenge 
as defined by the group is that there are no clear levels of responsibility and accountability 
because of the strange reporting structures and the functioning of the various committees.  
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Awortwi (2006) stresses the importance of having a well-qualified and professional civil 
service to implement NPM. None is more crucial than in the health sector particularly as it 
pertains to professional as well as support staff. This is a worldwide problem and 
particularly worse in developing countries. The CEOs argue the same in that they feel they 
are only as good as their team and if the team hasn’t the appropriate staff in terms of 
capacity (qualifications and experience) than they are sure to fail. The DBSA findings also 
illustrate this as the CEOs in the DBSA study felt that another constraint to their 
performance was a lack of competence of direct reporting lines as well as that of support 
staff. Professionalising the bureaucracy has been an intention of the government for a long 
time according to the experts interviewed but this never materialised largely because of a 
lack of political will. 
 
The policy management experts all concur that we have inappropriate bureaucrats in senior 
positions at all levels of government. This is so because of widespread patronage and 
nepotism. The ANC government deploy their faithful comrades into very senior positions 
and this affects the running of public service in nearly all spheres of government. However 
they all believe that  it is worse in provincial structures and therefore impacts more on the 
health and education sectors in particular.  Often budget locks were imposed by provinces 
late in the financial year and all the filling of vacancies gets frozen. A CEO in the focus group 
discussion made the following point in this regard:  “I don’t have enough money to employ, 
then you cannot employ as you wish?” What is clear is that the HRM function rests 
ultimately with politicians. They have the power to hire and fire. At provincial health level 
this power rests with the MEC. 
 
4.3.4. Operational Management 
 
The third biggest challenge is in relation to operational management according to the CEOs 
and senior hospital managers and this associated with the difficulty in managing finances as 
well were those relating to procurement practices and repairs and maintenance. The CEOs 
opined that this was mainly due to poor procurement practices generally in the province as 
head office often had the final say.  Procurement was often under the discretion of 
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procurement officers and in Gauteng was largely controlled by the GSSC (Gauteng Shared 
Services Centre – a centralised provincial procurement office). The GSSC was a centralised 
structure in the Gauteng Province that oversaw all HR, Finance and Maintenance functions 
of all the education and health services rendered by the province. They proved to be 
inefficient and very expensive. Allegations of corruption against the GSSC left the province 
no option but to dismantle it and shift the functions it had back to the Provinces Health and 
Education Departments in particular. With that there has been a shift to discretionary 
expenditure of up to R500 000 that has been given to CEOs since 2014. This has its own 
challenges too because they CEOs require three vendor quotations before they can sign off 
the order. This becomes difficult when they need to repair something urgently such as a 
boiler that is malfunctioning and is negatively affecting the power supply to the hospitals. 
With frequent blackouts this often becomes a crisis and needs to be acted upon quite 
urgently according to the CEOs. The CEOs complain that within the current regulations they 
need three quotations and visits by the preferred providers who have to dismantle the 
boiler before giving the quotes and this becomes a longwinded exercise which can have dire 
consequences. With tenders, this being centralised, late payments are also a huge issue. The 
central office takes an inordinate length of time to pay vendors and some vendors stop 
supplying essentials such as food and drugs because they haven’t been paid timeously. “I 
think the major challenges are making sure that you have resources, especially supplies that 
you need on a daily basis, your gloves, syringes, medicines and even making sure there is 
food” complained one CEO (Interview 9).   
 
In terms of goods and services supplies are more often than not less than what CEOs apply 
for because it has been curtailed by the central or head office through which routine 
purchase orders go through. Hospitals frequently run out of basics such as syringes, needles, 
paper towels, gloves and food. The CEOs and the senior hospital managers believe that a 
combination of corruption and ineptitude is to blame for this. Even medical supplies have to 
come from a central depot and this poses huge challenges when hospitals run out of drugs 
in particular. However there has been some move to decentralise this function where 
hospitals can buy directly from suppliers, but this has its own challenges according to the 
senior hospital managers when linked to preferred providers. The senior hospital managers 
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find this preferred provider approach as extremely problematic when the providers cannot 
supply the contracted items as agreed in their initial awarding of tender. Eyles (expert 
interview, 2015) as mentioned before also finds this extremely problematic and easily open 
to corruption. The awarding of tenders at head office and the lack of transparency of this 
process is also questionable according to him. 
 
Another CEO commented on goods and services saying: “we submit requests and you find 
yourself given smaller amounts than last year and you think adjustments will help you which 
never really do as a result you find yourself overspending.”(Interview 7). The accrual 
accounting system also exacerbates this in that over expenditure on essential goods and 
services are carried over in to the following financial year. 
 
The focus group discussion with the senior hospital managers highlighted the issues of a lack 
of competence and inappropriate systems at operational level that exacerbates this 
problem. At a tertiary hospital the operational SCM work is left to a person with a Standard 
8 (Grade 10) certificate, with no real prior experience in procurement and who deals with 
over 5000 items on a paper based filing and procurement system. The question has to be 
raised as to how did this appointment occur and why was nothing done to correct this? 
However this person reports to a Deputy Director and a Director who often contributes to 
the inflated bureaucracies that we often have at public hospital with no real accountability 
held by these positions. The senior hospital managers as well as the experts blame this poor 
performance in SCM on a lack competence as well as on a lack of accountability. There are 
no consequences for non-performers. A point repeatedly echoed by Van Den Heever and 
Eyles (expert interviews, 2015). This is a reflection on the failures of PMDSs and tools of 
NPM if not implemented properly according to Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015).  
 
Most provinces have embarked on embracing the private sector to deliver its supplies and 
part of its maintenance. The tedious bureaucratic nature of the way it awards its tenders 
and the lateness of payments lead to hugely inefficient service provision in these areas. This 
also opens the way for corruption to creep into these areas of concern according to the 
CEOs and the senior hospital managers. All the experts warn of the dangers of the current 
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awarding of tenders by government and its how it easily lends itself to corruption. Van Den 
Heever and Fitzgerald (expert interviews, 2015) both caution against outsourcing without 
the necessary governance and accountability structures. In Gauteng “Builders Warehouse” 
has been awarded the contract for repairs and maintenance and are supposed to provide a 
24 hour callout service to public hospitals but rarely does so according to one senior hospital 
manager. This was a head office imposed preferred provider without any consultations with 
the hospitals. 
 
4.3.5. Other Challenges 
 
Other challenges that CEOs often faced were related to inappropriate patient referrals, 
organised labour disputes, lack of support staff capacity, inadequate information technology 
and communication systems, poor procurement and maintenance practices and health 
sector reform issues. 
 
 Inappropriate patients are those that come to hospital without referral notes and most 
central and tertiary hospitals have this as a major problem. Patients cross provincial borders 
or are inappropriately referred from other provinces and this leads to congestion and 
overflow at the receiving hospitals. Also there has been a huge increase in acute trauma 
cases across all public hospitals. The budgets given to hospitals do not take into 
consideration of this according to CEOs.  This challenge of inappropriate referrals mainly 
affected tertiary and central hospitals in particular. These bigger and more specialised 
hospitals tended to see patients that should have been managed at a lower level such as 
Regional and District Hospital level. The reasons given by the CEOs is often due to 
inadequate services at these lower level hospitals,  inappropriate referrals from these very 
same hospitals and private practitioners, or because of the perceived better reputation of 
these central or tertiary hospitals the patients vote with their feet. Also patients flow across 
provincial borders because of the unavailability of specialised care in some provinces. The 
Steve Biko Academic Hospital for example is both a Central and Tertiary hospital situated in 
Pretoria and is often inundated with patients from Limpopo and the North West Provinces. 
The CEO describes his problem as follows: 
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The bigger challenge at Steve Biko is that we have a lot of inappropriate patients, 
inappropriate levels of care…people go to central hospitals because the care at 
district level is inappropriate.. there is a lot of demand from Limpopo and North 
West. (Interview 5). 
 
The Steve Biko Academic Hospital has also seen a dramatic rise in acute trauma cases over 
the past few years. This has  impacted negatively on the other wards (mainly medical as the 
overflow of patients is accommodated here) and the budgeting and human resources 
planning at provincial level has not taken this into account. Patient demand has increased 
dramatically over the past few years without the additional resources being made available 
according to most CEOs. 
 
As far as relationships with organised labour are concerned most CEOs felt that it is 
important to have good relationships with the unions but this poses its own challenges. If 
CEOs don’t have good relationships with unions this can undermine them when they take 
disciplinary actions against truant staff members. Dismissals are taken up by head office and 
because of union interference (head office is perceived to be sympathetic to organised 
labour by the CEOs) some staff are kept on suspension (whilst still being paid) for years. This 
means that the CEOs are unable to fill these posts as they are not vacant. These views were 
confirmed by the senior hospital managers and they felt that this was further exacerbated 
by the fact that the people at head office do not understand the nature of how hospitals are 
run and what challenges hospitals face. 
 
Dismissals are often overturned by HODs and suspensions drag on for years. They often 
interfere in appointments as well. One CEO opined that: “I can mention of our organised 
labour - you should have a good relationship with them. If you don’t they report to the head 
office and their side is always taken.” (Interview 8). However there was evidence of some 
good working relations with organized labour.  Another CEO said that when it comes to 
dismissals only the HOD can do that. He further elaborated upon its consequences as: “ In 
my institution I found that people were stealing money, it was 2006, that even today are still 
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on (the staffing), some of them resign and go, what is this saying to other employees who 
are honest.”(interview 9). However, according to some CEOs in the Western Cape Province 
there could be good working relationships with organised labour. Their cleaning services 
were apparently outsourced with the agreement of labour as the current staff was far too 
old to carry on working. 
 
 Information Technology and Communications is another huge challenge raised by the CEOs 
as well as the other participants. Computer networks that are in place are often slow and 
outdated and internet and emails work erratically. There are poor Health Information 
Systems generally in most hospitals and some are still paper based. The computer systems 
on patient management are often around 15 years old. There appears to be a government 
move to upgrade these according to most of the CEOs and senior hospital managers.  There 
is also a lack of IT support within the hospitals. The literature argues the importance of 
having good information technology for NPM purposes as it drives efficiency in service 
delivery and in decision making (van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002). Fitzgerald (expert interview, 
2015) believes that an effective and efficient e-government element is critical to any NPM 
reform process. 
 
One of the senior hospital managers in the focus group who is “in charge”’ of Maternal and 
Child Health (MCH) says that she never assessed health outcomes in these areas. The 
hospital as a whole did not measure health outcomes. But now with increasing levels of 
litigation the hospital is looking at mortality and causes of death. It is only now that the 
hospital is interested in outcome indicators. Causes of death were not recorded routinely. In 
fact according to the one hospital manager no mortality rates were ever recorded. There is 
also a very poor information system that does not support the collection of health outcome 
data. There are multiple sources of information and multiple information systems that do 
not talk to one another.  For example the Medicom system that is currently used in most 
public hospitals is purely for patient administration and to order medicines. Clinical 
information is not collected electronically anywhere. One senior hospital manager lamented 
the fact that:  “we have not cracked HIS in 21 years”. In Gauteng in particular there are no 
integrated information systems and both the focus groups feel strongly that as long as there 
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is  a lack of interest from leadership on the importance of information systems and that 
there may be perverse incentives as to what is used . They believe that we will never have 
an integrated system in the foreseeable future. Strangely though, according to the senior 
hospital managers, is that Gauteng Health has purchased the full SAPS system that can do 
this integrated HIS but the question remains as to why has this not been rolled out. It seems 
that each political head wants their own system according to some members of the group. 
So deaths continue to be recorded manually in the main. 
 
According to the interviews and focus group discussions many CEOs come and go but the 
inefficient administrative system remains. Many people in the system know this and they 
often do not take the new CEOs seriously as they know that they won’t last. According to 
the focus group each CEO should look at admissions, discharges and deaths daily, but they 
do not. There is also no forum where health outcomes are discussed. The meetings 
attended by the senior clinicians and senior management always centres on non-core issues 
such as parking, accommodation and security. Mortality and morbidity issues are rarely if 
ever raised at these meetings. 
 
Some activities are also captured on the District Health Information System, electronic TB 
register and various other performance management indicators of the institution as a 
whole. They recently had inspections by the Office of Health Standards and Compliance and 
often received conflicting audits where the one CEO was scored a 55% but received the 
prize for the most improved hospital in the province from head office. 
 
As regards the OHSC and its audit of SCM a lot still needs to be done according to most of 
the participants. The OHSC was supposed to assist in improving the quality of hospital 
services through its regular audits. The senior hospital managers believe that it measures 
inappropriate things. For example they measure TB cure rates and the use of hypertension 
and diabetic registers at regional and central hospitals whereas these services are found 
only at PHC clinics. A shocking example of inappropriate scoring was where a SCM 
department at one hospital got full marks based on the four criteria that the OHSC used but 
yet the SCM department is known to function atrociously in real life according to the senior 
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hospital managers. There is also a lack of transparency of the findings of these OHSC audits 
according to the focus group discussions and these are elaborated upon later. If The OHSC is 
conceptually being copied from the UK its findings should be made public according to the 
focus group. 
 
 One CEO believed that performance management functioned well in the private sector but 
for some reason it does not seem to work in the public sector and this could be due to 
reasons of “demotivation”, “attitude” to work or “the environment”. There is a monitoring 
system of the PMDS in the HR PERSAL system but the CEOs felt that “you just chase 
numbers” reporting whether you have done it or not. 
 
Another challenge that came up in the interviews was a lack of support staff capacity both in 
number and in qualifications in carrying out the procurement and repairs and maintenance 
efficiently.. The CEOs complained that they are often required to have the necessary 
qualifications, competence and experience to fill their posts but the same was not required 
of support staff. Quoting a CEO: “In terms of management support, there is a challenge 
where you are a CEO of the hospital but you don’t have a fully-fledged management team 
that will support you.”(interview 12). This was also of particular concern in relation to 
finance and human resources officers, as well as supply chain managers. Even auxiliary 
services such as artisans were in short supply.  
 Another CEO elaborated as follows: 
..when you take certain responsibilities they must go hand in hand with support staff 
so example human resources, finance, auxiliary services such as maintenance, we 
don’t have posts like artisan, when anything breaks you have to outsource because 
we don’t have knowledgeable people in the hospital. (Interview 9). 
 
Communication is also a challenge and quite a few CEOs raised it as such. This was in 
relation to structures at head office. Communication was often top down with a barrage of 
memo’s and circulars coming from head office to the CEOs often with no consultation as to 
the feasibility or appropriateness of these. The lack of continuity in leadership was also an 
issue raised in the interviews as it affects continuity in communication adversely. Gauteng 
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for example and according to one CEO has had six CEOs and six HODs in the recent past. 
Each comes with their own agenda and changes things all the time. There are also many 
people in acting positions and these lead to bad communication between CEOs and head 
office because of all these changes. These issues lead to a lack of institutional memory and 
inefficiency according to the CEOs. Another issue that came up was a lack of head office and 
political support. It seems that if anything goes wrong at a hospital it is the CEO who is held 
accountable even if he or she has no direct influence or control. CEOs are often suspended 
by the MECs or HODs and this occurs when news of bad incidences at the hospital reach the 
press. 
 
4.3.6. Delegations  
 
Delegations were initially given in 2006 according to a CEO from Gauteng. These were 
signed off by the Head of Department (HOD) and the responsible Member of the Executive 
Committee (MEC). But according to one CEO in Gauteng they were removed gradually by 
2010. Another CEO from Gauteng had this to say: 
 
..the department policies – some do assist. There are some that actually nullify or 
dilute delegations that we do have, and the delegations have are the last one 
outdated 2006 documentation……. if the delegation says you allow post retirement 
appointments and a subsequent circular says that you cannot anymore you now 
need to apply to the HOD to reverse this. (Interview 5). 
 
The Western Cape CEO said that: “policies rained upon them from head office”( Interview 
4), but in the main were welcomed.  A CEO from the Free State called delegations “yo yo 
delegations”( Interview 12), alluding to the frequency that they come and go and he 
referred to the policies as being good but often not implementable. These issues of 
delegation are discussed further below. 
 
According to the research, inadequate and inappropriate delegations and departmental 
policies were a cause for concern, a view held by most participants. The last delegations 
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were given in 2006 in some provinces and these were signed off by the MEC, HOD and the 
CEOs. It covered HR, Finance and Supply Chain Management and CEOs were able to do 
much more in terms of managing their hospitals. But decision making in these areas was 
slowly reduced or removed over time. In Gauteng this was worsened with the centralisation 
of many Finance and HR functions in the Gauteng Shared Service Centre (GSSC) and this led 
to a rapid decline in service delivery and a rise in corruption. A CEO quoted an example 
relating to this: “We would pay R6500 for an advert in City Press (for a post) and pay R39000 
to R40000 for the same advert through GSSC.” The GSSC was put in place to save money but 
by 2009 it became apparent that it wasn’t and has subsequently being dismantled with 
powers still remaining at central office level. This was due to a combination of political 
(MEC) and HOD intervention.  
 
Some CEOs blamed the removal of delegations on the rapid turnover of MEC’s and HOD’s.  
“You need a stable provincial office for you to expect to be stable, if in six years you have six 
MECs and six HODs, almost one MEC and one HOD per year you can’t expect stability in the 
department. Every time you have new plans and ideas, before they can be implemented 
they are removed” complained one CEO (Interview 8). 
 
Policies too that were put in place after 2006 removed some delegations according to the 
CEOs. Current financial delegations allow CEOs to spend up to R500 000 for goods and 
services. However those that require tenders are administered by head office with no input 
from the CEOs at all. HR delegations allow for staffing replacement positions (vacant funded 
posts) in some provinces, but any new posts or posts lost through the last financial year 
have to be motivated for. Disciplinary action is not entirely delegated as appeals go to head 
office where they stay unresolved often for years. Operational management issues linked to 
tenders or public works are a huge problem too. The repairs of equipment and general 
maintenance of infrastructure takes a long time to do. These problems according to the 
participants suggest is due to a lack of clear communication channels between the hospitals 
and their respective head offices. It is further aggravated by a lack of insight and 
competence by the bureaucrats at head office level who do not understand the intricacies 
and responsibilities that go with running a hospital. There are a few policies that do assist in 
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managing the hospitals according to the CEOs as regards those that guide some discretion 
on finance, human resources and day to day operational management issues, but these 
varied across provinces. The senior hospital managers however opined that these can 
change yearly and this often sows confusion. A CEO summed up the challenges they faced 
as follows: “We have yo-yo delegations” referring to the frequency that they come and go 
or change(Interview 11). 
 
There were some delegations given to CEOs recently (post 2009) but these were patchy and 
differentiated across the country. The CEOs complained about this differentiation and also 
mentioned that HR and Finance delegations need to link with the appropriate capacities 
within the hospital. One CEO said that: “If I have the delegation to do so… this is my budget 
and plans for the hospital and I should sign for it… and they should let me do it, .. I should be 
responsible if I fail..” ( Interview 1). 
 
Some CEOs felt that there was micro management from the Head Office. The CEOs complain 
that they don’t have the appropriate authority to be responsible and to have complete 
management control over their hospitals. Starting in 2010 some CEOs were given via 
departmental policy some control over their budgets, but on paper only, as mentioned 
before. They were often historical in nature and there was invariably overspend.  The last 
delegations were given in the mid-2000s according to most CEOs and became outdated and 
superseded by new policies. A CEO who had procurement powers of up to R500 000 still has 
to get a signature from head office before money is spent.  It appears that with most things 
financial:  “you have to apply through the HOD”( Interview 2). 
 
This can take ages, for example a tender for a new Radiology service at one big hospital was 
awarded in 2011 and is only being installed in 2014. Security tenders are administered by 
head office but the cost comes out of the hospital budget which often does not allow for 
this line item expense appropriately as they are not part of the adjudication process. Some 
CEOs have delegations of up to R50 000 and this is far too little according to them (district 
hospitals). The main concern of CEOs is that according to the Public Finance Management 
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Act (PFMA) they could be ultimately responsible even if they don’t have the necessary 
power or control over finances and HR. 
 
A few CEOs had some delegations that allowed for quick appointments. This came through 
new departmental policies that allowed for what is called walk-in interviews i.e. if you 
identify a health professional that is scarce you can interview directly without advertising. 
However in the main you had to follow DPSA policies around recruitment and affirmative 
action and some of these processes take a long time because of head office interference. 
This often led to the loss of prospective staff.  
 
There were new HR delegations that were developed over five years ago according to some 
CEOs across a few provinces but the provinces did not follow through and implement these 
as yet. It seems that a major determinant of delegations according to most of the 
participants is political and it is often when a new MEC comes into power that delegations 
are curtailed, changed or removed. All CEOs continually argue for more HR and financial 
delegations in particular to be able to function. One CEO said: “I don’t have a dentist but I 
have two dentists from outside the public service that have been waiting for the last three 
months to be appointed.” (Interview 7). In some district hospitals the CEO can only appoint 
up to level six and the district office does the rest. Some CEOs find it:  “difficult to appoint 
people that you wish”. (Interview 1).  The CEOs often have to get approval for certain posts 
from head office as elucidated by this same CEO: “For most professional nurses and doctors 
you have to get permission”. (Interview 1).  Another CEO elaborated similarly: “I can’t 
advertise, I can’t appoint, even issues of discipline are also centralized at district” (interview 
7). 
 
However, in the Western Cape there appears to be a greater level of delegations. CEOs are 
able to appoint medical officers, specialists and professional nurses up to the level of 
assistant directors. For director level upwards the provincial head office appoints.  Also with 
finances the CEOs in the Western Cape have financial business units and the management 
teams are appropriately qualified and well-staffed. The procurement delegations are also up 
to R500 000. Tenders are however done through head office in the Western Cape. 
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As regards delegations and policies related to it the common themes reflected upon in the 
focus group was similar to that of the in-depth interviews. The last real delegations were in 
2006. These have been slowly withdrawn and replaced with circulars that dictated how 
CEOs should work in relation to Finance and HR issues. Policies have also undermined most 
delegations, but some policies do assist.  For example the CEOs have delegated authority to 
spend up to R500 000 currently as long as they have three quotations. Anything more than 
R500 000 needs to have head office approval. This means that CEOs can now renovate 
wards for example which used to cost over R200 000 in the past and was way over the 
previous R50 000 limits. However there are also new approaches to control expenditure and 
this has been recently introduced, a mechanism called “budget lock”. “If you overspend on 
any line item it is budget locked, you are not allowed to shift money between line items”.   
 
The CEOs commented that there are some useful policies that are implemented at the 
hospital level such as human resources policies, information and record policies, risk 
management policies and supply chain management policies.  The CEO from the Western 
Cape (a CEO that was part of the KwaZulu Natal group and had subsequently got employed 
in the Western Cape) in particular was happy with the policies as they created 
standardisation across the whole province: “In this particular province if you want to paint 
the walls of the offices it has to be a certain colour…you don’t have to waste time to make 
small decisions because policy is driven by it.”(Interview 4). 
 
CEOs of district hospitals also agreed that some policies do assist but the administering of 
them has to be vetted by the district head office: “Whatever I request has to go through the 
Chief Director and the final approval is through our provincial district office”.(Interview 7). 
 
A different take on the issue of delegations was taken up by the experts interviewed. 
Delegations in themselves are not of concern to Prof van Den Heever (expert interview, 
2015). In terms of institutional economics, according to him, was the issue of principal agent 
and whether they act in their private capacity or not and whether there were incentives or 
not. He felt that there were structural problems in dealing with the latter and delegations 
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dealt with autonomy but not with incentives. Money can still get stolen because of 
delegation. What is required is the ability to regulate public administration through 
accountability mechanisms.  
 
Decentralisation (a main feature of NPM) according to Prof Van Den Heever (ibid) needs 
clear accountability mechanisms. There are four pillars to this accountability according to 
him.  Firstly there needs to be explicit performance requirements. Secondly there has to be 
transparency and therefore reports on performance requirements must be made public. 
Thirdly there needs to be a supervisory structure that receives regular reports on 
performance and offers strategic direction and be able to act on it if things go wrong. The 
supervisory structure should have no conflict of interest and should be independent and 
represent the public’s interest. Finally there should be penalties and rewards. These four 
pillars provide a coherent accountability framework which is largely absent in the public 
sector and especially so in hospital management. CEOs are currently not held accountable to 
hospital boards and hospital boards are not appropriately functioning according to Van Den 
Heever(ibid). However the CEOs feel that they are held accountable through performance 
management agreements (the PMDSs) and their short term contracts with head office. 
 
4.3.7. Performance management 
 
Performance management was implemented in 2002 and most people were not happy with 
it according to the CEOs. It had major gaps in its implementation according to the CEOs. 
There was a particular weakness in the verification process and the Bargaining Council 
questioned the role of moderators. It tends now to focus on incentives rather than how you 
performed. Directives are also lacking in terms of how you score and measure according to 
the CEOs. All CEOs do have performance management systems in place but they all agree 
that it does not really help with performance management at present. Performance 
Management contracts are signed at the beginning of the financial year between employer 
and employee and are reviewed at the end of the year.  This is also supposed to happen 
quarterly but this is not always the case. Most CEOs find the three monthly appraisals 
problematic and these are very often not done or done very superficially. CEOs are assessed 
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by the Directors of Hospitals or Directors of Districts in the main. The CEOs in turn assess the 
staff reporting to them and this cascades down the organisational structure. 
 
One CEO said: “It is subjective and everyone scores above average”,(Interview 2), and 
another CEO said that: “It has to be specific as to how you measure performance on the 
basis of  one to  five  with  three being normal… if you have done what you are expected to 
do you should get a  three and not a  five which is often demanded of you”.(Interview 6). 
 
Some of the CEOs argue that although there are performance management policies in place 
compliance is problematic. One CEO made the following point: “All appraisals done by 
supervisors and managers of performance agreements are not genuine as they don’t focus 
on service delivery or health outcomes”(Interview 7). 
 
Even after the performance appraisal is done by the supervisor or manager it has to be 
moderated. This is often problematic and arduous. The CEOs argue that the performance 
management needs to link to the specific job description and duties of the individual with 
clear outputs that are measurable. A CEO is quoted making the point: “ …some people don’t 
understand what to put in the contract and how to assess the individual against the 
performance indicators”.(interview 5). 
 
Another CEO indicated its misuse as follows: “We have a problem when we look at scores 
and what people do, they do not follow a normal curve, it is a skewed curve to the right”.     
( Interview 9). 
 
In terms of its intention the CEOs concur that it was supposed to hold people accountable, 
identify gaps in terms of their performance and offer training and development 
opportunities. But it tends to be used purely to get the cash bonus at the end of the year. 
Quoting a CEO who makes these points: 
 
..it is not done properly at the level section because there is a need of capacity 
building around the performance management system and also to instill the sense of 
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responsibility among managers, to ensure that when they do these evaluations it is 
in a professional and objective manner rather than just to give scores and points for 
the sake of the cash bonus. (Interview 12). 
 
Another CEO described his situation as follows: “At the moment there is micromanagement 
from the head office. At the beginning of the year there is a performance agreement that 
you sign which is meaningless because they don’t allow you to do all these things”. 
(Interview 7). 
 
Performance Management as an issue was also raised in the focus group with the CEOs. 
Although they did not understand it in the context of the NPM paradigm they concurred 
with the in-depth interviews in the way it was implemented and has its problems too 
according to the focus group discussions. It does not adequately manage 
underperformance. There are no disincentives. It is often done by supervisors who tend to 
score what the subordinate employee scores which invariably is higher than the expected 
three. There is a sense of entitlement for the bonus that goes with the higher scores (four 
and five).  Three is the score you should get for doing your work as expected.  CEOs are 
currently permanently employed and they do sign annual PMDS contracts and are supposed 
to be quarterly and annually assessed. The quarterly assessments are rarely done but they 
view them as important for developmental and monitoring purposes. The developmental 
needs of employees that are identified through the PMDS process should be met through 
the HR Training and Development Unit but this is rarely the case. So the CEOs question the 
usefulness of the PMDS as it is currently used.  It also creates perverse incentives in that 
employees only focus on what they put in the PMDSs in the beginning of the year and tend 
to ignore their other duties. 
         
Performance Management Systems have been implemented since 2002 but have their pros 
and cons in implementation according to the CEOs and the other research participants. The 
biggest problem according to the CEOs and the senior hospital managers is that 
underperformers are not managed and there are no disincentives. The inability to weed out 
non-performers is at the crux of the problem according to Eyles (expert interview, 2015). 
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There is a sense of entitlement (Eyles calls it a culture of entitlement) and most staff 
members see it as an opportunity to get a bonus according to the CEOs and the senior 
hospital managers. Most supervisors sign what the employee grades themselves without 
thoroughly interrogating it. Also the employees put in their performance measures 
indicators or outcomes in terms of what they know they can achieve in their jobs without 
putting in all the measurable deliverables in their job descriptions. This gaming of the PMDS 
is quite rife according to the CEOs and senior hospital managers. “It is subjective and 
everyone scores above average”, opined one CEO(Interview 6). The experts share this view 
but are much harsher in their judgement of the current PMDSs. It is not achieving what it set 
out to do, it is abused and should be discarded according to them. 
 
Overall, the CEOs, senior hospital managers and the experts questioned the performance 
management system’s current usefulness. CEOs also described other ways in which their 
performances should be measured which relates to hospital indicators such as bed 
occupancy rates, cure rates (TB hospitals), caesarian section rates, average length of stay 
and so on. This lack of alignment of institutional performance indicators with that of the 
staff’s PMDSs was also an unresolved issue raised by the experts. Another CEO confirmed 
this opinion by saying that: “All supervisors and managers of performance management 
agree that these (measurement indicators) are not genuine as they don’t focus on service 
delivery or health outcomes” (Interview 9). There have been recent audits by The Office of 
Health Standards and Compliance (OHSC) and this may be another mechanism to assess 
performance of the institution as a whole which should reflect the performance of staff 
ultimately. However the audits tend to focus on input and process measures mainly at 
present. The senior hospital manager’s feel that the OHSC can assist in holding health 
services accountable but at present they use inappropriate indicators and their findings are 
not transparent. A point also raised by Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015) who 
criticises the current worth of the OHSC. 
 
The PMDSs as it is currently designed appears to refer to generic outcomes that are easily 
manipulated according to the CEOs. Most people know how to game the performance 
management system according to Van Den Heever (ibid). The measurements that should be 
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used must add value and focus on outputs and outcomes (results based management). 
Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015) expressed a similar opinion on how bonuses are 
determined in the City of Johannesburg where inappropriate indicators are used and the 
senior managers get huge bonuses in spite of the fact that citizens are not getting 
appropriate services. The senior hospital managers confer with Eyles (expert interview, 
2015) view that we have a sense of entitlement in the public services at present and that 
everyone gets a four score. Staffs feel that they are entitled to a cash reward each year and 
the senior hospital managers believe that this status quo will remain as no-one really 
challenges it. 
 
Performance contracts are critical to achieving the NPM agenda of improving efficiency and 
holding public servants accountable (De Lancer Julnes, 2006). However, the current 
performance management system leaves a lot to be desired as its implementation does not 
meet its objectives. It creates the performance paradox as sometimes good performance is 
not always rewarded according to the CEOs, experts and senior hospital managers. It also 
leads to perverse incentives as the employee selects the indicators that they know they can 
perform well in (van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002). The linkage of individual performance 
contracts to the performance of the institution as a whole is also not clear. However some 
CEOs believed that with the introduction of the National Core Standards one might be able 
to improve the application of performance management in hospitals in particular, however 
this does not address the issue of quality of care. 
 
As far as NPM was concerned Prof Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015) agreed that 
decentralisation and performance agreements can be part of the discussion but we need to 
question the gains. It talks to autonomy and there are gains or benefits from having a 
degree of autonomy but he stresses that one still needs strong accountability. He believed 
that one can have multiple indicators for accountability. However, he felt that NPM was 
generated in Pretoria which is far from the coal face and hence did not work effectively in 
the public sector. He felt that command and control is still government’s default structure. 
He wanted more voice and more transparency linked to accountability frameworks and 
questioned how public opinion influences authority with this current model. He felt quite 
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strongly that the NPM discussion does not deal with design intricacies.  Choice refers to 
internal market mechanisms. The moment information is made available to the public 
people will choose. Choice and accountability requires objective measurement. However at 
present people cannot choose. You cannot link choice with incentives currently. 
 
Prof van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015) emphasised that the solution was to address 
the governance issue. According to him we need to appoint boards that are independent 
and who can appoint CEOs and fire them if they don’t perform.  The UK has appointed 
boards or governance structures that hold CEOs accountable. Ideally he believes that we 
should have a democratic governance structure such as the New Zealand model. This places 
incentive pressures on the executive. Health care has become too expensive and this is a 
worldwide phenomenon. The main focus is to improve productivity and not cut budgets.  
However he felt that ideal governance structures are still very far away as far as South Africa 
were concerned. He suggested that we can have a staged or phased approach to a stronger 
accountability model that is independent from government. He suggested that fundamental 
to the effective functioning of independence governance structures is access to appropriate 
systematic information. This access to information coming from hospitals is currently not 
available according to all three experts. They recommended that the rationalisation of 
health information systems should also be done systematically. 
 
As far as performance management is concerned all the experts concedes that it is not a 
new idea. It is trending and monitoring and evaluation is even trending more. They are 
perhaps the “dying kicks of the Weberian horse” according to Fitzgerald (expert interview, 
2015). People in public management doubt the value of performance management today 
according to Fitzgerald.  In 2002, Mayor Amos Masondo established a performance 
monitoring set up in the City of Johannesburg. It is now statutory. Fitzgerald chairs this 
committee, and has 12 years’ experience with this, but feels deeply concerned about it. 
Executives score well on their balanced score card. This is because they all have five year 
contracts and maximise rather than optimise their services. He feels ambivalent about the 
measures for executive’s performance. As they do not do their whole jobs, they do not do 
new things and they do not innovate: “performance management is not anything other than 
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a last century tool to incentivise managers”.  He also believes it is an adversarial system and 
does not build teams.  Professor Fitzgerald (ibid) had an experience with this when he was 
Deputy Vice Chancellor at the University of the Witwatersrand. The Council wanted to 
introduce performance management systems with bonuses for senior management at the 
University. The managers rejected it outright.  Professor Fitzgerald regarded the 
performance bonuses as an insult.  He says that he cannot understand how one can 
incentivise if a person was supposed to do their job properly.  He believes that what is 
currently being used in government is outdated and is certainly not NPM. 
 
Prof Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015) made mention of the Taylor Commission of 
Inquiry (2002) that recommended back then the establishment of independent hospital 
boards that can hire and fire hospital CEOs. At the moment CEOs are political appointments 
and he believes feels CEOs “will fail without fail” because of this. He compared this to the 
Tamminy Hall experience in New York in the 1930s where under a Democratic Party led 
government people were appointed because of their political connections. Servicers 
deteriorated until they professionalised the services and delinked it from political influence. 
He firmly believes that health outcomes will not improve if this issue of political 
appointments is not sorted out. This will be further exacerbated if there are no incentives 
and no accountability mechanisms. He also believed that the Minister of Health with all his 
good intention has no real power over the provinces and that the DBSA recommendations 
to the Minister did not provide for a coherent or structural solution and this as implemented 
will likely degrade over time. MECs want access to decision making power and thereby 
access to financial decision making, tenders and patronage (promoting friends). Politicians 
who appointed CEOs perpetuate the current failings in the system. An appropriate 
regulatory framework can deal with this to a degree.  However we have seen a degradation 
of health services over the last decade despite the huge increase in expenditure according 
to Van Den Heever (ibid). He also complained that the public service, besides being 
inefficient, was extremely bloated. In 1994 we had one Director General (DG), two Deputies 
(DDGs) and a few Chief Directors (CDs) that ran Health and Welfare at national level.  We 
now have one DG for Health, with six DDGs and many more CDs. Despite this, there has 
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been no change in efficiency or outputs since this change according to Van Den Heever 
(ibid). 
 
Prof Van den Heever (ibid) further commented on indicators (performance or management 
indicators) that should be part of the reporting requirements of the CEOs and their 
hospitals. These have to be relevant and most importantly available for public scrutiny 
(transparency). He criticised the recently established Office for Health Standards and 
Compliance (OHSC) as being a fake accountability mechanism. If judged against the four 
pillars that he believes are fundamental to an accountability framework it fails miserably 
according to him. The OHSC measures mainly inputs and processes. There is an absence of 
transparency as their findings are not made public. He pointed out that there is no 
requirement of hospital CEOs or health managers in general to generate mortality rates ( as 
a health outcome indicator). This would make a material difference as to how you hold CEOs 
accountable according to him.  He suggested that one needs a few value based indicators 
that feeds into the accountability framework. This view was supported by most of the 
research participants. 
 
4.4. Health Sector Reform in South Africa 
 
NPM was at a high water mark and was trending globally when democratic government 
took over in 1994 according to Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015). NPM influenced the 
political spectrum in South Africa and was not a right wing ideology. He distinguished the 
influence of public choice theorists, which influenced Thatcher and Reagan, from that of his 
understanding of NPM, which had left of centre roots (especially as espoused in New 
Zealand at the time).  According to Professor Fitzgerald (ibid) New Zealand was considering 
contracting out health services and did not consider this as privatisation but allowing for 
more efficient control and regulation by government. It had contracted over 90% of General 
Practitioners, and so incorporated them into the public system, and obliged to government 
pricing and regulation. This was socialism in action according to Fitzgerald. 
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During his work in government Professor Fitzgerald(ibid) was aware of the ANC’s attempts 
to elevate the status and rank of hospital managers in an attempt to have them have more 
authority and be able to make decisions. This never materialised in his stay at government. 
This issue came back cyclically according to him. He commented on the then Minister of 
Public Services Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi’s  views that NPM gives you a toolbox and one can 
use as appropriate (rather than buy into its ideology), a point also repeatedly made in 
Chapter 2.  He felt strongly that politicians can through regulation rather than command and 
control achieve service objectives. NPM asks government to be a facilitator. He opined that 
hospital mangers had to be elevated in terms of status and rank so that they have the 
requisite authority to make the necessary decisions. They need their own budgets and 
“must be able to repair windows” if they want to. However the middle just bloated at head 
office level so that the heads of hospitals that was at Director Level during his tenure at 
government were under layers of Weberian bureaucracy.  Hospitals were supposed to be 
strategic business units, but nothing like this ever happened. The norms and standards that 
were set and the culture of the public service gobbled it up.  CEOs have subsequently been 
elevated in rank and salary and status but cannot do their jobs properly according to him. 
This is further exacerbated by bloated head offices which have a trench warfare mentality 
according to Eyles (expert interview, 2015) and this inaction is entrenched in most of the 
health departments contributing to the overall poor service delivery. NPM was trying to 
address this in that it gives you a vast array of tools and says “use as appropriate” and it is 
not an ideological debate but one of efficiency according to Fitzgerald (ibid).  
 
Prof Fitzgerald was a Director General at national government level post 1994 and used 
NPM principles and tools to re-organise the Weather Bureau, which has international 
significance, into an agency that is now much more efficient according to him. He felt that 
he needed to protect the bureau from layers of bureaucracy. Professor Fitzgerald felt that 
this was a left wing approach as government had the ultimate oversight through regulation. 
He also believed that Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi did not like NPM initially because NPM can 
have a non-nuanced interpretation in that it gives powers to the executive and seems to 
take it away from politicians. He felt strongly that political control would still be there but 
“through regulations rather than command and control”. He believed that we have very 
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expensive cell phone rates and internet bandwidth charges because of this command and 
control mentality.  NPM has other tools where government can be a facilitator to solve 
problems. Politicians were too caught up with the privatisation versus centralised debate.  
NPM is a post-modern approach and now employs e-government and informational nodes 
of management. He believes that at present we don’t talk about NPM but we can still see 
many good examples of it, for example, the King Shaka (a.k.a the Albert Nkosi Luthuli 
hospital) in KwaZulu Natal, where the management is run by the private sector. 
 
According to these research findings the CEOs were generally unaware of the NPM 
paradigm and its impact on public sector reform and health sector reform in South Africa in 
particular.  They were aware of some of the tools of NPM such as delegations, 
accountability, performance management and governance but saw that in terms of general 
PSR in South Africa. They also knew of some policies or legislation that directly affects the 
way they run their hospitals such as the Policy on the Management of Hospitals. They were 
also unaware of the NPM paradigm and its place in the White Paper for the Transformation 
of the Public Service or even its implications in the White Paper on National Health 
Insurance (South Africa, 2015). All that they knew was that hospitals were categorised in a 
particular way and that determined what services you are supposed to render and the role 
of the OHSC. Some were aware that there was draft legislation on the functioning of 
hospital boards and at central hospital level but this was still in its draft stages. 
 
The CEOs were acutely aware of the implications of the PFMA and its possible ramifications 
on their ability to account for the expenditure of their respective hospitals but felt 
hamstrung to control their own finances. The PFMA and subsequent regulations allows for 
financial delegations to be given to the CEOs by the HOD or his designate but they feel that 
HODs and MECs are reluctant to do this appropriately. Fitzpatrick (ibid) also believes that 
the PFMA as it currently is severely restricts the HODs ability to incur expense strategically 
rather than creating the flexibility to being creative with one’s budgets. Perhaps this is why 
the research shows that the HODs and MECs are reluctant to decentralise financial 
management fully. There are some piecemeal delegations that allow CEOs to for instance to 
purchase goods and services up to in some instances to a total of R500 000 but with strong 
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head office oversight and a poor payment history. The senior hospital managers also 
describe the procurement processes as tedious and often run by incompetent staffs that are 
rarely held accountable for their poor SCM systems. This flies in the face of the intended PSR 
and HSR initiatives in South Africa. This is also not in accordance with the principles of NPM 
principles and talks to the fluctuating government stance on the use of NPM principles in 
HSR over the past two decades according to the experts.  
 
In terms of HR Awortwi (2006) on his critique of NPM reforms in developing countries made 
the point that for NPM to be implemented their needs to be adequate numbers of well 
qualified and professional civil servants in the system. The WHO recommendations also 
highlight this issue, of having competent staff, as critical to the building clocks of a health 
system (WHO, 2001). The CEOs complained about the inability and restrictions placed upon 
them by head office compromising their ability to appoint staff. The appointment of health 
professionals took a long time and this affected service delivery quite severely.  They were 
also particularly concerned of not having appropriately qualified management staff in 
finance, human resources and supply chain management in particular. “You are as good as 
your team” was a perfect pronouncement on this issue by one CEO. These views were 
shared by the senior hospital managers and they blame it on a lack of understanding of 
those in authority at provincial head offices as to what HR requirements the current HSR 
asks for. 
 
However, according to the experts and as emphasised before, delegations can only be made 
effective if there are appropriate accountability frameworks in place. Their suggestion is 
that hospital boards should be given this responsibility and must hold the CEOs and senior 
hospital management to account on their ability to manage their budgets, their staff and 
ultimately the health outcomes of their patients. This is in line of the NPM paradigm of let 
the managers manage but hold them accountable to the public (through appropriate 
governance structures). The draft legislation in this regard as it relates to central hospital 
(South Africa, 2015) will lead to a huge contestation between the provinces and the national 
department. Constitutionally the provinces are responsible for health care delivery and the 
setting up central hospitals as currently envisaged is that it should become a national 
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government responsibility. I believe that we are still a very long way from implementing this 
and many CEOs and senior hospital managers are unaware of its implications. 
 
The MEC has the ultimate responsibility for human resource management issues but 
subsequent amendments to the PSA allows for delegations to be given to managers lower 
down the system. New MECs often do not delegate and I know of senior health professional 
appointments and even staff applications for study leave being held up by MECs. This 
political control manifests itself throughout our government where Ministers and MECs fire, 
move and suspend senior executives as and when they deem necessary. The ultimate HR 
function rests with politicians and this is also very evident in health. Again this lack of 
delegation stems from a lack of trust and flies in the face of NPM reform. 
 
As far as broad public sector financial reforms were concerned the CEOs knew about the 
implications of the PFMA and the PSA (South Africa, 2012). They did not seem to be aware 
of the immediate implications of the National Health Insurance on their work. They have 
been exposed to some work of the OHSC and were more concerned in meeting the 
requirements of this office in terms of core standards (South Africa, 2011). This is a major 
cause of concern for me as the CEOs and their senior hospital managers’ lack of engagement 
with the national processes on NHI will leave them and their hospitals ill prepared for the 
coming changes. In my opinion the NHI will have a great impact on the current public 
hospital services and issues of contracting hospitals to deliver on the NHI will be a crucial 
part of the coming debates. 
 
4.5. Recommendations to government 
 
Most CEOs were happy and committed to their jobs. But they acknowledge that there is 
always room for improvement and skills need to be enhanced. They wanted to be able to 
act independently, able to fill posts, procure and maintain their services and infrastructure 
with sufficient budget. More than anything they say is that “the tools of the trade are 
needed”, and “finance, HR, goods and services that are adequate”. (Interview 12). 
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The one CEO opined that CEOs need realistic budgets, which are activity based, and that 
CEOs should sign performance agreements that are related to explicit deliverables. Another 
CEO expressed his opinion as follows: “if there can be genuine delegations that allow 
managers to express themselves…if you fail (you sic!) will have to accept it yourself”.  
(Interview 1). 
 
A CEO stressed the importance of having a supportive team around the CEO and he is 
quoted as saying: “You have a budget of over half a billion and you have a finance manager 
sitting at level seven or eight it doesn’t make sense”. (Interview 2). Another CEO from a 
different province said, in terms of delegations and advice to government:  
 
My first one will be the issue of delegations, which they must give us the power to 
run the hospital and include that if I want to buy something which I think is 
important I should be allowed to…and as CEO I should be able to appoint, we lose 
doctors because we wait for appointment letters from head office. (Interview 8 ) 
 
CEOs also wanted to appoint their own executive teams that are adequately qualified and 
competent. CEOs also expressed the need for more support from the central or head office 
particularly in relation to HR, infrastructure maintenance and equipment. The CEOs also 
emphasised that:  “You must have an enabling environment”. (Interview 2). 
 
As far as our government’s attitude to NPM is concerned Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015) 
felt that initially government was in tune with global trends (immediately post 1994). Joined 
up government is a manifestation of NPM. There are some current initiatives that according 
to him are NPM in nature such as the establishment of the Gauteng City Region (GCR) which 
is a strategic alliance of government partners in a joined up manner. The GCR works to some 
extent as he believes it is not joined up optimally. We are still occupied with the 
developmental state dogma. He felt that he was committed to it initially and we had good 
case studies, such as Malaysia and the Asian Tigers, but we went nowhere with it. 
Government was interested in other things. 10 years later Trevor Manuel started talking of 
the developmental state again. Prof Fitzgerald (ibid) believes that we have moved on: “we 
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have missed that train”. He believes that the developmental state is a nostalgic idea where 
all government departments should be aligned. But Fitzgerald (ibid) does not see this 
happening. Provinces continue to function and will not relinquish their powers. You cannot 
have strong national, provincial and local governments. ANC technocrats tried to get rid of 
provinces but regional interests were so established that the idea was scuttled. So a 
centrally driven approach is not feasible in South Africa at present. He suggests that we 
should ask questions about using NPM going forward. Twinning for example is an NPM idea. 
We currently have twinning between some public hospitals and some French hospitals.  The 
point that Fitzgerald felt that had to be made was to use resources available to you and 
others, create different kinds of relationships and that are more entrepreneurial, should use 
NPM with “a light touch” was Prof Fitzgerald‘s recommendations going forward. 
Governments understanding and implementation of the developmental state is outdated 
and a 20th Century trend. “We need an Intelligent State” (which has more NPM features 
such as e-government) according to Professor Fitzgerald (ibid).  His  view is that NPM is still 
relevant today but we need to create different kinds of relationships. The new paradigm in 
the 21st Century which builds upon NPM (and all the other earlier layers of change in public 
management) is called Public Value according to him. We should ask how the public sector 
adds value to the services they deliver. He made reference to the work of Bennington in this 
regard. 
 
Public value is a new post Weberian paradigm but has elements of NPM in it according to 
the experts. It still retains the issue of incentives, partnerships and accountability. 
Performance Management and Monitoring and Evaluation are therefore still in vogue in 
government according to the experts.  They believe that the New Development Plan (NDP) 
has NPM elements in it. However with the move to public value the aggressive approach to 
NPM has smoothed out. These are global movements taking place in this regard. Advanced 
democracies do not use NPM rhetoric. Our government understands this but does not want 
to admit it according to the experts. Fitzgerald (ibid) says “government can only go so far. 
The private sector is driving our economy. Government has to say that they want this all 
seeing democracy and has to build it.” However he believes that as government we are in a 
limbo somewhat and we are moving to a semi-entrepreneurial state by default. 
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A critical recurring underlying sub- theme is a lack of leadership or lack of  a continuity of 
leadership where institutional memory is often lost. One CEO also argued the case for 
continuity in leadership and is worthwhile repeating the quote to make the point:  
 
“You need a stable provincial office for you to expect to be stable, if in six years you 
have six MECs and six HODs, that’s one MEC and one HOD per year you can’t expect 
stability in the department. Every time you have new plans and ideas, before they 
can be implemented they are removed. (interview 5). 
 
It was also pointed out (again) that it was only in the Western Cape that they had the same 
HOD for over ten years and every other province has changed their HOD numerous times.  
 
“People with institutional memory are gone; management by constancy is an issue”. 
(Interview 8). 
 
Criticism of the use of consultants when there are crises also came up: “..after three periods 
it is all over and we get KPMG in.. if we had good management we could have written the 
(policy sic!) documents ourselves”. (Interview 5). The Gauteng Health Department at the 
time of doing this research was under administration and so were five departments in 
Limpopo and this was of concern to the CEOs. The Premier in Gauteng had appointed Price 
Waterhouse Coopers and other consultants to intervene until March 2015. The CEOs in the 
affected province expressed concern that soon everything will be under their control viz. 
HR, procurement, finance, security, communication and infrastructure. 
 
 The CEO of a psychiatric hospital advises that psychiatric hospitals are different from other 
hospitals and that the Ministers and other politicians approach to them should be different 
as there is: “no one-size fits all”. (Interview 8). He further states that: “there are too many 
legal issues….many cases are taken to court….either they have to prove that they are 
mentally sound…” (Interview 8), and “the CEO should be involved with other stakeholders 
which include the community, the police, the department of justice, etc….. his job also has 
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political oversight but if he wants to transfer a patient to another province it is not him or 
the psychiatrist that decides but the HOD and the MEC”.(Interview 8). 
 
One CEO that was on the verge of retiring from his hospital said:  
 
for me it was a nice experience, after being a CEO I need to contribute something for 
that area. I am busy finalising a book that I am writing: ‘ Better Management of 
Public Hospitals’, and that book entails a lot of experiences…and how I was 
implementing to improve a particular hospital.(Interview 12). 
 
Inadequate funding on the whole was another issue that needed to be brought to 
government’s attention. One CEO said that if he compares his hospital to others that have 
fewer beds that he is surprised that they get the same budget as his. Also the budget grows 
on average about five-percent a year so there is no real growth as this is often below 
inflation and this pushes him to take money from goods and services to be able to pay 
employees. 
 
Our budgets are growing at a rate of 5% so there is no real growth. In the last three 
years …..the needs have been increasing and most of the money goes towards 
paying salaries and benefits. They will be complaining that the hospitals are dirty, 
when people retire we can’t replace them. …..the government must relook at 
budgeting…it must be zero based budgeting but currently it is not. (Interview 7). 
 
A CEO from a rural hospital had a particular challenge in attracting and retaining staff and in 
particular health professionals. He suggests that government must put in place schemes 
such as bursaries to attract rural students to the professions so that once they qualify they 
will return to these areas. In summary the one CEO said: “two principles that I believe will 
sort out our problems..(we) should be ..given the necessary delegations and the money and 
people should be employed on a contract basis maybe  five years renewable”. (Interview 
10). 
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Recommendations on further training were also made and the importance of the 
appointment of appropriate staff and the current nepotism that prevails: 
 
they appointed a chief operating officer here and it was a disaster and this person 
was promoted to the next post (CEO) in another hospital and it was again disastrous, 
and she was then asked to resign. She was not able to do her job, but she left two 
hospitals behind that have to get up… The corruption that goes on everywhere is 
because of this. (Interview 3). 
 
An important piece of advice was to clamp down on corruption and control absenteeism. 
Another important recommendation was to re-evaluate the organograms and start getting 
improved and more appropriate organograms in terms of the norms of the facility. 
Infrastructure too was a huge challenge and CEOs often don’t have an on-site handyman to 
assist with maintenance. They are too reliant on Public Works for infrastructure 
maintenance and development. The CEOs would like sufficient budget and delegations to 
allow them to deal with infrastructure needs independent of public works. One CEO 
elaborated upon these points as follows: 
 
The first thing will be the budget and on HR and evaluating and review of the current 
organogram… getting a proper organogram is essential in terms of the norms of the 
facility because that is the basis. If I can get that organogram that is really serving a 
purpose for the institution that will be a beginning….. We still do not have a handy 
man and we still have to deal with public works and the department of infrastructure 
and development, sometimes this is a huge problem .(Interview 6). 
 
Another issue that nearly all the particpants felt needed to be addressed by government 
was that of hospital boards and their governance roles. They were often ceremonially 
appointed with no real powers. They needed to represent community interests and be 
properly trained and supported. This is seen as critical by the experts. The issue of 
governance and appropriate accountability mechanisms is of paramount importance if we 
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want to hold CEOs and hospitals as a whole accountable to the public they serve especially 
according to Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015). 
 
I concur with the CEOs overall advice to government which was that the CEOs were 
prepared to take responsibility in managing their hospitals effectively if given the 
appropriate delegations with the systemic support that goes with this. They wanted 
appropriate budgets, appropriate human resources and appropriate support for all their 
operational management functions. With this they felt that tailor made performance 
management agreements that dealt with clearly defined outcomes and results could be 
signed by the CEOs and that it should also take into account each CEOs unique challenges. 
Also the necessary governance structures should be placed so as to hold the CEOs and their 
senior management accountable. These views were supported by the experts and the senior 
hospital managers. The experts were sceptical as to whether these proposals would be 
implemented in the short term but was optimistic that they could probably phased in over 
time. The lack of political will and the nature of the current political power issues (e.g. 
tension between provincial and national governments) led to unnecessary and often 
negative consequences in the current running of the health services. However, a broader 
question that has to be answered is whether there is value in implementing these NPM 
reforms in the health sector and in particular in relationship to public hospital management 
in the current political climate? My suggestion on reflecting on the findings of this research, 
is that NPM reforms should not be indiscriminately adopted in the public sector and less so 
in the health sector and consideration be now given to Public Value as an added dimension 
to viewing public services going forward. 
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CHAPTER 5: NPM, HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AND CEOs IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter integrates the literature review, the document analysis and the results from 
the quantitative and qualitative research in the context of international and local public 
sector reforms seen through the lens of NPM. The CEOs interviewed in the study do not 
operate in a vacuum. Their ability to function is also related to the degree that the South 
African government embraced NPM principles and tools in its reform of its administration 
and as regards health sector reform. This chapter also contextualise the CEOs and the other 
participant’s views as described in the previous chapter within the ongoing public sector and 
health sector reforms that were undertaken by the South African government and in 
particular it’s National Health Department since 1994. In South Africa post 1994 efforts to 
re-invent the post-apartheid state happened at the same as international shifts in the 
contemplation of what and how should the ideal workings of the public sector occur 
according to Chipkin and Lipetz (2012). Osborne and Gaeblers book, “Reinventing 
Government” (1992), became the reference public service reform text in the South African 
public sector context according to Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015). Osborne and Gaebler 
argued the case that the state could still play a critical role in the economy and society 
provided it changed its view on the old bureaucratic model to applying a selection of new 
and more efficient tools which include private management practices that have been 
developed and tested in the business world (viz. NPM managerialism). The South African 
government partially adopted this NPM approach in its public sector reforms post 1994 
(Cameron, 2009) and this is discussed next. 
 
The New Public Management (NPM) practices and tools is what the ANC led government 
wanted to use without buying into its ideology according to Cameron (2009) and Fitzgerald 
(expert interview, 2015). The ANC believed that this new public administration style could 
be disassociated from its neo-liberal roots to serve a more democratic developmental 
agenda consistent with its Reconstruction and Development Policy (RDP) (ANC, 1994). The 
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attraction to an efficiency-driven public management agenda aligned itself with this 
thinking. Within some ANC think tanks the NPM argument resonated very strongly 
(Fitzgerald, expert interview, 2015). It ensured a way of keeping the leadership role for the 
state while aiming to avoid waste, inefficiency and corruption according to Cameron (2009). 
For the purposes of this reflection the main point to be elaborated upon is that from the 
late 1990s restructuring and transforming the public sector in South Africa borrowed largely 
from the NPM paradigm. Fitzgerald (ibid) supports this view but distinguishes the NPM 
paradigm from its neo-liberal roots and argues that one can use the NPM principles and 
tools without associating it with right wing or neo-liberal ideologies. He argues that the 
latter are more strongly influenced by public choice theory than is NPM as the ANC 
understands it. This research indicates that from a policy point of view that in fact the ANC 
led government did adopt the tools of NPM managerialism such as decentralisation, 
performance management, contract appointments, and accountability mechanisms but 
failed largely in its implementation. This as the research indicates is in the main due to the 
context that influenced the ability of CEOs of public hospitals to manage effectively. This is 
explored further in the next section thorough the lens of NPM. 
 
5.2. New Public Management 
 
The research as to what extent has the South African public service and in particular its 
health sector been influenced by the New Public Management (NPM) reforms from 1994 to 
date is first discussed. The adoption of the Department of Public Services of the WPTPS 
embraced the NPM principles of  decentralisation and rightsizing; which means in essence 
the reducing of the size of the public sector; corporatisation in the form of changing public 
service departments into independent units or agencies; the formulation of the Senior 
Management System (SMS); the use of a performance contract system for heads of 
departments; the adoption of a flexible human resources system; and the introduction of 
performance management systems for all public servants; as measures to improve public 
service delivery (Cameron, 2009). Hood (1991) posits that NPM is a convergence of two 
different streams of thought. The one stream was business-like managerialism borrowed 
largely from the private sector. The other stream was based on New Institutional Economics 
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(NIE) which is informed largely by public choice theory, as well as transaction cost and 
principal agent theory. As informed by the research and opinions of the experts the ANC 
government primarily adopted the managerialism stream which are really private sector 
tools that attempts to improve the functioning, efficiency and effectiveness of the public 
sector. The NIE stream looks to privatisation and the creation of markets as its main 
mechanism to influence and improve the way the public sector delivers services. This is an 
important distinction and is clarified by the research. 
 
The United Nations (2005) stated that most of the embracing of NPM principles could be 
attributed to the ongoing attention that organisations such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) paid to it. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2005) argue that the extent to which 
NPM has superceded traditional bureaucratic public administration can be debated. There is 
also a growing view that NPM is perhaps inappropriate for developing countries (Manning, 
2001; United Nations, 2005). However, international economic influences have been an 
important part of the picture that informed public administrative reforms according to 
Cameron (2009). Some of the general reasons for public sector reforms internationally are 
to contain public sector expenditure, improve the bureaucratic burden and redesign social 
policies that have become unaffordable (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). This research 
indicates that we are not ready for wholesale NPM reforms in the public health sector and 
in particular as regards public hospital management. However South Africa was influenced 
somewhat by international trends and this is discussed next. 
 
Bardill (2000) posits that public sector reforms in South Africa was shaped by the increasing 
globalisation, the lack of success of centralised state-dominated development strategies, the 
deepening economic crisis in the developing world and the influence of IMF/World Bank 
structural adjustment programmes. This led to a reassessment of the role and functions of 
the state by the ANC government. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
was one of the most important policy initiatives of the ANC led government post 1994 (ANC, 
1994). It was according to Cameron (2009) a comprehensive, coherent, socio-economic 
programme which aimed to bring together development, reconstruction, redistribution and 
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reconciliation into a one national programme. It was a brave new vision for the fundamental 
transformation of South African society (RDP White Paper, 1994). The RDP was aimed to be 
a social democratic vision of a new South Africa, with an emphasis on the rights for the 
poor. However, due to tight fiscal constraints imposed by the previous regime onto the new 
government financial austerity measures were put in place. This led to the subsequent 
adoption of government’s macroeconomic strategy: Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR), in 1996 committed itself to more conservative and orthodox fiscal 
policies (Seekings and Nattran, 2006). Hirsch (2005) believes that GEAR was an economic 
strategy aimed mainly at reducing government budget deficit, albeit in the context of a 
broader developmental strategy.  This led to a reduction in all national budgets in real terms 
(including health) and led to a state of paralysis as far its transformation agenda was 
concerned which included a slowing down of the adoption of NPM tools in the public sector. 
 
Hirsch commented that although the government did not entirely abandon the RDP, public 
sector investment under GEAR remained low during this period of financial consolidation. 
The adoption of GEAR in 1996 according to Bardill (2006) led to some NPM public sector 
reforms being carried out in a more rigid budget driven paradigm with an emphasis on cost-
cutting, rightsizing and private sector partnerships. Seekings and Nattran (2006) argue that 
only two of the four aspects of GEAR had been subsequently implemented, namely the 
reduced budget deficit and trade liberalisation. The other two, labour market reforms and 
privatisation were partially implemented. This according to Cameron (2009) weakened the 
implementation of NPM reform in South Africa. This patchy implementation of NPM is also 
seen in the health sector. The appointment of HODs on contracts, the implementation of 
performance management systems, the outsourcing of certain services, public-private 
partnerships, the tender process and the intention to decentralise was part of the public 
sector reform and in particular health sector reform agenda since 1994. Whether there have 
been some successes with PSR and HSR or not in terms of NPM is now debated. 
 
South Africa was isolated during the apartheid era and was unaware of international 
developments in public administration according to Thornhill (2008). After 1994 it was quite 
evident as to what had to be done. There had to be a major transformation of the public 
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service towards a more democratic one which put customers (citizens) first (Fraser-Moleketi 
and Saloojee, 2008). In the early 1990s NPM was in its prime internationally and its 
principles had a great deal of appeal for the ANC led government according to Fitzgerald. 
The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS, 1997) was developed 
as the ANC governments’ policy framework for the transformation of the public service and 
most of its recommendations were according to international best practice in public 
administration, namely through the adoption of NPM managerialism principles. The 
subsequent Presidential Review Commission of Inquiry on the Transformation and Reform 
in the Public Service (PRC, 1998) was set up to review the public service. The Commission 
had international advisors according to Cameron (2009) and Fitzgerald (expert, 2015) who 
were steeped in NPM thinking and made wide ranging recommendations which were 
implemented by government without often thinking through their ramifications (South 
Africa, 1998).  
 
While the government did not lose its developmental and constitutional roles and 
responsibilities, most authors agree that NPM reforms were influential during this period of 
reform. Miller (2005) argues that much of the reform in South Africa paralleled those 
reforms in other countries such as United Kingdom (UK) and the USA. The Director-General 
for Public Service and Administration Richard Levin (2004) believes that public sector reform 
has been shaped by the tenets of NPM, which had a major focus on decentralisation of 
management and in particular that of human resources management. There were a range of 
reforms processes that influenced the shaping of the public sector. Geraldine Fraser 
Moleketi repeatedly argued that the ANC led government wanted to borrow the tools of 
NPM but not buy into its neo-liberal ideology (Fraser-Moleketi, 2010), a point also made by 
Cameron (2009) and Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015). This led to some NPM tools being 
adopted in the general public sector reforms such as mentioned before viz. contract 
appointments, performance management systems, contracting out certain services, tender 
awarding to private service providers, public-private partnerships, and some move to 
decentralisation. This according to the research has unfortunately not materialised 
sufficiently and is borne out by the experts’ opinions in this regard. In terms of 
decentralisation, the CEOs that participated in this study argue that delegations given in 
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2006 were slowly removed over the subsequent years and one CEO referred to them as “yo-
yo delegations” as they would come and go depending on the MEC and HOD at the time. 
This element of decentralisation, namely delegations, had a political imperative that was 
pushed by most of the Ministers of Health over the last few decades but rarely sufficiently 
materialised. This was largely due to the influence, often resistance, of the MECs in the 
provinces and the political power they had over these processes according to the 
participants in this research. The participants in this research also felt strongly that there 
was none if any move to decentralisation during the last decade of health sector reform. 
Decentralisation was a ministry of health’s priority, which had numerous task teams and 
inter-ministerial committees trying to advance it for over the last 20 odd years, but failed to 
have been affected because of a whole range of reasons. The main reason according to this 
research was a lack of political will and support particularly from the provinces. 
Decentralisation is one of the first steps to implementation of NPM PSR reforms and is 
briefly scrutinised below in terms of the findings of the research. 
 
5.3. Decentralisation 
 
One of the main characteristics of NPM is the dismantling of many central control 
mechanisms and passing them on to lower tears of the public service (Polidano, 1999). In 
NPM language, decentralisation is the means to enable line managers’ greater managerial 
authority and responsibility. Hood (1991) aptly describes this aspect as hands on 
professional management i.e. let the managers manage. Also, devolving human resources 
and financial management functions to managers is another important component of NPM. 
The Public Service Amendment Act of 1997 (South Africa, 1997) made the Minister for 
Public Services and Administration responsible for policy on functions of the public service,  
conditions of service, scales of salaries and wages, allowances of class, rank and grades, 
employment policy, its organisational structure, transfer of functions, post establishment, 
creating, grading and abolition of posts and appointments, and promotions and transfers 
(Ncholo, 2000).  
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A further amendment to the PSA in 1998 led to provincial departments reflecting the 
structures of their related national departments. Thus the members of the executive 
councils (MECs) in these newly created provincial departments now had the managerial 
authority to organise their departments and hire and fire their employees as they feel fit 
(Adair and Albertyn, 2000). This quasi-federal constitution meant that there was 
decentralisation down to sub-national actors such as provinces. Cameron (2009) 
commented that it was important to note that these executive powers were decentralised 
down to the level of politicians and not to managers, although provisions were made for 
further delegations to managers. This was according to Cameron (2009) inconsistent with 
international best practice, which rather than saying “let the managers manage” which is 
one of the central tenets of NPM, was more of a situation of “let politicians manage” (Hood, 
1991, p. 3). This criticism of having the politicians’ manage is also made by the experts that 
were interviewed. They also blame the politicians for inept bureaucratic appointments on 
nepotism, patronage and inappropriate ANC cadre deployment. 
 
The main reason post 1994 for not adopting or fully embracing NPM principles and 
particular its essential element of decentralisation according to Cameron (2009) and 
Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015) was that the ANC government did not trust the white 
bureaucrats of the old regime. These were still the majority of the staffing in the higher 
levels of public administration, a legacy of the past regime agreed to in the negotiations that 
led to a Government of National Unity post 1994. Executive politicians were required to 
change the higher echelons of the bureaucracy according to the ANC led government post 
1994. Subsequently new Public Service Regulations were introduced on the 1st July 1999. 
They were to replace the detailed human resources provisions contained in the old Public 
Service Staff Code. These new regulations according to Cameron (2009) were intended to 
transform the staffing structure of the public sector and promote the decentralisation of 
human resources power to lower levels of management (South Africa, 2001). However what 
must be borne in mind and emanating from the research that staffing, especially at senior 
levels, were largely political appointees (as confirmed by Van Den Heever and Eyles, expert 
interviews, 2015). This research, within this political context, attempts to unpack the degree 
to which decentralisation and delegations occurred in practice. One view as expressed by 
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the previous DG of the PSA is that decentralisation has been a failure (Levin, 2004). Levin 
argued that decentralisation has not really empowered managers with the necessary 
resources to use these delegations effectively. Van Den Heever and Fitzgerald (expert 
interviews, 2015) argue that politicians also did not really want to decentralise. According to 
the experts when politicians did appoint people in senior positions these were often done 
through patronage and nepotism than by expertise in the field. This created often bloated 
bureaucracies that were largely inefficient but with strong political oversight. This according 
to the research contributed to the lack of decentralisation and delegations and this is 
confirmed by the interviews with the CEOs and senior hospital managers.  
 
The CEOs and senior hospital managers argued that they cannot manage their hospitals 
effectively within the current situation largely because of inadequate delegations and poor 
head office support. This was in their opinion due to a generally inefficient bureaucracy that 
impacted negatively on finance, human resources and operational management in the main. 
The issue of appropriate governance structures for hospital boards, as raised by numerous 
ministerial tasked teams and described in the earlier chapters, were also never properly 
addressed until now according to the research.  The Policy on the Management of Hospitals 
(2012) indicates an intention to create independent and much more functional hospital 
boards. There is also draft legislation on the development and implementation of new 
governance structures for central hospitals or group of central hospitals that appears to 
address this (South Africa, 2015). In this draft piece of legislation the establishment of the 
hospital board and its control over and management of central hospital are elaborated 
upon. The hospital board (executive board) will appoint the CEOs and set the strategic 
direction of the hospital. It will hold the management of the hospital accountable in terms 
of performance agreements. This appears to be going in the right direction as far as 
delegations and accountability of CEOs are concerned but there will be contestation with 
the provinces as the central hospitals will have to become a national health function to 
achieve this and the Western Cape, governed by the Democratic Alliance, has made their 
opposition on this this quite clear according to this research.  
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While some policies for decentralisation have been put in place, there have been limited 
decentralisation and delegations in practice according to the experts interviewed. Also more 
importantly there has been a consistent lack of accountability frameworks put in place 
where decentralisation has occurred. In 2008 the DPSA requested all national and provincial 
departments to provide it with a list of delegations of powers and duties in terms of the PSA 
and Public Service Regulations. Seventy three out of 151 departments responded: a third of 
the respondents had limited delegations from EAs to HODs, 39% had average delegations, 
18% had above average delegations and 19% had extensive delegations (DPSA, 2008).   
 
These findings show that most departments are still not decentralised, with only 37% (18% 
above average and 19% extensive delegations) of HODs having a reasonable degree of 
delegations according to the report. In addition the data reveals that a trend was emerging 
where departments which were performing well were more likely to have delegated a fair 
proportion of powers and duties to HODs (DPSA, 2008). These findings therefore indicated 
that most managers have not been given sufficient powers to manage even at HOD level 
and most of the powers rest with the Executive Authorities (the MECs). This has been 
confirmed by the CEOs and experts that were interviewed in this study who argued that 
how can you hold managers accountable for service delivery if they have not been given 
sufficient authority to manage? As pointed out before CEOs wanted more delegations and 
the systemic support that goes with it. One Director General, according to the DPSA report 
(2008) said that the institutional parameters are not there for managers to manage. 
Another issue was that Ministers and MECs sometimes bypassed DGs or HODs and to 
manage other managers lower in the hierarchy. This has also been argued in the interviews 
with the CEOs and senior hospital managers where there is a nationwide experience of CEOs 
being removed or moved (redeployed) after political intervention. All CEOs and senior 
hospital managers complained without exception as to a lack of decentralisation particularly 
as it relates to human resources management (the ultimate power rests with the politicians, 
the MECs for Health in the provinces). Some CEOs and senior hospital managers complained 
that they have to get head office permission to hire new staff and even sometimes at the 
level of a new cleaner. Experts view this problem as political. The politicians don’t want to 
relinquish power. The expert’s views are that politicians fail to see that they can become 
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facilitators through the use of NPM tools in that they can control via regulations. The 
politicians fear the loss of power according to this research, or perhaps they do not want to 
relinquish the power they have as they don’t trust the bureaucrats that they employ. 
 
The conclusions of my research resonate with the discussion above and this is summarised 
as follows. The CEOs are very frustrated at the position they find themselves in. Their main 
challenge in enabling them to manage is not having the appropriate delegations for financial 
management, human resources deployment, operational management and eventually 
influencing health outcomes positively. However this decentralisation has to be within an 
appropriate accountability framework according to the expert interviews. Accountability 
cannot be held by CEOs if they are not given the appropriate powers and authority. The 
experts highlight the issue of a lack accountability in the public sector generally particularly 
around the financial implications of problem such as corruption and inefficiency. Political 
interference is according to this research the major contributor to the problem. The 
relevance of the research is that it examines the problems that CEOs face in managing South 
African public hospitals, explains them, compares them and validates them in relation to 
NPM theories and international viewpoints. The research indicates that at best only a few 
tools of NPM were adopted and these often patchy or incomplete (Cameron, 2009).  It 
furthermore explicates the view of a selection of CEOs, experts in public management and 
senior hospital managers and their views on how to solve the managerial problems faced 
because of a lack of decentralisation (which includes governance)and allows them the 
opportunity to offer solutions. Another huge challenge identified by most of the participants 
was financial public service reforms and this is discussed next. 
 
5.4. Financial Public Service Reforms 
 
Finances are generally more regulated than human resources because of their 
macroeconomic implications, most notably the impact of government expenditure on the 
budget deficit. One of the NPM tools is to decentralise financial management to lower levels 
of governments or agencies and put in the appropriate accountability frameworks and 
structures. Tenders and the procurement processes have been problematic according to this 
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research. There is therefore a particular concern that procurement policies are not open 
and transparent. The PFMA has also influenced politics-administration relationships in that 
it has sometimes led to conflicting lines of authority according to Cameron (2009). The DG 
or HOD has clear responsibility and accountability for financial management, while the 
executive politicians are ultimately responsible for human resources management. The 
PFMA made the DG or HOD responsible for the financial resources of his or her department 
as the accounting officer. It provides for a wide range of functions and responsibilities, 
including implementing internal audit systems, efficient use of departmental resources, 
effective systems for controlling financial resources in departments, management of 
liabilities and ensuring the safeguarding and maintenance of assets, and undertaking 
disciplinary action against public servants who contravene the Act (Miller, 2005). This has 
been problematic in the public sector in general and in particular for CEOs of public 
hospitals in South Africa according to this research. 
 
 The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (1999) introduced financial reforms and three 
year planned programme budgeting (DPSA, 2004). This Act introduced a performance based 
approach where the concentration was shifted from inputs and rules to outputs and 
responsibilities. The objective included giving greater responsibilities to officials but at the 
same time holding them more accountable. It also allowed for the modernising of the 
system of financial management in the public sector. However, Fitzgerald (expert interview, 
2015), believes that the PFMA is too restrictive and that it does not empower managers to 
make discretionary financial decisions. However, if anything there has been a move towards 
centralisation according to him. This view is supported by Cameron (2009) as well. This 
again is borne out by the interviews with the senior hospital managers as well as the other 
experts. CEOs are given a budget letter in the beginning of the financial year, often with 
insufficient funds, to operate their hospitals but all the payments are centralised with tons 
of red tape to negotiate through. Line items are kept rigid and there is no space to make 
discretionary expenses, a real problem in allowing managers to prioritise expenditure, a 
point also made by all the experts (2015). Procurement is a huge problem that was 
emphasised by the senior hospital managers during the focus group discussions. They 
believe that they have the inappropriate staff in charge of SCM and there is no real 
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accountability held by staff doing procurement. They believe that these staff members in 
procurement are incompetent and inefficient but because of blurred reporting lines they 
are not held accountable for non-performance. This is the place that corruption creeps in 
according to this research. This view is supported by the experts who believe that there are 
no mechanisms within the public sector to weed out non performers and procurement in 
particular is prone to corruption. In conclusion therefore, despite the best intentions of the 
PFMA i.e. to hold HODs and DGs accountable, it does not facilitate a process for sufficient 
delegations lower down the line management and therefore inadequate decentralisation. 
However it allows for corruption creep within existing functions and it cannot manage this 
adequately within the current bureaucratic structures. In theory CEOs are held accountable 
for huge budgets, anywhere between R400 Million to R2 Billion rand, but they are not privy 
to its determination nor its actual spend. Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015) argues 
that current budgeting systems are archaic and inappropriate. The current legislation (viz. 
the PFMA) does not support the implementation of NPM reforms. The research indicates 
that hospitals should determine their own budgets and be held accountable for its 
expenditure, and most importantly, this within the appropriate governance frameworks. 
 
5.5. Health Sector Reforms in South Africa 
 
The CEOs and senior hospital managers’ views on current health sector reform in South 
Africa were largely informed by their own experiences. They in fact knew nothing about the 
NPM paradigm and its influence on current public sector reform. A brief account of the 
sequence of the current health sector reforms post 2007 as informed by the literature 
review and document analysis is described next. It was most recently refined at the National 
Conference of the ANC held in Polokwane in 2007 and was informed by all the previous ANC 
policies that go back as far as the Freedom Charter of 1958. The ANC government was 
aware of the growing concerns of the poor performance of its health sector (Schaay, 
Sanders, Kruger, 2011). According to these authors the sequence of events was as follows. 
Firstly a Health Sector Roadmap was determined and this provided a diagnostic view of the 
key problems facing the health sector. It was commissioned by the ANCs National Executive 
Committee’s (NEC) Sub-Committee on Education and Health in 2008 and coordinated by the 
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Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA). The Roadmap report and other consultations led 
to the Health Minister’s 10 Point Plan which intended to guide government health policy for 
the next few years. It also identified opportunities for coordinated public and private health 
sector efforts in order “to improve access to affordable, quality health care in South Africa” 
(Rispel, 2010, p. 1). The 10 Point Plan informed the National Department of Health’s 
Strategic Plan 2010/11-2012/13. Two important points of the 10 Point Plan need to be 
highlighted here as they are of particular relevance to the functioning of public hospitals. 
The one point was no. 3. Health Service Quality Improvement, and point no. 4. 
Strengthening health care system management. This clearly indicates that the ruling party 
identified these two issues as important in improving health care delivery in South Africa 
and this also informed the development of the purpose of this research, albeit only 
focussing on CEOs and public hospital management. 
 
On the basis of the 10 point plan and the establishment of a Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation Department in the Office of the Presidency and the release by the National 
Planning Ministry of the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2009-2014 a 
performance agreement between the President and the Minister of Health was signed in 
October 2010. This is articulated as the Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement (NSDA) 
(signed between the Minister of Health and the President) for the Health Sector. This was 
based on the government’s vision to better the life of all South Africans ( A Better Life for 
Al)and in particular to attain Outcome 2: A Long and Healthy Life for all South Africans. For 
the health sector there were four strategic outputs identified which the health sector must 
achieve. 
Output 1: Increasing life expectancy 
Output 2: Decreasing Maternal and Child Mortality 
Output 3: Combating HIV and AIDS and decreasing the burden of disease from 
Tuberculosis 
Output 4: Strengthening the health system. 
 
With the setting of the NSDA and with reference to output 4, a significant number of health 
sector reforms were planned to be undertaken. In 2011 the Minister released a green paper 
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on the National Health Insurance (South Africa, 2011) as his first major piece of legislation 
under his headship. A further White Paper on the NHI was released in December 2015 
(South Africa, 2015). This proposed NHI is a plan for a financing mechanism for the health 
system that will pool mandatory contributions and public sector finance to purchase 
services from accredited public and private sector providers. The main aim of the NHI is 
achieving universal health coverage for all South Africans. In its first five years of being 
rolled out, the key focus is to strengthen the health system through: “Improved 
management of health facilities and districts; Quality Improvement; Infrastructure 
Development; improved medical devices and equipment purchases; Human Resources 
planning, development and management; and Information management and systems 
support” (South Africa, 2015). The establishment of the NHI fund is intended to be a 
government-owned entity that is publicly administered.  
 
Research was commissioned to inform the NHI process and Schaay, et al (2011) reviewed 
how to improve the running of the services by assessing hospital autonomy issues. Also in 
recognition of the need to improve quality of care as per the 10 point plan the Ministry of 
Health implemented a number of quality assurance and quality improvement programmes 
according to Schaay, et al (2011). These included the setting up of National Core Standards 
for Health Establishments in South Africa (South Africa, 2011). The core standards consist of 
seven domains. The first three relate to the core business of the health system: delivering 
quality health care to users or patients. These are: Patient Rights, Clinical Governance and 
Care, and Clinical Support Services. The remaining four domains are essentially the support 
systems that ensure that the core business is developed and these are: Public Health, 
Leadership and Corporate Governance, Operational Management, and Facilities and 
Infrastructure. The Office for Health Standards and Compliance (OHSC) has already audited 
health facilities including hospitals and are piloting auditing tools according to the CEOs. 
 
As part of the plan to improve health systems management a Healthcare Management 
Project, initiated by the Ministry of Health and facilitated by the Development Bank of South 
Africa, was carried out to assess the competency of public hospital CEOs and district 
managers and was reported upon earlier in this research (DBSA, 2010).  According to the 
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DBSA (2010) the way of determining the competence of hospital CEOs would have been to 
review individual and institutional performance data and compare these. The DBSA could 
not find reliable individual performance data and given the number of factors that 
contribute to the overall institutional performance, it was impossible according to them to 
make any firm conclusions about individual performance based on this data. Thus they 
developed their own health management competency framework, scorecard and 
assessment battery which was used to assess each CEO. The key components of the 
scorecard were: qualifications, experience and assessed competencies. The findings of the 
DBSA study concurred somewhat with this research in terms of qualifications and 
experience. However it did not objectively assess performance and fails to get any 
viewpoints from the CEOs or health manager’s perspective on what their opinion of the 
management challenges there are. This is also the view of Van Den Heever (expert 
interview, 2015) who criticised the DBSA process as being unscientific and inappropriate. He 
felt that objective measures of performance were not used. He also criticises the DBSA 
research on not answering the question as to how the CEOs were appointed in the first 
place and secondly what are the hospital senior managers views on how do the CEOs 
perform (for example a 360 degree assessment was not performed). Most importantly 
according to him was the issue of how CEOs and senior health service managers are held to 
account is ignored. He was especially concerned as to what sort of independent democratic 
governance structures were to be put in place to hold CEOs and their senior management 
accountable.  
 
The DBSAs findings however, incomplete as it was, informed the current Policy on Hospital 
Management. Its main failing in my opinion and confirmed by the experts is that it was not 
informed by the CEOs lived experiences and challenges in running a public hospital. This 
research argues the case that CEOs of public hospitals face many challenges in their day to 
day work. This has largely stemmed from the fact that they do not have the necessary 
delegations and support to do their work properly. A lack of political will and a lack of 
enabling policies and accountability frameworks are the key limiting factors according to the 
CEOs, senior hospital managers and experts in public management that I interviewed. This is 
not reflected in the DBSA findings at all. Other limiting factors that these participants 
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identified are inadequate human resources (lack of health professional staff and lack of 
support staff), inadequate financial resources and inappropriate information technology. 
The experts believe also that as long as we don’t provide appropriate accountability 
frameworks and hold senior managers to account delegations in themselves may not lead to 
efficiency. Van Den Heever (ibid) in particular emphasised the case repeatedly that we need 
the appropriate governance structures in place before delegations are given to CEOs. Also, 
Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015) does argue that decentralisation is still an important 
aspect of managerialism thinking but is concerned that government is still ambivalent about 
implementing it and the rationale behind this is that politicians feel that they will relinquish 
power if they do so. 
 
Conclusion 
 
CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa operate within a particular political climate that 
determines the way they function. All PSR and HSR are largely determined by the political 
context according to this research.  The government wanted to adopt the tools of NPM but 
not buy into its ideology. It also got huge resistance from the provincial executives (MECs of 
Health in particular) in trying to decentralise and delegate financial and human resource in 
particular to line managers such as CEOs of hospitals. This led to an inefficient public sector 
in general and health in particular as regards the management effectiveness of hospitals. 
The use of the NPM paradigm and its usefulness within the South African has to be 
questioned according to this research particular in the light of the politics at play.  
 
According to the literature review, document analysis and the qualitative research South 
Africa is not ready to buy into the entire NPM paradigm at this point in time. This is because 
we do not have the relevant expertise nor capacity (particularly in finance, human resources 
and supply chain management), nor the appropriate information systems (lack of e-
government) to make appropriate and timeous decisions. There is also a glaring lack of 
appropriate accountability frameworks (such as democratic governance structures) in the 
public sector in general and in public health care in particular. Most importantly, and this 
research concludes this, is that the political context invariably determines whether we move 
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towards this managerialism framework or not. There has been a reluctance from politicians 
(MECs in the province) to relinquish power and move to more centralisation (Cameron, 
2009). This view was shared by the all three experts interviewed in this research. 
International experience and in particular the African experience according to Awortwi 
(2006) and Vyas-Doorgepersadh (2011) also makes this point. 
 
Some commentators, such as Hutton (1996), point to fundamental weaknesses in the NPM 
ideology implementation and as a contributor to relative economic decline where these 
NPM principles are implemented. As far as the health sector reforms are concerned the 
qualitative research indicates that CEOs want to manage effectively with the appropriate 
decentralisation mechanisms in place that will allow for clear cut delegations and 
accountability mechanisms put in place. What is needed is a re-evaluation of what NPM 
tools can be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public hospital system 
in the current South African context if any. According to Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015) 
we have in fact moved beyond NPM per say and should reconsider the new public 
management paradigm of what are public goods, does the public have choice and the 
importance of public value. I have not deliberated upon the Public Value approach as 
espoused by Bennington (2005) as the South African public sector has not embraced its 
principles.  I definitely believe, and as informed by this research,  that we should now 
include it in the discourse of current public sector reform. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter interrogates the research question and links it to the research findings that 
have been interpreted through the lens of NPM and in the context of current health sector 
and public sector reform in South Africa. The purpose of the study was to explore the views 
of CEOs in public hospitals in South Africa as regards the managerial challenges they face 
and what possible solutions there are in improving these. Their views were complimented 
by in-depth discussion with public management experts (a view from the top) and a focus 
group discussion of senior hospital managers (a view from the bottom). This research shows 
that there are systemic restrictions on the ability of CEOs of public hospitals to perform. The 
voices of CEOs in public hospitals have not generally been heard. Their views, opinions and 
recommendations on how to better manage public hospitals have not been articulated 
before. This research provides critical information that is informed and expressed by the 
practitioners themselves. Further depth in terms of understanding the research question 
was gleaned through the interviews of experts in public management and the focus group 
discussion with senior hospital managers. The triangulation of all these findings with the 
literature review and document analysis is presented in this concluding chapter. 
Recommendations for consideration are also presented here. 
 
The quantitative study outcomes showed that of the 30 CEOs who completed and returned 
the questionnaire all had some form of higher education, and a reasonable amount of 
experience(average was 7.7 years and DBSA recommends 6 years). The majority were 
African (87%) and male (53%). The most important point that the CEOs emphasised was that 
in the current circumstances they were bureaucratically hamstrung and unable to manage 
effectively (86%). This is a worrying figure and does not appear anywhere in local literature, 
policy or research. It is patently absent in the DBSA (2010) research commissioned by the 
NDoH in assessing the competence and requirements for CEOs in public hospitals in South 
Africa. Most CEOs felt that they had insufficient delegations for managing their finances, 
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staffing and quality of care. The majority felt that they needed more delegations for 
finances (90%) and for staffing (100%).  
 
These findings concurred with those of the in-depth interviews of the CEOs and of three 
experts in policy and management and the focus group discussions with the CEOs and with 
senior hospital managers. Most of the CEOs explained that the main impediments and 
challenges facing them were systemic and lack of clear policy direction. In their opinion 
some legislative constraints (such as the PFMA and PSA) were also placed on the scope of 
their financial, human resources, performance and operational management capabilities. 
These powers for all intent and purposes were held at provincial head offices (at MEC and 
HOD level). It was not only a matter of decentralisation and the devolving of delegations but 
of ensuring that there were effective processes on the ground in terms of adequate staffing 
(professional and support), support systems such as HIS and most importantly appropriate 
head office support. They urgently wanted clear and appropriate delegations and were 
prepared to take the consequent responsibility and accountability. The experts felt that 
delegations in themselves will not address the managerial challenges. What are needed 
more importantly are democratic accountability frameworks. In particular they believe it is  
important to have appropriate governance structures to be put in place first before 
delegations are given. This governance structure should have no conflicts of interest and 
should be able to hold the CEOs and senior management to account on predetermined 
deliverables. The research also stresses that relevant monitoring and measurement 
processes are to be put in place which has to hold the CEOs and senior hospital 
management account to these democratic governance structures. The process of 
measurement and accountability also has to be transparent. The latter i.e. being 
transparent, in effect being the main measure of public accountability. However, this 
research shows that this is unlikely to occur because of the politics at play i.e. the political 
context will ultimately determine if decentralisation will ever take place. 
 
This idea of using NPM tools such as decentralisation with both the appropriate delegations 
and accountability mechanisms are critical in enabling institutions such as public hospitals to 
manage themselves better. There is currently draft legislation enabling the establishment of 
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hospital boards with accountability mechanisms for CEOs but only covers central hospitals 
contingent on these hospitals becoming national responsibilities (South Africa, 2015). 
However this is unlikely to be implemented in the short term as it first requires that the 
NDoH take over the running of central hospitals and this research shows that many 
provinces are resistant to this (arguing that the delivery of hospital services are their  
constitutionally charged duty of province). The CEOs and the senior hospital managers were 
also unhappy with the current performance management systems that were in place. They 
were all prepared to sign performance contracts if given the necessary powers and 
resources and to be held appropriately accountable. The CEOs currently don’t sign the 
budget letters given to them and their performance contracts are generic with no real 
incentives or disincentives for CEOs. The CEOs were also concerned that the current 
performance measurement system as being far from adequate. I agree with the views of the 
experts in public management to dismiss the current PMDSs as inappropriate and in fact  
suggest that it should probably be discarded in its present application. The CEOs too 
highlighted the fact that there was no alignment between their performance management 
systems and that of the institutions ability to perform particularly in the light of the work of 
the Office of Health Standards and Compliance (OHSC).  Of concern was that there was little 
obvious structural preparation taking place aside from meeting OHSC requirements for the 
implementation of the ambitious NHI (National Health Insurance) that the Minister of 
Health has embarked upon. The research findings are also critical of the functioning of the 
OHSC. The current OHSC audit mainly looks at input and process indicators and does not 
hold CEOs to account. The main criticism of the OHSC audits is that they will not be made 
public (i.e. a lack of transparency) according to Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015). 
 
This is an important consideration in that the NHS in the United Kingdom (UK) publishes 
league tables for hospitals according to Eyles (expert interview, 2015) and should be 
considered as part of public accountability requirements. This in the light of the current 
health sector reforms in South Africa where the proposed NHI borrows a lot of its ideas 
from the UK NHS. The senior hospital managers also see some of the OHSC audit indicators 
as inappropriate for hospitals. There has also been a clear lack of involvement of CEOs and 
senior hospital managers in the preparation for the NHI. This is a critical oversight by the 
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Minister in my opinion in that the bulk of health expenditure occurs through hospitals. 
Furthermore, with the move towards the NHI, decentralisation of public hospitals was going 
to be a possibility notwithstanding some opposition to it. The NHI is looking towards a 
model based largely on the United Kingdom’s experience of establishing independent trusts 
(or boards) to oversee the running of hospitals in a decentralised manner. In relation to this 
the implications of the White Paper on the NHI (South Africa, 2015) which was released 
after this research was done are discussed next. 
 
6.2. Implications for Implementation of the National Health Insurance 
 
Since the launch of the Green Paper on the National Health Insurance in August 2011 (South 
Africa, 2011) there has been substantial progress according to Matsoso and Fryatt in terms 
of health sector reform, hospital management and performance standards setting and 
evaluation (2013). Part of this progress according to these authors is related to hospital 
management reforms. Regulations on the designation of the various types of hospitals and 
on policy and governance were released for public comment on the 2nd March 2012 (South 
Africa, 2012). The regulations gave clarity on the categorisation into district (small, medium 
and large), regional, tertiary, central and special (such as psychiatric and tuberculosis 
hospitals), and the services that should be provided in each.  This regulation also broadly 
defined the roles and responsibilities of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and this a key step 
according to Matsoso and Fryatt (2013) in ensuring the appointment of appropriately 
competent hospital managers paving the way for the decentralisation of management.  
However, the findings of this research indicate that there are already appropriate CEOs that 
have been appointed in the main and that there are often political and systemic factors that 
constrain their performance. Most importantly this research indicates that there has been 
little if any decentralisation to public hospitals taking place. 
 
The subsequent White Paper on the National Health Insurance was released on the 10th 
December 2015 (South Africa, 2015). Pertinent points related to this research are briefly 
discussed here.  
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The White Paper builds on the Green Paper of 2011 in that it articulates a more detailed 
plan as to how the NHI will be rolled out and what the financing options are. Its main focus 
is to provide universal health coverage to all South Africans in an affordable manner. Of 
interest to this research is that it talks more clearly to a purchaser provider split. It talks to 
the accreditation of health service providers, private and public, as well as elaborating on 
provider-payment at hospital level.  The NHI fund will be the single purchaser of personal 
health services for the population The NHI Fund will contract directly with accredited public 
and private facilities at the relevant level of care. It identifies the problems as raised in this 
research that public hospitals are paid through inappropriate budgeting mechanisms. The 
policy suggest a move towards a case-mix activity adjusted payment system (such as 
Diagnostic-Related Groups or DRGs) to hospitals irrespective of whether the hospital is 
public or private.  There is also a move to greater management autonomy by establishing 
governance structures such as hospital boards across all levels of hospital categories.  It talks 
to an establishment of a National Health Information Repository and Data System. The 
White Paper is quite ambitious in what it wants to achieve in quite a short space of time. It 
does however address some of the concerns raised by this research in that it argues for 
better governance structures. But whether these will be independent and able to hold CEOs 
accountable is not that clear. Also the CEOs roles will have to dramatically change. As can be 
seen from this research CEOs are largely unprepared for this new role as envisaged by the 
NHI. This in my opinion is because of their lack of involvement with the discussions of the 
implications of the NHI. They need to be much more involved with the Ministerial teams 
that have been created to address the various aspects of the NHI and in particular its 
implications for public hospitals as these changes are planned to be phased in over the next 
five years. 
 
A major concern as informed by this research is regarding the planned structure of the NHI 
in that we do not have the appropriate technical support staff, both at purchaser and 
provider level, to provide the necessary information available for timeous decisions as this 
model currently demands. All the CEOs, the public management experts and senior hospital 
managers complained of this lack of professional competent support staff and inefficient, 
outdated information systems. A professional bureaucracy is critical to any PSR which uses 
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NPM principles according to Awortwi (2006).This in particular as it relates to financial 
management that is required for such a complex purchaser-provider split.  
 
The OHSC will have to be much more involved in ensuring quality of care and appropriate 
costing and charging of services at all levels of care rather than focussing on input and 
process measures as it currently does. Our current HIS is and has always been the Achilles 
heel of our entire public health system and is particular poor in our public hospitals as 
demonstrated by this research. We will have to have detailed information as to the unit 
costs at the various levels of care and this will have to be risk adjusted. This requires skills 
that are really in short supply in South Africa. Another concern as regards this White Paper 
on the NHI is that it has copied quite a bit of its structure and principles from the 
experiences of the current NHS of the United Kingdom without testing its feasibility in our 
context. There has been no clear demonstration of whether the UK NHS has become more 
efficient since it moved to the purchase provider split model under the Thatcher 
government (and her interpretation of NPM largely driven by public choice theory and 
private sector involvement) and which is now continued to be tampered with (and 
continued to be dismantled in my opinion) by the current Conservative government.(Hood 
and Dixon, 2015). 
 
As mentioned before the NHI policy (2011) and the recent White Paper (2015)  talks to 
changing  the way  the management of hospitals will take place due to the separation of 
purchaser and provider functions and is of particular importance to the future functioning of 
public hospital managers. I am certain that with the current crop of CEOs, competent as 
they are in my opinion, may require the appropriate training and support to do this 
effectively. According to the NHI policy complex institutions such as hospitals need highly 
skilled and empowered senior managers to ensure the provision of efficient and high quality 
services. The NDoH has prepared draft guidance within the regulations for the 
strengthening of hospital boards in the public health sector. In addition, the NDoH plans to 
take over the management of central hospitals. Work in this regard has already started with 
three hospitals in Gauteng viz. The Charlotte Maxeke Johannesburg Academic Hospital, the 
George Mukhari Academic Hospital and the Steve Biko Academic Hospital.  
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These hospitals render highly specialised services (tertiary and quaternary) on a national 
basis and are a platform for the training of health workers and for carrying out research. 
They also function as referral units for the other hospitals and employ highly trained staff. 
Initial work has focussed on the establishment of functional business units that will define 
the costing of services, revenue generation, collection and retention as a first step in 
strengthening their information and administration systems. Also, a case-based hospital 
payment system (based on Diagnostic Related Groups) is being piloted in several hospitals 
including Umtata (Eastern Cape), Universitas (Free State), and Inkosi Albert Luthuli 
(KwaZulu-Natal) (Matsoso and Fryatt, 2013). However this research indicates that most of 
the CEOs and senior hospital managers of public hospitals are unaware of the implications 
of these NHI initiatives on the future functioning and financing of their hospitals. In fact the 
CEOs and senior hospital managers have not been invited to any discussion of the NHI to 
date. 
 
A notable achievement of the NHI process was the advertisement of senior manager posts 
and the appointment of new health facility managers in 2013 and 2014. Whether this has 
strengthened the health system capacity is uncertain. This followed the report from the 
DBSA (2010) on the assessment and capacities of senior health managers in 2010. There has 
also been re-imbursement reform with many CEO posts re-graded and then advertised. 102 
of the 118 new CEO positions have been filled (i.e. 86%). A decision has also been taken by 
the NDoH that in future all senior health service managers will need to have undergone 
specialist training and be accredited by the newly established South African Leadership and 
Management Academy. The improvement of administration and management is high on the 
NDoH agenda. But what is missing is that all these initiatives appear to be top down and are 
not informed by the CEOs experiences on the ground (i.e. not bottom up). Also and more 
importantly appropriate accountability mechanisms (in particular democratic governance 
structures) have still not been put in place. 
 
None of the current initiatives seem to address the concerns raised by the CEOs and the 
senior hospital managers in this study. This is largely due to the fact that the CEOs have not 
been engaged in policies that affect them. All the recent policies are driven by the Minister 
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and the NDoH and are too prescriptive according to this research with no real engagement 
of important stakeholders including the CEOs. This also interferes with the autonomy of the 
provinces which have constitutional implications according to the experts. The Western 
Cape in particularly, run by the opposition party (the Democratic Alliance) has largely 
ignored the Minister of Health’s policy in implementation. This will be another area of 
contestation as regards the NHI going forward. According to this research all that appears to 
have happened as regards public hospital reform during the study period is that the 
government shuffle the chess pieces around, namely CEOs, and is clearly not addressing 
system, process or policy issues that improve the way they function. The CEOs, senior 
hospital managers and the experts interviewed raised the issue of the serious lack of 
adequate budgets and inappropriate budgeting systems. The current NDoH plan is to look at 
cost centres as part of the creation of functional business units but that is long term and 
does not address the immediate problem of a lack of financial information systems capacity 
in most public hospitals that can inform current budgeting processes appropriately. There is 
some commitment to improving infrastructure and the setting aside of moneys for this but 
inexplicably there is no mention of any improvement in the provision of medical equipment, 
drugs and other supplies. The latter is mainly due to the current poor financial management 
and inefficient payment systems.  Suppliers are not paid in time, a perennial problem 
affecting nearly all government departments that result in public hospitals running out of 
essentials such as medicine and equipment as well as food for patients.  
 
The CEOs and senior hospital managers have repeatedly stressed the importance of 
appropriate human resources both in capacity and quantity. There is in contrast not a 
mention of appropriate staffing structures in any document released by NDoH in the 
capacitation of facilities and in particular hospitals. The severe lack of health professionals is 
a chronic problem that will probably worsen in the future and the lack of support staff such 
as porters and cleaners is becoming a crisis in some hospitals.  However, as mentioned 
before there has been a draft document on the development and implementation of new 
governance structures for central hospitals or group of central hospitals (South Africa, 
2015). Albeit in draft form it goes some way to address issue of accountability structures for 
central hospitals. It gives much more responsibilities to hospital boards and sets up 
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mechanisms to hold CEOs of central hospitals accountable to these new governance 
structures. Whether this will ever materialise remains to be seen? 
 
This approach according to the experts interviewed should be rolled out to all public 
hospitals. However the CEOs and the senior hospital managers were in the main unaware of 
the implications of this draft legislation. The White Paper on the NHI elaborates much more 
on having governance structures across all levels of care and suggests it be phased in. If 
these governance structures are democratic, independent and can hold CEOs accountable 
on the performance of the institutions than this may well work in the long run. This research 
indicates that these will probably be political appointments reporting directly to vested 
political interests. The CEOs will be given new performance criteria and hopefully it will 
include being measured against health outcomes as well as financial management as was 
requested by CEOs in this research. Much more work needs to be done on what exact 
measurements will CEOs be judged against and how will these measurements be done, by 
whom and most importantly how will the CEOs be held publicly accountable for their 
performance. 
 
The Office for Health Standards and Compliance (OHSC) was established in 2013 according 
to legislation (South Africa, 2013). The overarching objectives of the office are to protect 
and promote the health and safety of the users of health services. However it uses 
institutional performance measurement tools.  Its functioning will have to now align with 
the White Paper on the NHI in that it will now be the key accreditation body for both private 
and public sector services and will probably have to be the quality assurance and efficiency 
monitoring body. At this stage it is still very far from being able to do any of these 
competently according to the research. However, improvement in the quality of services 
through ensuring compliance with standards will remain the responsibility of health service 
providers. Since the promulgation of the legislation and the establishment of the OHSC 
there has  been an audit of 3880 public sector health facilities (including clinics, community 
health centres,  district, regional, specialised and tertiary hospitals) in all nine provinces 
using specialised performance measurement tools for certification purposes (Health System 
Trust, 2013). The main criticism levelled at the performance measurement indicators is that 
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they are largely input and process indicators and not output or outcome indicators, often 
not appropriate for public hospitals, and that the findings are not made public i.e. the 
process is not transparent. It is at present an inappropriate audit system for the NHI, a view 
supported by both the experts and the senior hospital managers interviewed in this 
research. 
 
This research confirms the points made by Bateman (2011) and Harrison (2010) that CEOs of 
hospitals face huge challenges in managing their hospitals and in particular their enforced 
inability to make decisions. These authors attribute this to a lack of delegations, poor 
performance management systems and unclear lines of responsibility and accountability. 
The research found that a lack of enabling legislation, a lack of clear accountability 
frameworks and the lack of political will at provincial level to be the key factors in retarding 
this process of decentralisation. 
 
Kettl (2000) describes six core characteristics of NPM and these are improved productivity, 
marketisation, service orientation, decentralisation, appropriate policy, and accountability. 
If measured against these our policies appear appropriate but the lack of will in supporting 
its implementation is where it fails. From my discussions with the research participants if we 
had to just focus on improved productivity, appropriate decentralisation and establishing 
proper accountability structures we will go a long way in improving the quality of service we 
provide as well as improve the efficiency of public hospitals. There is a not the political will 
to decentralise functions because politicians don’t want to lose power if these institutions 
becoming autonomous. This research argues that the political interests can still retain the 
power by having the appropriate regulations in place, a view strongly supported by 
Fitzgerald and the other experts (2015). There are also inappropriate policies and ill-defined 
responsibilities given to the CEOs of public hospitals. There is generally a lack of support 
from provincial head offices as far as central, tertiary, regional and specialised hospitals are 
concerned and provincial district offices as far as district hospitals are concerned. These are 
important issues that have to be addressed at the highest levels of government. However, it 
seems with the current Minister of Health we may have the opportunity to turn the corner 
in improving hospital performance in areas of governance and responsibility through the 
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NHI White Paper even though clear implementation policies in this regard have still not 
been made public. 
 
Using another measure the WHO (2007: p2) defined six building blocks critical for an 
effective health system and these are: 
A good health system which delivers effective, safe, quality personal and non-
personal health interventions to those that need them, when and where needed 
with a minimum waste of resources; a well performing health workforce that 
operates in ways which are responsive, fair and efficient to achieve the best health 
outcomes possible; a well- functioning health information system; a well- functioning 
health system; a good financing system and good leadership and governance.  
 
Using these building blocks and viewing the hospital as a microcosm of the health system, 
the public hospitals and the CEOs perform poorly as well. Our current health system does 
not deliver effective and safe health care. We have an unacceptably high Infant Mortality 
Rate (IMPR) and Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) compared to countries that are similarly 
developed as us. We have inappropriate and understaffed health services. We have archaic 
health information systems and poor leadership and governance. In relation to the latter, 
and as mentioned before, we generally do not have governance structures that can hold 
officials accountable throughout the public sector. Power often rests with politicians and 
they meddle in service delivery rather than focussing on policy development and 
establishing regulatory frameworks (which should be their main function according to the 
experts). Interestingly the WHO does not use an NPM paradigm to inform its policy. It looks 
at the generic functioning of a good public health system and what is required to build it. 
This raises the question that we do not have to view the functioning of the health services 
nor that of the public hospitals only through an NPM lens but we can use other lenses such 
as the WHO building blocks framework. The White Paper largely ignores the 
recommendations of the WHO according to this research (although it makes a brief mention 
of them). But we can still use its principles while we phase in the NHI and as I pointed out 
before that if we just aim to improve productivity we can probably achieve just as much 
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gains as will be possible by re-engineering the entire system, a view I share with Van Den 
Heever (expert interview, 2015). 
 
The WHO approach confirms my opinion as informed by this research in that the problem is 
not only with the CEOs, it exists within the context and processes that they have to function 
within. There is a huge waste of resources in both time and money when decision making is 
centralised. This is further exacerbated by an inadequate workforce that includes support 
staff. There are insufficient financial and human resources delegations to CEOs. 
Furthermore, the current health information systems that should support timeous and 
appropriate decision making are not integrated and largely dysfunctional, the budgeting and 
financing systems currently used are inappropriate and often unworkable, the supply chain 
management systems are in a crisis and there is a lack of good political leadership and 
democratic governance generally. The NHI White Paper also acknowledges this but does not 
give clear cut strategies to improve these. 
 
The debate about the value of implementing NPM has to be revisited. The theoretical 
framework argues the case for public choice as one of the main theories informing NPM. 
Public choice is a branch of modern economics that assumes that public firms are inefficient, 
and, therefore, their role should be diminished (Bruntetto, Y, and Farr-Wharton, R., 2005). 
Moreover, they argue that public sector organisations that cannot be privatised (such as 
public hospitals) should adopt private sector management tools because they are more 
efficient and effective. However this has been questioned. I argue against the use of public 
choice theory as when you are sick (and poor) you do not have much choice in determining 
where you are going to get health care from. Inevitably it’s the most accessible public health 
service to you that determines where you go and this applies to the majority of South 
Africans (who are largely poor). Fitzgerald (expert interview, 2015) also believes that we 
don’t need to use the public choice theory to inform our use of NPM. He argues that there 
could be efficiency gains if NPM tools are used appropriately. This is in line with the 
managerialism approach to NPM where efficiency and effectiveness can be improved by 
using some private sector management mechanism but not necessarily privatisation. 
According to Rainey (1991, p. 131) the present day beliefs about “ private sector superiority 
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... have driven a massive amount of political and administrative activity and a substantial 
body of scholarly writing [yet] no one really know which assumptions are valid”. Hence 
there is also an emerging debate questioning the real impact of NPM. The post NPM 
paradigm is inclusive of a public value dimension and this is what now should be explored 
going forward. The current public sector reform and health sector reform in South Africa has 
lagged behind international trends in public management that have already embraced the 
public value paradigm as espoused by Bennington (2005) and Moore (1995). From the 
research it appears that we have to move beyond the NPM paradigm and begin to consider 
that as we develop a more accountable public service we need to look at what the public 
values and how do public services add value to the public. 
 
6.3 The main findings of this research 
 
The main finding of this research is that CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa are 
appropriately qualified and do have the appropriate experience to do their work well. This is 
contrary to the view of government, the DBSA and authors such as Awortwi (2006) in this 
regard. They are, however, are unable to function effectively because they have not been 
given the appropriate delegations to manage their finances, human resources and 
operational management requirements optimally. This in the view of CEOs and senior 
hospital managers is due to a lack of appropriate finances, delegations to make financial, 
human resource and operational management decisions and poor support from their 
respective head offices. There is also a lack of appropriate professional staff (from finances, 
human resources to health professionals) and effective accountability frameworks that is 
seen as key requirements for the implementation of NPM in developing countries (Awortwi, 
2006 and Cameron, 2009). There is a need to carefully delineate the responsibilities of the 
public hospital CEOs with a clear performance contracts that are carefully matched to the 
delegations that they are given. The experts in public management advise that we also need 
the appropriate leadership and democratic governance structures to support the CEOs in 
their work. I believe that the CEOs who participated in this study provide important insight 
as to why they cannot perform optimally. This is critical information that should be taken to 
the highest tiers of decision making in the provinces and the national department of health 
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so that their voices can be heard and that appropriate action to remedy the situation be 
taken. To me the most important contribution of this research is that to understand 
managerial challenges that are being faced in the delivery of public services generally and by 
public hospitals in particular is that of the ‘context’. In South Africa it is largely the political 
context that determines this. 
 
The value of adopting the NPM principles and practices also has to be questioned 
particularly within the South African public health sector context.  Although the underlying 
ideas that drive the global public management revolution may appear elegant i.e. give 
managers more flexibility, let (or make) them manage, hold them accountable for results, 
incorporate more market testing and private sector management techniques and so on. 
However, what is missing in the discourse are certain troubling elements of current 
government sector reform in South Africa. In particular the relationship between public 
managers and elected officials, the connections between managers’ performance and 
government budgets, and governments leverage over the private sector. The reluctance of 
politicians to decentralise is a recurring theme. Also the lack of appropriate governance 
structures is critical if we need to have appropriate accountability frameworks and these are 
yet to be established. Politicians according to the experts are reluctant to establish 
democratic governance structures in the main because they believe that they will lose 
power and control. Political meddling is probably the biggest challenge facing public 
managers in South Africa today. Whether the NHI White Paper will be implemented as 
planned in a phased approach to deal with these challenges may well be thwarted by 
political agendas at provincial level as is the current case of resistance of central hospitals to 
being made a national competency. So understanding the context is critical to the 
implementation of any policies in health sector reform and this is often largely ignored. 
 
In questioning if NPM is appropriate for Africa, Vyas-Doorgapersad (2011) in his review of its 
implementation in Africa has found this varied with varying degrees of success. 
Decentralisation and downsizing has largely been a failure according to this author. 
Contracting out and corporatisation has been successful in some countries in Africa. 
However the author argues that the application of NPM tools has to be context specific. 
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According to this research it is the political context that largely determines if NPM tools can 
be effectively used. 
 
Some of the other new techniques that have been adopted in some parts of Africa include 
performance management systems (Botswana, South Africa, Uganda); pay and grading 
reform ( Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea and Tanzania), operational and management control 
systems (South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius), total quality management and 
information and communication technologies in service delivery in many African countries. 
(Vyas Doorgapersad, 2011). These again have some successes but mostly have not been 
sustained. Larbi (1999) argues that the new public management approach may not be a 
panacea for the problems of public sector management particularly in crisis states, but a 
careful and selective adaptation of some elements to certain sectors may be beneficial. 
 
Therefore, in terms of this research and those mentioned above NPM principles tools should 
not be adopted as a blanket solution to deal with inefficient health systems. Specific NPM 
tools relevant to the South African context should be piloted before adopted as national 
policy. Some scepticism has to be maintained as we don’t have the human resources 
capacity (lack of professional bureaucracies) nor the information system infrastructure (e-
government) within the current public health sector to take on NPM wholeheartedly. NPM 
principles include the need for accountability and this governance principle of how to hold 
public institutions to account to the public is not being addressed adequately by 
government and less so in the health sector. The issue of governance and accountability 
within the prevailing political context is probably the most important issue that has to be 
addressed, even as regards the NHI, before we can see any real improvement in public 
service delivery and in particular public hospital management in South Africa. Consideration 
should also be given to the public value paradigm as we move away from the individual 
(public choice) to the involvement of the public in the future delivery of public health 
services. 
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6.4. Recommendations 
 
The CEOs made interesting recommendations when asked what advice they would give to 
government to assist them in performing better in their jobs.  They first qualified what they 
had to say by insisting that overall they are happy and committed to their work. They 
wanted to be able to act independently, able to fill posts, procure and maintain their 
services and infrastructure with sufficient budget. More than anything they say, what is 
needed are the appropriate “tools of the trade” and “finances, HR, goods and services that 
are adequate”.  They need realistic budgets, which are activity based, and they are willing to 
sign performance agreements that are related to explicit deliverables. 
 
The international recommendations on improving leadership and management in health 
services, resonates with what the CEOs want.  The WHO also elaborated further upon this in 
its series on “Making Health Systems Work”, in its Working Paper No. 10 (2007) called 
“Towards Better Leadership and Management in Health:  Report on an International 
Consultation on Strengthening Leadership and Management in Low-Income Countries. 29 
January – 1 February 2007, Accra, Ghana (WHO, 2007)” where it makes special mention in 
its proposed framework on the following as regards managers in the health services: 
 
Ensuring adequate numbers and deployment of managers throughout the health  
system; ensuring managers have appropriate competencies (knowledge, skills, 
attitudes and behaviours); the existence of a functional critical support system (to 
manage money, staff, information, supplies, etc.) and; creating an enabling working 
environment (w.r.t. roles and responsibilities, organisational context and rules, 
supervision and incentives, relationship with other actors). 
 
In terms of creating an enabling environment the WHO framework requires clarification of: 
the degree of autonomy; clear definition and communication; clarity of roles and 
responsibilities; a clear fit between roles and structures; existence of national standards; 
rules and procedures and so on. The report highlights and emphasises the importance of 
delegation of authority (over staff, budgets, etc.) as a particular challenge in the working 
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environment in the health sector and this resonates with this research’s main findings and 
recognises this as an international problem (WHO, 2007). What is important to note is that 
these recommendations are for traditional public health service bureaucracies and is 
independent of any NPM framework? So it also raises the point made before and that is that 
NPM tools are not the only solutions to move to more efficient health service delivery. 
 
The issue of competence of CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa has always been a 
vexing one for government. The DBSA report (2011), states that the obvious way of 
determining the competence of hospital CEOs and district managers would be to review 
individual and institutional performance data and compare these. Unfortunately reliable 
individual performance data was not available and given the number of factors contributing 
to overall institutional performance it was impossible to come to firm conclusions in their 
research. Thus based on their empirical research the DBSA study developed a health 
management competency framework, scorecard and assessment battery with which 
hospital CEOs and district managers were assessed. Their research hypothesised that the 
ideal profile of a hospital /district manager would comprise: health and business 
qualifications, and extensive experience within the public health system. This research 
findings do well when measured against these two criteria and I would hasten to say that in 
fact most hospitals in the public sector have appropriately qualified and experienced CEOs. 
The NDoH and DBSA had a predetermined idea that the CEOs were incompetent largely 
because they believed that they were ill qualified and inexperienced without any objective 
evidence in my opinion.  
 
The questions that I have regarding the DBSA study are that albeit interesting findings it 
does not deal with underlying contextual and structural issues that make CEOs 
underperform, a point also made by Van Den Heever (expert interview, 2015). Firstly it 
assumes that CEOs are functioning in an ideal world and secondly that their measurement 
tools are valid and reliable. The details of the tools are never clearly explained anywhere in 
the report, which is not in the public domain. The report did inform however the new policy 
on hospital management and subsequent re-advertising and re-employment of new CEOs 
across many hospitals and at a higher grade.   Another interesting finding of the DBSA work 
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was that when hospital CEOs and district managers were asked about delegations, that in 
terms of preferred delegations the hospital CEOs indicated a strong preference for HR 
delegations out of a choice of HR, Finance and Supply Chain Management delegations; 
whereas district managers expressed a preference for financial delegations. The CEOs in this 
study wanted both delegations and the concomitant accountability. But the biggest obstacle 
I found through this research was one of a political reluctance to do so. 
 
This research agrees with the DBSAs overall recommendations which required a range of 
differentiated interventions for hospital and district managers. These interventions 
according to the DBSA could include but are not limited to: training and development; 
mentorship and coaching; correct recruitment and succession planning. This will be even 
more critical as the NHI is rolled out to public hospitals and districts. The DBSA also confirms 
the findings of this research are that manager competence is only one amongst many 
systemic and institutional factors to consider but does not elaborate on these. 
 
It is certain from reading the international literature, experiences in Africa and South Africa 
and the findings of this study that recommendations to government need to be clear and 
strongly put. The new policy on the management of hospitals is not adequate in addressing 
the needs that are articulated by the CEOs in this research. It provides some framework but 
not sufficient detail. There needs to be a clear decision on the adoption of appropriate NPM 
principles and tools such as decentralisation, relevant performance management systems 
and the appropriate adoption of selected private sector mechanisms in order to achieve 
improved efficiency and productivity. Africa and South Africa have adopted aspects of NPM 
piecemeal according to Oluwu and Wunsch (2004) and Cameron (2009). The political 
context of countries in Africa is probably the key determinant as to whether its 
implementation will be successful or not. NPM emphasises results rather than input and 
processes. This can be supported by current audit mechanisms such as the core standard 
requirements of the OHSC which are intentionally developmental in improving the 
institutional capacity to function optimally. However the indicators that are measured by 
the OHSC are mainly input and process driven. We need performance indicators that are 
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output and outcome based and that links institutional performance to that of the managers 
and ultimately the CEOs of public hospitals. 
 
 There is an urgent need for clear policy on delegations that give CEOs appropriate control 
over the financial, human resources and operational management of their hospitals. This 
also urgently requires enabling legislation. The CEOs need appropriate budgets, human 
resources, health information systems and the necessary support from provincial head 
office to do their work efficiently. Key to their performance is having the appropriate 
professional and support staff to enable them to carry out their responsibilities. However, I 
believe and a view shared by the experts, that within the South African context the main 
way to hold services accountable is through the establishment of appropriate democratic 
governance structures first. This issue of governance and accountability is partially 
addressed by the draft legislation that was just released for public comment (South Africa, 
2015) but falls short of holding CEOs accountable for health outcomes. It may also take a 
long time to implement according to the research. There may be individual training 
requirements for some CEOs but they should be specific to the CEO and not generic for all 
CEOs. There may be a need to professionalise health service management and the public 
service more generally (Awortwi, 2006). This is an important NPM requirement which we 
have not achieved in the public health sector as yet. The CEOs need to be prepared for the 
NHI and the requirements of the OHSC and training and support may be required here. 
Finally, an appropriate performance management system for CEOs needs to be put in place 
where the CEOs are held to account for budget, human resources, operational management 
and as mentioned before, health outcomes.  
 
Internationally there is insufficient evidence that NPM Hospitals are more efficient than 
traditionally managed ones. (Alonso, Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes, 2013). According to these 
authors what did matter may be the management itself and not the management model. 
Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashburner and Fitzgerald (1996) document a whole series of NPM 
structural changes which were implemented in the 1980’s and 1990’s in the UK as part of an 
NPM study. One of the most important examples that they elaborate upon was the 
establishment of the internal market or quasi-market in the UK’s National Health Services 
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(NHS). What was interesting to note was that these authors concluded that this was a series 
of reforms within the NHS which had failed. This began with the abandonment of Regional 
Hospital Boards (too local), and their replacement by a three tier – Regional/ Area/ District – 
health authority structure (more national co-ordination) which was subsequently altered by 
the deletion of Area Health Authorities (too many tiers), the reduction in the overall number 
of Regional Health Authorities ( to establish a national executive), the subsequent abolition  
of District structures in favour of Hospital Trusts (which were to be more responsive to 
patients), the abandonment of Regional Health Authorities, and the replacement of Hospital 
Trusts by Foundation Hospitals (which were to be even more responsive to patient needs). 
(Webster, 1998). More recently Hood and Dixon (2015) published the findings of a 30 year 
review of NPM as implemented in the United Kingdom. Their main findings are that the 
United Kingdom does not have a government that works better and costs less. In fact, the 
government works slightly worse with respect to fairness and costs a bit more than before! 
 
CEOs, experts in public management and senior hospital managers interviewed in this 
research study overwhelmingly believe that the crises in South Africa’s hospitals can be 
overcome by appointing suitably qualified and experienced staff to support the CEOs, 
arming the CEOs with the required tools and powers to enable them to address the 
challenges of the job and setting up structures that will hold them accountable to the public.  
 
The CEOs through their collective voices as amplified by this research urgently require the 
government to ensure the adoption and implementation of Dr Motsoaledi’s 10 point plan. 
This requires eliminating the systemic blockages indicated in this research and currently 
extant, addressing the lack of proper delegations, through redrafted clear policy, as well as 
the serious legislative constraints facing CEOs of hospitals. Eliminating the politics and 
political gatekeepers at provincial level, by closer adherence to the recommendations 
geared to empower CEOs and managers, as well as to be able to hold them to account, is 
the solution. Finally the government needs to question its commitment to the NPM 
paradigm and if so does it adopt elements of it which it finds useful. The feasibility of NHI 
structures as informed by the NPM paradigm in particular as regards purchaser-provider 
splits need to be tested within the South African context before it is widely implemented. 
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My final recommendations to government as regards public health services is that 
consideration be given to embracing the public value paradigm in its future planning and 
deliberations. In my opinion the public value approach argues for much more public 
accountability than the NPM paradigm ever did.   
 
6.5. Directions for future research 
 
This study contributes to the debates and critiques around decentralisation and the 
required autonomy of management in public hospitals. It gives insights into the challenges 
faced by CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa. However, more research needs to be done 
in areas such as: 
Developing theories on how public institutions such as hospitals function in South Africa, in 
relation to new governance structures and appropriate accountability frameworks in 
particular, 
Conduct comparative studies with other public institutions that face similar challenges as 
regards lack of decentralisation and lack of enabling legislation, 
Examine the changing organisational cultures of public institutions since 1994 and how it 
informed health sector reform, 
Explore the impact of the NHI on the future functioning of public hospitals and the roles of 
CEOs in the future dispensation through the lens of NPM. 
Question the validity of NPM in today’s public sector environment in South Africa 
considering global trends towards an emphasis on public value as the new discourse of 
public management. 
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Annexure 1: Chief Executive Officers of Public Hospitals Questionnaire Survey 
Please fill in the required information and place a tick or a cross in your answer? 
General Information:  Study ID Code: …………………………………..  
HOSPITAL Tick: (District), (Regional), (Tertiary), (Central). 
Province: …………………………Years working: ………………… 
Demographics: Age in years………… Sex…………. Race…………….. 
Educational Qualifications……………………………………… 
   
Question Yes No Don’t Know 
1. Are you familiar with Departmental policies that 
govern the way you manage? 
   
2. Are there Performance Management Systems for 
CEOs in public hospitals in place in your province? 
   
3. Are there management delegation guidelines for 
CEOs in place in your province?  
   
4. What are CEOs in your province measured against? Yes No Don’t Know 
• Budget    
• Staffing    
• Quality of Care    
• Health Outcomes of patients    
5. In your opinion are you able to manage your hospital 
effectively in the current circumstances? 
   
6. In your opinion do you have sufficient delegations to 
manage your hospital effectively in respect of: 
Yes No Don’t Know 
• Budget    
• Staffing    
7. In your opinion are there areas of your performance 
as CEO that can be improved with respect to: 
Yes No Don’t 
 
• Budget    
• Staffing    
• Quality of Care    
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General Information:  Study ID Code: …………………………………..  
HOSPITAL Tick: (District), (Regional), (Tertiary), (Central). 
Province: …………………………Years working: ………………… 
Demographics: Age in years………… Sex…………. Race…………….. 
Educational Qualifications……………………………………… 
   
Question Yes No Don’t Know 
• Health Outcomes of patients    
8. What in your opinion are the main criteria for 
assessing CEOs performance in the public sector? 
Yes No Don’t Know 
• Budget control and/or    
• Health Outcomes of patients    
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Annexure 2: Information Sheet (Questionnaire only) 
 
Information Sheet for Informed Consent: Questionnaire Survey 
Chief Executive Officers and Public Hospital Management in South Africa. 
 
Hello. My name is Shan Naidoo and I am doing my PhD with the Graduate School of Public 
and Development Management, based at the University of the Witwatersrand. I am doing a 
study to understand the management challenges facing CEOs of public hospitals in South 
Africa. I am inviting you to participate in this study, which is a survey using a self 
administered questionnaire, because I believe that you can provide important insights into 
the challenges facing CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa? 
 
What is the purpose of our study? 
The study will look at how CEOs view their management effectiveness and what are the 
constraints that impede effective management of hospitals and what are the possible 
solutions. I will look at how important management decisions are made. In other words, I 
am exploring management challenges in selected hospitals in South Africa: and in particular 
management effectiveness in the delivery of hospital services and decision-making to 
provide such services. As part of this overall study, I am interested in the views of CEOs in 
particular. You are one of 60 CEOs that have been randomly selected by me and all your 
inputs for this self- administered questionnaire will be kept confidential. 
 
Why have you been invited to take part?  
You have been invited to take part because of your involvement in the MPH Hospital 
Management programme at the School of Public Health and that as a CEO of a public 
hospital with substantial experience I believe that you will provide insightful views on the 
management challenges facing CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
202 
 
 
 
 
 
What procedures are involved?   
I will ask you to answer a questionnaire (that will be e-mailed or faxed to you) that briefly 
explores your views on management effectiveness,  what does this mean to you, and 
management delegations and performance management, are they sufficient or not? 
Do you have to answer this questionnaire?  
No. You can refuse to answer this questionnaire. Even if you agree, you can change your 
mind at any time. Your non-participation or withdrawal from this study will not prejudice 
you in any way. 
 
What are the risks of taking part in this questionnaire? 
You may worry that I am testing you on how much you know about management 
effectiveness. This is not the case. Rather, I hope to identify those areas where management 
responsibilities, delegations and its current effectiveness may have to be clarified, or even 
changed. 
 
What are the benefits?  
There are no direct benefits to participants. It is possible that taking part in the study will 
assist us in informing the authorities as to what the challenges facing CEOs of public 
hospitals are and what can be done to improve them. The study has three components 
which are made up of the following: 
1. A questionnaire survey of 60 CEOs randomly drawn from the MPH class list so that I 
have few CEOs each from Gauteng, Limpopo, Free State, Northern Cape and 
Mpumalanga Province (to have a quantitative understanding of the management 
challenges and delegations that you have). This informed consent information sheet is 
for your participation in this aspect of the study. 
2. An in-depth interview of 12 CEOs drawn from the 60 who participated in the 
questionnaire survey and who have agreed to participate in a more in-depth interview 
(which will address the qualitative aspect of the study). You may indicate now if you 
wish to participate in this aspect of the study which will be done later. 
3. A focus group discussion with four CEOs involved in the in-depth interviews and who 
have agreed to participate in the focus group discussion (and to explore qualitatively 
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how they view the challenges facing them). You may also indicate your interest now to 
as to whether you would like to participate in this aspect of the study. In the long run, 
we also hope that recommendations for improved guidelines will make for clearer 
direction on this issue.  
 
What will happen to the data and how will confidentiality be maintained? 
All data will be kept confidential. Only grouped data will be reported upon so identification 
of individuals viewpoints will not be able to be done.  Your name and other identifying 
details will not be stored together with any data. The questionnaire data will be stored 
safely, that is, in a locked cabinet, and electronic records will be password protected. The 
data will be kept in storage in de-identified form and not destroyed. 
What will happen to the results? 
Results will be included in:  
 My PhD 
 Academic publications in open access journals; and  
 Conference presentations 
 Report back to all the participants (- you will be able to see the results and a 
summary report) 
 
What do you need to do? 
If you agree to participate, we will need you to sign the informed consent form below and 
return the self- administered questionnaire to me. The questionnaire will take about 15 to 
30 minutes.  If you need to discuss any questions you may have about the study please 
contact me. This may be in person or over the phone or by email. You may also want to 
indicate your willingness to participate in the two follow-up studies (the in-depth interviews 
and focus group discussions) and you can do so by placing the X in the appropriate box in 
the declaration form attached. 
 
Will participants be paid?  
Persons who take part in the questionnaire survey will not be paid. 
Was this study ethically approved? 
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This study proposal was approved by the HREC (the Human Research Ethics Committee: 
Non-Medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand. 
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
For questions related to the study, please contact me Shan Naidoo at 011 717 2614 or email 
me at shan.naidoo@wits.ac.za 
 
Please fill this written consent document and the questionnaire survey and fax it to me at 
011 717 2084 or scan and e-mail it to me at shan.naidoo@wits.ac.za 
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DECLARATION from CEOs (CONFIDENTIAL) 
 
Consent to take part 
 
I, _________________ ______________________________________ (full names of 
participant) confirm that I understand this consent form and the nature of the study and 
agree to take part in: 
 
 Insert X 
The questionnaire survey on management effectiveness and delegations 
of CEOs in public hospitals? 
 
If invited I agree to participate in the in-depth interviews to follow the 
survey? 
 
If invited I agree to participate in the focus group discussion?  
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: _________________________________      
                                                Code: ______________     
DATE: __________________________ 
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Annexure 3: Information Sheet (Interviews) 
 
Information Sheet for Informed Consent: Interview Survey 
Chief Executive Officers and Public Hospital Management in South Africa. 
 
Hello. My name is Shan Naidoo and I am doing my PhD with the Graduate School of Public 
and Development Management, based at the University of the Witwatersrand. You may 
remember that I had sought your permission earlier when I sent you a self- administered 
questionnaire where you agreed to participate in subsequent research. However as 
informed consent is a continuous process I wish to reaffirm your participation in my 
proposed research as well as inform you what the study is about. 
 
What is the purpose of our study? 
The study will look at how CEOs view their management effectiveness and what are the 
constraints that impede effective management of hospitals and what are the possible 
solutions.  As part of this overall study, I am interested in the views of CEOs in particular. 
You are one of 12 CEOs that have been purposively selected by me and that has agreed to 
be interviewed. All your inputs for this interview will be kept confidential. 
 
Why have you been invited to take part?  
You have been invited to take part because of your involvement in the MPH Hospital 
Management programme at the School of Public Health and that as a CEO of a public 
hospital with substantial experience I believe that you will provide insightful views on the 
management challenges facing CEOs of public hospitals in South Africa.  
 
What procedures are involved?   
I will ask you to answer a few in-depth questions that explore  your views on management 
effectiveness at your hospital, performance management, challenges in management at 
your hospital, management delegations, are they sufficient or not, and how to manage 
better if given the opportunity. 
Do you have to answer this questionnaire?  
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No. You can refuse to be interviewed. Even if you agree, you can change your mind at any 
time. You will not be prejudiced in any way if you do not participate. 
 
What are the risks of taking part in these interviews? 
There are no risks in you taking part in this survey. All information will be kept confidential 
and only thematic analysis of your opinions will be done together with the inputs of the 
other CEOs being interviewed. Your interviews will be kept in de-identified form by me. 
 
What are the benefits?  
There are no direct benefits to participants. It is possible that taking part in the study will 
assist us in informing the authorities as to what the challenges facing CEOs of public 
hospitals are and what can be done to improve them.  
 
What will happen to the data and how will confidentiality be maintained? 
All data will be kept confidential. Only grouped data will be reported upon so identification 
of individuals viewpoints will not be able to be done.  Your name and other identifying 
details will not be stored together with any data. The interview data will be stored safely, 
that is, in a locked cabinet, and electronic records will be password protected. All the data 
will be kept securely by myself.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
As mentioned before the results will be included in my PhD; academic publications; 
conference presentations and a report back to all the participants (you will be able to see 
the results and a summary report) 
 
What do you need to do? 
If you agree to participate, we will need you to sign the informed consent form below and 
return it to me. You are free to call me to discuss any questions you may have about the 
study with me. The interview will be done by myself at a time and place convenient to you 
and may take about one to two hours.  Because the interviews will be taped I will ask for 
your permission separately for audio taping  in another form. 
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Will participants be paid?  
Persons who take part in the in-depth interviews will not be paid. 
 
Was this study ethically approved? 
This study proposal was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) 
at the University of the Witwatersrand before it was implemented.  
 
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
For questions related to the study, please contact me Shan Naidoo at 011 717 2614 or email 
me at shan.naidoo@wits.ac.za 
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Annexure 5: Interview guide for CEOs  
Study Title: Chief Executive Officers and Public Hospital Management in South Africa. 
 
1. What are the major challenges that you face as a CEO of a public hospital? 
 Prompt on: Finance; Human Resources; Operational management issues; and other? 
 
2. Do you have departmental policies and procedures that govern how you manage?       
 Prompt on: What are they about (get a copy)?  Do they assist or hinder you? 
 
3. Are Performance Management Systems in place at the hospital? 
Prompt on: Who do they apply to (get a copy)? If they apply to you what are its 
implications? Do they assist or hinder you? Do they measure quality of care? 
 
4. Ask what are your delegated authorities? In respect of: Budget; Human Resources, 
Procurement and Supplies; Operational management and any other? 
 
5. What recommendations would you like to make to government that will enable you to 
manage your hospital better?  
 Probe in relation to current government policies such as PFMA, NHI and policies on 
hospital management? 
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Annexure 6: Consent for audio taping 
(Template for in-depth interviews and focus group discussions) 
 
Consent for Audio Taping 
 
I hereby confirm that I have been informed by the researcher, Shan Naidoo, about the 
nature, conduct, benefits and risks of the study. I have also received, read and understood 
the written participant sheet.     
I understand that I can decide whether or not the interview/ focus group discussions will be 
tape recorded and that there will be no prejudicial consequences for me if I do not want the 
interview to be recorded. I understand that if the interview/focus group discussion is tape-
recorded that the tape will be safely stored for five years after the interview has been 
transcribed, and then destroyed. I understand that I can ask the person interviewing me to 
stop tape recording, and to stop the participating altogether, at any time.   
I hereby give my written consent to be tape recorded. 
 
 
 
Participant 
_____________________                               _________________________      
Print Name                                                       Signature                                         Date  
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Annexure 7: Focus Group discussion guide  
 
Study Title: Chief Executive Officers and Public Hospital Management in South Africa. 
After each probing question, reflect on the in-depth interview findings and assess if there is 
consensus or if a new argument is developing? 
1. What are the major challenges that you all face as a CEO of a public hospital? 
Prompt on Finance; Human Resources; Operational management issues 
 
2. Do you have departmental policies, delegations (new) and procedures that determine 
how you work? Reflect on NPM principles? What are they about (clarify)? Do they assist 
or hinder you (clarify)? 
 
3. Are Performance Management Systems in place at the hospital? 
Who do they apply to (clarify)? 
If they apply to you what are its implications? 
Do they assist or hinder you? 
Do they measure quality of care? 
 
4. What is happening in the current public service (Public Service Regulations) and National 
Health (Insurance) Scenario that may affect the way you manage hospitals? 
 
5. What recommendations would you like to make to government that will enable you to 
manage your hospital better? Probe in relation to current government policies such as 
PFMA, NHI and policies on hospital management?  
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Annexure 8: Informed Consent for In-depth Interviews  
 
DECLARATION (CONFIDENTIAL) 
Consent to take part 
I, _________________ ______________________________________ (full names of 
participant) confirm that I understand this consent form and the nature of the study and 
agree to take part in: 
 
 Insert X 
I agree to participate in the in-depth interviews to follow the survey?  
If invited I agree to participate in the focus group discussion?  
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: _________________________________      
                                                Code: ______________     
 
  DATE: _________________________ 
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Annexure 9: Information Sheet (Expert Interviews) 
Information Sheet for Informed Consent: Interview Survey 
Re: Chief Executive Officers and Public Hospital Management in South Africa. 
 
Hello. My name is Shan Naidoo and I am doing my PhD with the Graduate School of Public 
and Development Management, based at the University of the Witwatersrand. I wish to 
reaffirm your participation in my proposed research as well as inform you what the study is 
about. 
What is the purpose of our study? 
The study will look at how CEOs view their management effectiveness and what are the 
constraints that impede effective management of hospitals and what are the possible 
solutions.  As part of this overall study, I am interested in the views of experts in this area 
particular. You are one of 3 experts that have been purposively selected by me and that has 
agreed to be interviewed. All your inputs for this interview will be reported upon. 
Why have you been invited to take part?  
As an expert in the space of governance, public services and perhaps NPM I believe that you 
will provide insightful views on the management challenges facing CEOs of public hospitals 
in South Africa.  
 
What procedures are involved?   
I will ask you to answer a few in-depth questions that explore  your views on policy and 
administrative context of current public sector reform and health sector reform. I am also 
interested in your views on CEOs management effectiveness public hospitals, the value of 
performance management, challenges in management delegations, are they sufficient or 
not, and how to manage better. 
Do you have to answer this questionnaire?  
No. You can refuse to be interviewed. Even if you agree, you can change your mind at any 
time. You will not be prejudiced in any way if you do not participate. 
What are the risks of taking part in these interviews? 
There are some risks in you taking part in this survey. All information will be made public 
and you will be identified in the research. Also, thematic analysis of your opinions will be 
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done together with the inputs of the other experts being interviewed. Your interviews will 
be captured by audiotaping it. 
What are the benefits?  
There are no direct benefits to participants. It is possible that taking part in the study will 
assist us in informing the authorities as to what the challenges facing CEOs of public 
hospitals are and what can be done to improve them.  
What will happen to the data and how will confidentiality be maintained? 
All original data will be kept confidential. Only pertinent data will be reported upon. Your 
name and other identifying details will not be stored together with any data. The interview 
data will be stored safely, that is, in a locked cabinet, and electronic records will be 
password protected. All the data will be kept securely by myself.  
What will happen to the results? 
As mentioned before the results will be included in my PhD; academic publications; 
conference presentations and a report back to all the participants (you will be able to see 
the results and a summary report) 
What do you need to do? 
If you agree to participate, we will need you to sign the informed consent form below and 
return it to me. You are free to call me to discuss any questions you may have about the 
study with me. The interview will be done by myself at a time and place convenient to you 
and may take about one to two hours.  Because the interviews will be taped I will ask for 
your permission separately for audio taping. 
Will participants be paid?  
Persons who take part in the in-depth interviews will not be paid. 
Was this study ethically approved? 
This study proposal was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) 
at the University of the Witwatersrand before it was implemented.  
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
For questions related to the study, please contact me Shan Naidoo at 011 717 2614 or email 
me at shan.naidoo@wits.ac.za 
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Annexure 10: DECLARATION by CEOs (CONFIDENTIAL) 
 
Consent to take part 
 
I, _________________ ______________________________________ (full names of 
participant) confirm that I understand this consent form and the nature of the study and 
agree to take part in: 
 
 Insert X 
I agree to participate in the focus group discussion?  
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT: _________________________________      
                                                Code: ______________     
 
  DATE: _________________________ 
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Annexure 11: DECLARATION by Experts (CONFIDENTIAL) 
 
Consent to take part 
 
I, _________________ ______________________________________ (full names of 
participant) confirm that I understand this consent form and the nature of the study and 
agree to take part in: 
 
 Insert X 
I agree to participate in the expert interview?  
If invited I agree to have my interview audiotaped  
 
Signature…………………………………………………………………Date……………………20…………… 
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Annexure 12:    Interview guide for experts: 
 
1. We have a situation where hospitals don't function because CEOs are held 
responsible for all the outcomes in their hospital, yet have no authority, can't initiate 
anything, in the two key areas of Finance and HR.  
 
2. How did we get here, from the original ideals for govt decentralisation and 
autonomy, in 1994?  
 
3. What was govt.s intention as regards NPM and where are we now, and why? 
 
4. Power is still centralised? Probe on political interference? 
 
 
5. Why has it taken so long to delegate?  Probe – is it governments intention? 
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Annexure 13: Interview guide for senior hospital manager’s focus group: 
 
1. CEOs of public hospitals that I have interviewed have said that the main challenges 
facing them are finance, human resources, and operational management and 
communication systems. They say that the main reason is the lack of delegations. 
What are your opinions in this regard? 
 
2. Can you comment on this – there can be no delegations without accountability – 
probe on current or proposed accountability structures if any? 
 
 
3. What is govt.s intention as regards NHI and public hospitals, and why? 
 
4. Power is still centralised? Probe on political interference if any? 
 
 
5. Why has it taken so long to delegate?  Probe – is it governments intention? 
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Annexure 14: DECLARATION by senior hospital managers (CONFIDENTIAL) 
Consent to take part 
 
I, _________________ ______________________________________ (full names of 
participant) confirm that I understand this consent form and the nature of the study and 
agree to take part in: 
 
 Insert X 
I agree to participate in the expert interview?  
If invited I agree to have my interview audiotaped  
 
Signature…………………………………………………………………Date……………………20…………… 
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Annexure 15: Information Sheet (Focus group discussion with senior hospital managers) 
 
Re: Chief Executive Officers and Public Hospital Management in South Africa 
 
Hello. My name is Shan Naidoo and I am doing my PhD with the Graduate School of Public 
and Development Management, based at the University of the Witwatersrand. I am inviting 
you to participate again in this study, which is the focus group discussion of selected senior 
hospital managers and their views on the challenges CEOs face in the management of public 
hospitals. 
 
What is the purpose of our study? 
This part of the study will look at how senior hospital managers as a collective view their 
management effectiveness and what are the constraints that impede effective management 
of hospitals and what are the possible solutions. As part of this overall study, I am interested 
in your views within a group situation in particular. You are one of four senior hospital 
managers that have been puropsefully selected by me and that has agreed to be part of this 
process where we interrogate opinions as a group and perhaps get some group consensus 
going forward. 
 
Why have you been invited to take part?  
As a senior hospital manager of a public hospital you have substantial experience that I 
believe will provide insightful views on the management challenges facing CEOs of public 
hospitals in South Africa.  
 
What procedures are involved?   
I will ask you as a part of a group of senior hospital managers to answer a few questions that 
explores your group views on management effectiveness at your hospital, performance 
management, challenges in management at your hospital, management delegations, and 
how to manage better if given the opportunity.  
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Do you have to participate in the focus group discussion?  
No. You can refuse to be part of the focus group discussions. Even if you agree, you can 
change your mind at any time. You will not be prejudiced in any way for non-participation. 
 
What are the risks of taking part in the focus group discussion? 
I hope to identify those challenges faced by you as a group of senior hospital managers, your 
current performance management systems and do these impede or assist you in carrying 
out your jobs as well as your management delegations and its current effectiveness. I also 
want to have a sense of your collective view of these challenges and how they may be 
remedied. The only risk is that in a focus group discussion we cannot guarantee 
confidentiality, but all of the data will be presented anonymously in my report.  
 
What are the benefits?  
There are no direct benefits to participants. It is possible that taking part in the study will 
assist us in informing the authorities as to what the challenges facing CEOs and senior 
hospital managers of public hospitals are and what can be done to improve them from your 
perspectives? 
 
What will happen to the data and how will confidentiality be maintained? 
 I cannot guarantee the confidentiality of focus group discussion as you all know one 
another. However, all the data that I collect will be kept confidential. Only grouped data will 
be reported upon so identification of individuals viewpoints will not be able to be done.  
Your name and other identifying details will not be stored together with any data. The focus 
group data will be stored safely, that is, in a locked cabinet, and electronic records as well as 
audio taping will be safely protected.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
As indicated before the results will be included in my PhD, academic publications 
conference presentations and a report back to all the participants (you will be able to see 
the results and a summary report). 
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What do you need to do? 
If you agree to participate, you will need to sign the informed consent form below and 
return it to me. You may want to discuss any questions you may have about the study with 
me. The facilitation of the focus group discussions will be done by myself at a time and place 
convenient to you and may take about one to two hours.   
 
Will participants be paid?  
Persons who take part in the focus group discussions will not be paid. However your travel 
and accommodation costs will be covered by the study. 
 
Was this study ethically approved? 
This study proposal was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical) 
at the University of the Witwatersrand before it was implemented. 
 
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
For questions related to the study, please contact me Shan Naidoo at 011 717 2614 or email 
me at shan.naidoo@wits.ac.za 
 
